THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, USA
An Online Journal of Political Commentary & Analysis
Volume VIII, Issue # 208, October 27, 2006
Dr. Almon Leroy Way, Editor
Government Committed to & Acting in Accord with Conservative Principles
Ensures a Nation's Strength, Progress, & Prosperity
WHY WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ IS THE WORST OPTION
By Dr. Michael Rubin
THE WAR IN IRAQ & UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: WHAT MUST BE DONE IN IRAQ TO BRING ABOUT PEACE &
STABILITY: IMPROVE LONGTERM
SECURITY IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH & MAINTAIN AN ORDERLY SOCIETY, THE RULE OF LAW, & A TRULY CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM -- COUNTER THE MILITIAS THROUGH ROBUST DISRUPTION OF SUPPLY & OPERATIONS --
PRESS THE IRAQI LEGISLATURE TO ABANDON PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION & PARTY LISTS IN FAVOR OF POPULAR
ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECTLY-ELECTED LEGISLATORS FROM GEOGRAPHIC CONSTITUENCIES
FULL STORY:
The news from Iraq is bad, but many of the recommendations coming from London and Washington are worse. Dividing Iraq
would abet ethnic cleansing and break the country into morsels more easily digested by neighbouring states. Outreach to
Iran and Syria is no panacea: Tehran and Damascus treat diplomatic commitment with disdain; Iran's revolutionary guards
seldom abide by the promises of Iranian diplomats.
Imposing a strong man to govern is easier said than done: while Iraqis support the concept, consensus quickly breaks down;
Iraq is a country with 100 would-be generals for every private. There is no magical political formula. Compromise is undercut
both by maximalist demands and a growing belief that violence leads to concession. Withdrawal is the worst option: it would
enable terrorism to flourish not only in Iraq, but around the world.
Solutions in Iraq require precise treatment of the problems. One in six Iraqis fled the country under Saddam Hussein. Those
who settled in the West had no cultural impediment to democracy. This suggests the problem in Iraq is not democracy, but,
rather, the rule of law. Any solution to the Iraq quagmire, therefore, requires improving security, not creating a vacuum. The
greatest impediment to the rule of law in Iraq is not the insurgency, still relatively localised, but the militias. These exist for
one reason: to impose through force what citizens are unwilling to volunteer through the ballot box.
To improve security, the Coalition must improve the police and eviscerate the militias. The problems are related. The Interior
Ministry has become a refuge for militiamen and a cover for death squads. As the Coalition did with the reconstituted Iraqi
Army, the Coalition troops must embed with the police at every level. There should not be any police checkpoint that does
not include Coalition soldiers, nor should there be any Interior Ministry raid conducted without a Coalition supervisor
outside. This requires resolving a catch-22: the Coalition does not station its troops with the police because of inadequate
security, but the driving forces of this insecurity are the police. If security is the goal, there is no shortcut.
A related lesson is that desire for shortterm calm cannot trump the quest for longterm security. While it has become
conventional wisdom that de-Baathification, the initial removal of Saddam Hussein's Baathist Party members from authority,
sparked insurgency, the data show violence to be proportional to that policy's subsequent reversal. In Mosul, U.S. General
David Petraeus spoke of reconciliation when he appointed senior Baathist General Mohammed Kheiri Barhawi to be that
city's Police Chief. He portrayed Mosul as a model of calm. But the peace was illusionary. General Barhawi was unreformed.
He used his position to provide intelligence, equipment, and arms to terrorists. In November, 2004, he handed the keys of
every police station in the city over to insurgents.
What General Petraeus did in the north, British commanders replicated in the south. While successive British commanders
juxtaposed their non-confrontational strategy with more heavy-handed American tactics, the British approach sacrificed
longterm stability for the sake of shortterm calm. Rather than pacify southern Iraq, the British Army enabled militias to
entrench. Contrary to the belief of General Sir Richard Dannatt, the British Army Chief, occupation itself is not responsible
for the deteriorating situation in Iraq, but, rather, the fact that militias have grown secure enough to believe themselves
capable of defeating the British army.
Countering the militias need not require immediate confrontation, but, rather, more robust disruption of supply and
operations. Both big Shia militias receive support from Iran. In 1992, the U.S. forced down an Iranian aircraft ferrying men,
money, and weapons to Bosnia. Such operations in Iraq lack only political will: U.S. and British intelligence are well aware
of Iranian supply lines.
It would be a mistake to abandon democracy. To do so would reaffirm the worst conspiracy theories about Coalition
intentions and drive Iraq into the arms of neighbouring states. Still, there is room for improvement in the election system.
The current system of proportional representation encourages populist rhetoric, empowers political parties that sponsor
militias, and encourages parties to form on ethnic and sectarian lines. The Coalition should press the Iraqi legislature to
abandon party lists in favour of directly-elected legislators from geographic constituencies. This would make Iraqi
politicians more accountable to constituents than party leaders, but encourage them to discuss more the problems of
security, electricity and schools, rather than spout corrosive rhetoric.
As violence spreads in Iraq, politicians are right to change course. But abandoning the Iraqis should not be an option.
Rather, Coalition strategy should address the rule of law directly, and remain cognisant that the war in Iraq has broader
repercussions. While many in Britain and Europe believe war in Iraq to be illegal, they should not sacrifice ordinary
Iraqis on the altar of anti-Americanism.
LINKS TO RELATED TOPICS:
The Middle East & the Problem of Iraq
Page Two
Page One
The Problem of Rogue States:
Iraq as a Case History
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
Middle East -- Arabs, Arab States,
& Their Middle Eastern Neighbors
Islamism & Jihadism -- The Threat of Radical Islam
Page Three
Page Two
Page One
War & Peace in the Real World
Page Two
Page One
Islamist Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.A.
Osama bin Laden & the Islamist Declaration of War
Against the U.S.A. & Western Civilization
Islamist International Terrorism &
U.S. Intelligence Agencies
Counterterrorism & U.S. National Security
U.S. National Security Strategy
Dr. Michael Rubin, a Ph.D. in History (Yale University) and a specialist in Middle Eastern politics, Islamic culture and Islamist
ideology, is Editor of the Middle East Quarterly and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. Dr Rubin is author of Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami's Iran (Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 2001) and is co-author, with Dr. Patrick Clawson, of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005). Dr. Rubin served as political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad (2003-2004); staff
advisor on Iran and Iraq in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (2002-2004); visiting lecturer in the Departments of
History and International Relations at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2001-2002); visiting lecturer at the Universities of
Sulaymani, Salahuddin, and Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan (2000-2001); Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy (1999-2000); and visiting lecturer in the Department of History at Yale University (1999-2000). He has been a fellow at
the Council of Foreign Relations, the Leonard Davis Institute at Hebrew University, and the Carnegie Council on Ethics and
International Affairs.
The foregoing article by Dr. Rubin was originally published in the Financial Times, October 26, 2006, and can be found
on the Internet website maintained by the Middle East Forum.
Republished with Permission of the Middle East Forum
Reprinted from the Middle East Forum News
mefnews@meforum.org (MEF NEWS)
October 26, 2006
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