By virtue of its power ``to ordain and establish'' courts, Congress has occasionally created courts under Article III to exercise a specialized jurisdiction. These tribunals are like other Article III courts in that they exercise ``the judicial power of the United States,'' and only that power, that their judges must be appointed by the President and the Senate and must hold office during good behavior subject to removal by impeachment only, and that the compensation of their judges cannot be diminished during their continuance in office. One example of such courts was the Commerce Court created by the Mann- Elkins Act of 1910,\37\ which was given exclusive jurisdiction of all cases to enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission except those involving money penalties and criminal punishment, of cases brought to enjoin, annul, or set aside orders of the Commission, of cases brought under the act of 1903 to prevent unjust discriminations, and of all mandamus proceedings authorized by the act of 1903. This court actually functioned for less than three years, being abolished in 1913, as was mentioned above.

NOTE:

Another court of specialized jurisdiction, but created for a limited time only, was the Emergency Court of Appeals organized by the Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942.\38\ By the terms of the statute, this court consisted of three or more judges designated by the Chief Justice from the judges of the Untied States district courts and circuit courts of appeal. The Court was vested with jurisdiction and powers of a district court to hear appeals filed within thirty days against denials of protests by the Price Administrator and with exclusive jurisdiction to set aside regulations, orders, or price schedules, in whole or in part, or to remand the proceeding, but the court was tightly constrained in its treatment of regulations. There was interplay with the district courts, which were charged with authority to enforce orders issued under the Act, although only the Emergency Court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of such orders.\39\

NOTES:

\39\In Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943), the limitations on the use of injunctions, except the prohibition against interlocutory decrees, was unanimously sustained.
      A similar court was created to be utilized in the enforcement of the economic controls imposed by President Nixon in 1971. P.L. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743, 211(b). Although controls ended in 1974, see 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1904 note, Congress continued the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and gave it new jurisdiction. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, P.L. 93-159, 87 Stat. 633, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 754, incorporating judicial review provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act. The Court was abolished, effective March 29, 1993, by P. L. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506.
      Another similar specialized court was created by Sec. 209 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, P. L. 93-226, 87 Stat. 999, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 719, to review the final system plan under the Act. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases(Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp.), 419 U.S. 102 (1974).

Other specialized courts are the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is in many respects like the geographic circuits. Created in 1982,\40\ this court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the United States Court of Federal Claims, from the Federal Merit System Protection Board, the Court of International Trade, the Patent Office in patent and trademark cases, and in various contract and tort cases. The Court of International Trade, which began life as the Board of General Appraisers, became the United States Customs Court in 1926, and was declared an Article III court in 1956, came to its present form and name in 1980.\41\ The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, staffed by federal judges from other courts, is authorized to transfer actions pending in different districts to a single district for trial.\42\

NOTES:

\41\Act of Oct. 10, 1980, 94 Stat. 1727.

\42\28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407.

To facilitate the gathering of foreign intelligence information, through electronic surveillance, search and seizure, as well as other means, Congress authorized in 1978 a special court, composed of seven regular federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice, to receive applications from the United States and to issue warrants for intelligence activities.\43\

NOTE:

Even greater specialization is provided by the special court created by the Ethics in Government Act;\44\ the court is charged, upon the request of the Attorney General, with appointing an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute charges of illegality in the Executive Branch. The court also has certain supervisory powers over the independent counsel.

NOTE:

Legislative courts, so-called because they are created by Congress in pursuance of its general legislative powers, have comprised a significant part of the federal judiciary.\45\ The distinction between constitutional courts and legislative courts was first made in American Ins. Co. v. Canter,\46\ which involved the question of the admiralty jurisdiction of the territorial court of Florida, the judges of which were limited to a four-year term in office. Said Chief Justice Marshall for the Court: ``These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3rd article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States.''\47\ The Court went on to hold that admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the States only in those courts which are established in pursuance of Article III but that the same limitation does not apply to the territorial courts, for in legislating for them ``Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government.''\48\

NOTES:

\45\In Freytag v. CIR, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), a controverted decision held Article I courts to be ``Courts of Law'' for purposes of the appointments clause. Art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2. See id., 888-892 (majority opinion), and 901-914 (Justice Scalia dissenting).

\46\1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511 (1828).

\47\Id., 546.

\48\In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-545 (1962), Justice Harlan asserted that Chief Justice Marshall in the Canter case ``did not mean to imply that the case heard by the Key West court was not one of admiralty jurisdiction otherwise properly justiciable in a Federal District Court sitting in one of the States. . . . All the Chief Justice meant . . . is that in the territories cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard to the limitations of that article. . . .''

Canter postulated a simple proposition: ``Constitutional courts exercise the judicial power described in Art. III of the Constitution; legislative courts do not and cannot.''\49\ A two-fold difficulty attended this proposition, however. Admiralty jurisdiction is included within the ``judicial power of the United States'' specifically in Article III, requiring an explanation how this territorial court could receive and exercise it. Second, if territorial courts could not exercise Article III power, how might their decisions be subjected to appellate review in the Supreme Court, or indeed in other Article III courts, which could exercise only Article III judicial power?\50\ Moreover, if in fact some ``judicial power'' may be devolved upon courts not having the constitutional security of tenure and salary, what prevents Congress from undermining those values intended to be protected by Article III's guarantees by giving jurisdiction to nonprotected entities that, being subjected to influence, would be bent to the popular will?

NOTES:

\50\That the Supreme Court could review the judgments of territorial courts was established in Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cr. (10 U.S.) 307 (1810). See also Benner v. Porter, 9 How. (50 U.S.) 235, 243 (1850); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 434 (1872); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-313 (1922).

Attempts to explain or to rationalize the predicament or to provide a principled limiting point have from Canter to the present resulted in ``frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents'' spelled out in cases comprising ``landmarks on a judicial `darkling plain' where ignorant armies have clashed by night''.\51\ Nonetheless, Article I courts are quite usual entities in our judicial system.\52\

NOTES:

\52\In addition to the local courts of the District of Columbia, the bankruptcy courts, and the U. S. Court of Federal Claims, considered infra, these include the United States Tax Court, formerly an independent agency in the Treasury Department, but by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Sec. 951, 83 Stat. 730, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7441, made an Article I court of record, the Court of Veterans Appeals, Act of Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4105, 38 U.S.C. Sec. 4051, and the courts of the territories of the United States. Magistrate judges are adjuncts of the District Courts, see infra, n. 105, and perform a large number of functions, usually requiring the consent of the litigants. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991). The U. S. Court of Military Appeals, strictly speaking, is not part of the judiciary but is a military tribunal, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 867, although Congress designated it an Article I tribunal and has recently given the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over its decisions.

Power of Congress Over Legislative Courts. -- In creating legislative courts, Congress is not limited by the restrictions imposed in Article III concerning tenure during good behavior and the prohibition against diminution of salaries. Congress may limit tenure to a term of years, as it has done in acts creating territorial courts and the Tax Court, and it may subject the judges of legislative courts to removal by the President,\53\ or it may reduce their salaries during their terms.\54\ Similarly, it follows that Congress can vest in legislative courts nonjudicial functions of a legislative or advisory nature and deprive their judgments of finality. Thus, in Gordon v. United States,\55\ there was no objection to the power of the Secretary of the Treasury and Congress to revise or suspend the early judgments of the Court of Claims. Likewise, in United States v. Ferreira,\56\ the Court sustained the act conferring powers on the Florida territorial court to examine claims rising under the Spanish treaty and to report its decisions and the evidence on which they were based to the Secretary of the Treasury for subsequent action. ``A power of this description,'' it was said, ``may constitutionally be conferred on a Secretary as well as on a commissioner. But [it] is not judicial in either case, in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States.''\57\

NOTES:

\54\United States v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143 (1883); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).

\55\2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 561 (1864).

\56\13 How. (54 U.S.) 40 (1852).

\57\Id., 48.

Review of Legislative Courts by Supreme Court. -- Chief Justice Taney's view, that would have been expressed in Gordon,\58\ that the judgments of legislative courts could never be reviewed by the Supreme Court, was tacitly rejected in DeGroot v. United States,\59\ in which the Court took jurisdiction from a final judgment of the Court of Claims. Since the decision in this case, the authority of the Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over legislative courts has turned not upon the nature or status of such courts but rather upon the nature of the proceeding before the lower court and the finality of its judgment. The Supreme Court will neither review the administrative proceedings of legislative courts nor entertain appeals from the advisory or interlocutory decrees of such a body.\60\ But in proceedings before a legislative court which are judicial in nature, admit of a final judgment, and involve the performance of judicial functions and therefore the exercise of judicial power, the Court may be vested with appellate jurisdiction.\61\

NOTES:

\59\5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 419 (1867). See also United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886).

\60\E.g., Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927); Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 576, 577-579 (1962).

\61\Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944); D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

The ``Public Rights'' Distinction. -- A major delineation of the distinction between Article I courts and Article III courts was attempted in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.\62\ In this case was challenged a summary procedure, without benefit of the courts, for the collection by the United States of moneys claimed to be due from one of its customs collectors. It was objected that the assessment and collection was a judicial act carried out by nonjudicial officers and thus invalid under Article III. Accepting that the acts complained of were judicial, the Court nonetheless sustained the act by distinguishing between any act, ``which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty,'' which, in other words, is inherently judicial, and other acts which Congress may vest in courts or in other agencies. ``[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.''\63\ The distinction was between those acts which historically had been determined by courts and those which historically had been resolved by executive or legislative acts and comprehended those matters that arose between the government and others. Thus, Article I courts ``may be created as special tribunals to examine and determine various matters, arising between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it. The mode of determining matters of this class is completely within congressional control.''\64\

NOTES:

\63\Id., 284.

\64\Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).

Among the matters susceptible of judicial determination, but not requiring it, are claims against the United States,\65\ the disposal of public lands and claims arising therefrom,\66\ questions concerning membership in the Indian tribes,\67\ and questions arising out of the administration of the customs and internal revenue laws.\68\ Other courts similar to territorial courts, such as consular courts and military courts martial, may be justified on like grounds.\69\

NOTES:

\66\United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) (Court of Private Land Claims).

\67\Wallace v. Adams. 204 U.S. 415 (1907); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899) (Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court).

\68\Old Colony Trust Co. v. CIR, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).

\69\See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (consular courts in foreign countries). Military courts may, on the other hand, be a separate entity of the military having no connection to Article III. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65, 79 (1857).

The ``public rights'' distinction appears today to be a description without a significant distinction. Thus, in Crowell v. Benson,\70\ the Court approved an administrative scheme for determination, subject to judicial review, of maritime employee compensation claims, although it acknowledged that the case involved ``one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.''\71\ This scheme was permissible, the Court said, because in cases arising out of congressional statutes, an administrative tribunal could make findings of fact and render an initial decision of legal and constitutional questions, as long as there is adequate review in a constitutional court.\72\ The ``essential attributes'' of decision must remain in an Article III court, but so long as it does, Congress may utilize administrative decisionmakers in those private rights cases that arise in the context of a comprehensive federal statutory scheme.\73\ That the ``public rights'' distinction marked a dividing line between those matters that could be assigned to legislative courts and to administrative agencies and those matters ``of private right'' that could not be was reasserted in Marathon, but there was much the Court plurality did not explain.\74\

NOTES:

\71\Id. 51. On the constitutional problems of assignment to an administrative agency, see Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).

\72\Id., 51-65.

\73\Id., 50, 51, 58-63. Thus, Article III concerns were satisfied by a review of the agency fact finding upon the administrative record. Id., 63-65. The plurality opinion denied the validity of this approach in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n. 39 (1982), although Justice white in dissent accepted it. Id., 115. The plurality, rather, rationalized Crowell and subsequent cases on an analysis seeking to ascertain whether agencies or Article I tribunals were ``adjuncts'' of Article III courts, that is, whether Article III courts were sufficiently in charge to protect constitutional values. Id., 76-87.

\74\Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-70 (1982) (plurality opinion). Thus, Justice Brennan states that at a minimum a matter of public right must arise ```between the government and others''' but that the presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means to distinguish ``private rights.'' Id., 69 & n. 23. Crowell v. Benson, however, remained an embarrassing presence.

The Court continued to waver with respect to the importance to decision-making of the public rights/private rights distinction. In two cases following Marathon, it rejected the distinction as ``a bright line test,'' and instead focused on ``substance''--i.e., on the extent to which the particular grant of jurisdiction to an Article I court threatened judicial integrity and separation of powers principles.\75\ Nonetheless, the Court indicated that the distinction may be an appropriate starting point for analysis. Thus, the fact that private rights traditionally at the core of Article III jurisdiction are at stake leads the Court to ``searching'' inquiry as to whether Congress is encroaching inordinately on judicial functions, while the concern is not so great where ``public'' rights are involved.\76\

NOTES:

However, in a subsequent case, the distinction was pronounced determinative not only of the issue whether a matter could be referred to a non-Article III tribunal but whether Congress could dispense with civil jury trials.\77\ In so doing, however, the Court vitiated much of the core content of ``private'' rights as a concept and left resolution of the central issue to a balancing test. That is, ``public'' rights are, strictly speaking, those in which the cause of action inheres in or lies against the Federal Government in its sovereign capacity, the understanding since Murray's Lessee. However, to accommodate Crowell v. Benson, Atlas Roofing, and similar cases, seemingly private causes of action between private parties will also be deemed ``public'' rights, when Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its Article I powers, fashions a cause of action that is analogous to a common-law claim and so closely integrates it into a public regulatory scheme that it becomes a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.\78\ Nonetheless, despite its fixing by Congress as a ``core proceeding'' suitable for an Article I bankruptcy court adjudication, the Court held the particular cause of action at issue was a private issue as to which the parties were entitled to a civil jury trial (and necessarily which Congress could not commit to an Article I tribunal, save perhaps through the consent of the parties).\79\

NOTES:

\78\Id., 52-54. The Court reiterated that the Government need not be a party as a prerequisite to a matter being of ``public right.'' Id., 54. Concurring, Justice Scalia argued that public rights historically were and should remain only those matters to which the Federal Government is a party. Id, 65.

\79\Id., 55-64. The Court reserved the question whether, a jury trial being required, a non-Article III bankruptcy judge could oversee such a jury trial. Id., 64. That question remains unresolved, both as a matter, first, of whether there is statutory authorization for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials, and, second, if there is, whether they may constitutionally do so. E.g., In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 497 U.S. 1023, vacated and remanded for consideration of a jurisdictional issue, 498 U.S. 964 (1990), reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 500 U.S. 928 (1991); In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1991), pet. for reh. en banc den., 976 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992).

Constitutional Status of the Court of Claims and the Courts of Customs and Patent Appeals. -- Though the Supreme Court for a long while accepted the Court of Claims as an Article III court,\80\ it later ruled that court to be an Article I court and its judges without constitutional protection of tenure and salary.\81\ Then, in the 1950s, Congress statutorily declared that the Court of Claims, the Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were Article III courts,\82\ a questionable act under the standards the Court had utilized to determine whether courts were legislative or constitutional.\83\ But in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,\84\ five of seven participating Justices united to find that indeed the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, at least, were constitutional courts and their judges eligible to participate in judicial business in other constitutional courts. Three Justices would have overruled Bakelite and Williams and would have held that the courts in question were constitutional courts.\85\ Whether a court is an Article III tribunal depends largely upon whether legislation establishing it is in harmony with the limitations of that Article, specifically, ``whether . . . its business is the federal business there specified and its judges and judgments are allowed the independence there expressly or impliedly made requisite.'' When a court is created ``to carry into effect [federal] powers . . . over subject matter . . . and not over localities,'' a presumption arises that the status of such a tribunal is constitutional rather than legislative.\86\ The other four Justices expressly declared that Bakelite and Williams should not be overruled,\87\ but two of them thought the two courts had attained constitutional status by virtue of the clear manifestation of congressional intent expressed in the legislation.\88\ Two Justices maintained that both courts remained legislative tribunals.\89\ While the result is clear, no standard for pronouncing a court legislative rather than constitutional has obtained the adherence of a majority of the Court.\90\

NOTES:

\81\Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); cf. Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450-455 (1929).

\82\67 Stat. 226, Sec. 1, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 171 (Court of Claims); 70 Stat. 532. Sec. 1, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 251 (Customs Court); 72 Stat. 848, Sec. 1, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 211 (Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).

\83\In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438. 459 (1929), Justice Van Devanter refused to give any weight to the fact that Congress had bestowed life tenure on the judges of the Court of Customs Appeals because that line of thought ``mistakenly assumes that whether a court is of one class or the other depends on the intention of Congress, whereas the true test lies in the power under which the court was created and in the jurisdiction conferred.''

\84\370 U.S. 530 (1962).

\85\Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 531 (1962) (Justices Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart).

\86\Id., 548, 552.

\87\Id., 585 (Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren concurring); 589 (Justices Douglas and Black dissenting).

\88\Id., 585 (Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren).

\89\Id., 589 (Justices Douglas and Black). The concurrence thought that the rationale of Bakelite and Williams was based on a significant advisory and reference business of the two courts, which the two Justices now thought insignificant, but what there was of it they thought nonjudicial and the courts should not entertain it. Justice Harlan left that question open. Id., 583.

\90\Aside from doctrinal matters, in 1982, Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, giving it, inter alia, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 96 Stat. 25, title 1, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 41. At the same time Congress, created the United States Claims Court, now the United States Court of Federal Claims, as an Article I tribunal, with the trial jurisdiction of the old Court of Claims. 96 Stat. 26, as amended, Sec. 902(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4516, 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 171-180.

Status of Courts of the District of Columbia. -- Through a long course of decisions, the courts of the District of Columbia were regarded as legislative courts upon which Congress could impose nonjudicial functions. In Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe,\91\ the Court sustained an act of Congress which conferred revisory powers upon the Supreme Court of the District in patent appeals and made its decisions binding only upon the Commissioner of Patents. Similarly, the Court later sustained the authority of Congress to vest revisory powers in the same court over rates fixed by a public utilities commission.\92\ Not long after this, the same rule was applied to the revisory powers of the District Supreme Court over orders of the Federal Radio Commission.\93\ These rulings were based on the assumption, express or implied, that the courts of the District were legislative courts, created by Congress in pursuance of its plenary power to govern the District of Columbia. In dictum in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,\94\ while reviewing the history and analyzing the nature of the legislative courts, the Court stated that the courts of the District were legislative courts.

NOTES:

\92\Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).

\93\Federal Radio Comm. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).

\94\279 U.S. 438, 450-455 (1929).

In 1933, nevertheless, the Court, abandoning all previous dicta on the subject, found the courts of the District of Columbia to be constitutional courts exercising judicial power of the United States,\95\ with the result that it assumed the task of reconciling the performance of nonjudicial functions by such courts with the rule that constitutional courts can exercise only the judicial power of the United States. This task was accomplished by the argument that in establishing courts for the District, Congress is performing dual functions in pursuance of two distinct powers, the power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, and its plenary and exclusive power to legislate for the District of Columbia. However, Article III, Sec. 1, limits this latter power with respect to tenure and compensation, but not with regard to vesting legislative and administrative powers in such courts. Subject to the guarantees of personal liberty in the Constitution, ``Congress has as much power to vest courts of the District with a variety of jurisdiction and powers as a State legislature has in conferring jurisdiction on its courts.''\96\

NOTES:

\96\Id., 535-546. Chief Justice Hughes in dissent argued that Congress' power over the District was complete in itself and the power to create courts there did not derive at all from Article III. Id., 551. See the discussion of this point of O'Donoghue in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.C.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court).

In 1970, Congress formally recognized two sets of courts in the District, federal courts, district courts and a Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, created pursuant to Article III, and courts equivalent to state and territorial courts, created pursuant to Article I.\97\ Congress' action was sustained in Palmore v. United States.\98\ When legislating for the District, the Court held, Congress has the power of a local legislature and may, pursuant to Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 17, vest jurisdiction to hear matters of local law and local concerns in courts not having Article III characteristics. The defendant's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to be tried before an Article III judge was denied on the basis that it was not absolutely necessary that every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense based on an act of Congress or a law made under its authority need be conducted in an Article III court. State courts, after all, could hear cases involving federal law as could territorial and military courts. ``[T]he requirements of Article III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.''\99\

NOTES:

\98\411 U.S. 389 (1973)

\99\Id., 407-408. See also Pernell v. Southall Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363, 365-365 (1974); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59 (1978). Under Swain, provision for hearing of motions for postjudgment relief by convicted persons in the District, the present equivalent of habeas for federal convicts, is placed in Article I courts. That there are limits to Congress' discretion is asserted in dictum in Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 201-202, 204 (1977).

Bankruptcy Courts. -- After extended and lengthy debate, Congress in 1978 revised the bankruptcy act and created as an ``adjunct'' of the district courts a bankruptcy court composed of judges, vested with practically all the judicial power of the United States, serving for 14 year terms, subject to removal for cause by the judicial councils of the circuits, and with salaries subject to statutory change.\100\ The bankruptcy courts were given jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under the bankruptcy code or arising in or related to bankruptcy cases, with review in Article III courts under a clearly erroneous standard. In a case in which a claim was made against a company for breaches of contract and warranty, purely state law claims, the Court held unconstitutional the conferral upon judges not having the Article III security of tenure and compensation of jurisdiction to hear state law claims of traditional common law actions of the kind existing at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.\101\ While the holding was extremely narrow, a plurality of the Court sought to rationalize and limit the Court's jurisprudence of Article I courts. According to the plurality, as a fundamental principle of separation of powers, the judicial power of the United States must be exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in Article III. Congress may not evade the constitutional order by allocating this judicial power to courts whose judges lack security of tenure and compensation. Only in three narrowly circumscribed instances may judicial power be distributed outside the Article III framework: in territories and the District of Columbia, that is, geographical areas in which no State operated as sovereign and Congress exercised the general powers of government; courts martial, that is, the establishment of courts under a constitutional grant of power historically understood as giving the political branches extraordinary control over the precise subject matter; and the adjudication of ``public rights,'' that is, the litigation of certain matters that historically were reserved to the political branches of government and that were between the government and the individual.\102\ In bankruptcy legislation and litigation not involving any of these exceptions, the plurality would have held, the judicial power to process bankruptcy cases could not be assigned to the tribunals created by the act.\103\

NOTES:

\101\The statement of the holding is that of the two concurring Justices, id., 89 (Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor), with which the plurality agreed ``at the least,'' while desiring to go further. Id., 87 n. 40.

\102\Id., 63-76 (Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens).

\103\The plurality also rejected an alternative basis, a contention that as ``adjuncts'' of the district courts, the bankruptcy courts were like United States magistrates or like those agencies approved in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), to which could be assigned factfinding functions subject to review in Article III courts, the fount of the administrative agency system. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76-86 (1982). According to the plurality, the act vested too much judicial power in the bankruptcy courts to treat them like agencies, and it limited the review of Article III courts too much.

The dissent argued that, while on its face Article III provided for exclusivity in assigning judicial power to Article III entities, the history since Canter belied that simplicity. Rather, the precedents clearly indicated that there is no difference in principle between the work that Congress may assign to an Article I court and that which must be given to an Article III court. Despite this, the dissent contended that Congress did not possess plenary discretion in choosing between the two systems; rather, in evaluating whether jurisdiction was properly reposed in an Article I court, the Supreme Court must balance the values of Article III against both the strength of the interest Congress sought to further by its Article I investiture and the extent to which Article III values were undermined by the congressional action. This balancing would afford the Court, the dissent believed, the power to prevent Congress, were it moved to do so, from transferring jurisdiction in order to emasculate the constitutional courts of the United States.\104\

NOTE:

Again, no majority could be marshaled behind a principled discussion of the reasons for and the limitation upon the creation of legislative courts, not that a majority opinion, or even a unanimous one, would necessarily presage the settling of the law.\105\ But the breadth of the various opinions left unclear not only the degree of discretion left in Congress to restructure the bankruptcy courts, but placed in issue the constitutionality of other legislative efforts to establish adjudicative systems outside a scheme involving the creation of life-tenured judges.\106\

NOTES:

\106\In particular, the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, under which judges may refer certain pretrial motions and the trial of certain matters to persons appointed to a specific term, was threatened. P.L. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108, as amended, 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 631-639. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).

Congress responded to Marathon by enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.\107\ Bankruptcy courts were maintained as Article I entities, and overall their powers as courts were not notably diminished. However, Congress did establish a division between ``core proceedings,'' which bankruptcy courts could hear and determine, subject to lenient review, and other proceedings, which, though the bankruptcy courts could initially hear and decide, any party could have de novo review in the district court, unless the parties consented to bankruptcy-court jurisdiction in the same manner as core proceedings. A safety valve was included, permitting the district court to withdraw any proceeding from the bankruptcy court on cause shown.\108\ Notice that in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,\109\ the Court found that a cause of action founded on state law, though denominated a core proceeding, was a private right.

NOTES:

\108\See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 157.

\109\492 U.S. 33 (1989).

Agency Adjudication. -- The Court in two decisions following Marathon involving legislative courts clearly suggested that the majority was now closer to the balancing approach of the Marathon dissenters than to the position of the Marathon plurality that Congress may confer judicial power on legislative courts in only very limited circumstances. Subsequently, however, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,\110\ a reversion to the fundamentality of Marathon, with an opinion by the same author, Justice Brennan, cast some doubt on this proposition. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co.,\111\ the Court upheld a provision of the pesticide law requiring binding arbitration, with limited judicial review, of compensation due one registrant by another for mandatory sharing of registration information, the right arising from federal statutory law. And in CFTC v. Schor,\112\ the Court upheld conferral on the agency of authority, in a reparations adjudication under the Act, also to adjudicate ``counterclaims'' arising out of the same transaction, including those arising under state common law. Neither the fact that the pesticide case involved a dispute between two private parties nor the fact that the CFTC was empowered to decide claims traditionally adjudicated under state law proved decisive to the Court's analysis.

NOTES:

\111\473 U.S. 568 (1985).

\112\478 U.S. 833 (1986).

In rejecting a ``formalistic'' approach and analyzing the ``substance'' of the provision at issue in Union Carbide, Justice O'Connor`s opinion for the Court pointed to several considerations.\113\ The right to compensation was not a purely private right, but ``bears many of the characteristics of a `public' right,'' since Congress was ``authoriz[ing] an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program.''\114\ Also important was not ``unduly constrict[ing] Congress in its ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers;''\115\ arbitration was ``a pragmatic solution to [a] difficult problem.'' The limited nature of judicial review was seen as a plus in the sense that ``no unwilling defendant is subjected to judicial enforcement power;'' on the other hand, availability of limited judicial review of the arbitrator's findings and determination for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation, and for due process violations, preserved the ```appropriate exercise of the judicial function.'''\116\ Thus, the Court concluded, Congress in exercise of Article I powers ``may create a seemingly `private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.''\117\

NOTES:

\114\Id., 473 U.S., 589.

\115\CFTC v. Schor, supra, 478 U.S., 851 (summarizing the Thomas rule).

\116\Thomas, supra, 473 U.S., 591, 592(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932)).

\117\473 U.S., 594.

In Schor, the Court described Art. III, Sec. 1, as serving a dual purpose: to protect the role of an independent judiciary and to safeguard the right of litigants to have claims decided by judges free from potential domination by the other branches of government. A litigant's Article III right is not absolute, the Court determined, but may be waived. This the litigant had done by submitting to the administrative law judge's jurisdiction rather than independently seeking relief as he was entitled to and then objecting only after adverse rulings on the merits. But the institutional integrity claim, not being personal, could not be waived and the Court reached the merits. The threat to institutional independence was ``weighed'' by reference to ``a number of factors.'' The conferral on the CFTC of pendent jurisdiction over common law counterclaims was seen as more narrowly confined than was the grant to bankruptcy courts at issue in Marathon, and as more closely resembling the ``model'' approved in Crowell v. Benson. The CFTC's jurisdiction, unlike that of bankruptcy courts, was said to be confined to ``a particularized area of the law;'' the agency's orders were enforceable only by order of a district court,\118\ and reviewable under a less deferential standard, with legal rulings being subject to de novo review; and the agency was not empowered, as had been the bankruptcy courts, to exercise ``all ordinary powers of district courts.''

NOTE:

Granfinanciera followed analysis different from that in Schor, although it preserved Union Carbide through its concept of ``public rights.'' State law and other legal claims founded on private rights could not be remitted to non-Article III tribunals for adjudication unless Congress in creating an integrated public regulatory scheme has so taken up the right as to transform it. It may not simply relabel a private right and place it into the regulatory scheme. The Court is hazy with respect to whether the right must be itself a creature of federal statutory action. The general descriptive language suggests that, but in its determination whether the right at issue in the case, the recovery of preferential or fraudulent transfers in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding, the Court seemingly goes beyond this point. Though a statutory interest, the actions were identical to state-law contract claims brought by a bankrupt corporation to augment the estate.\119\ Schor was distinguished solely on the waiver part of the decision, relating to the individual interest, without considering the part of the opinion deciding the institutional interest on the merits and utilizing a balancing test.\120\

NOTES:

\120\Id., 59 n. 14.

Thus, while the Court has made some progress in reconciling its growing line of disparate cases, doctrinal harmony has not yet been achieved.

Passing on the constitutionality of the establishment of the Sentencing Commission as an ``independent'' body in the judicial branch, the Court acknowledged that the Commission is not a court and does not exercise judicial power. Rather, its function is to promulgate binding sentencing guidelines for federal courts. It acts, therefore, legislatively, and its membership of seven is composed of three judges and three nonjudges. But the standard of constitutionality, the Court held, is whether the entity exercises powers that are more appropriately performed by another branch or that undermine the integrity of the judiciary. Because the imposition of sentences is a function traditionally exercised within congressionally prescribed limits by federal judges, the Court found the functions of the Commission could be located in the judicial branch. Nor did performance of its functions contribute to a weakening of the judiciary, or an aggrandizement of power either, in any meaningful way, the Court observed.\121\

NOTE:

Judicial power is the power ``of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.''\122\ It is ``the right to determine actual controversies arising between diverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.''\123\ Although the terms ``judicial power'' and ``jurisdiction'' are frequently used interchangeably and jurisdiction is defined as the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between parties to a suit\124\ or as the ``power to entertain the suit, consider the merits and render a binding decision thereon,''\125\ the cases and commentary support, indeed require, a distinction between the two concepts. Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to exercise judicial power in a specific case and is, of course, a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power, which is the totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.\126\ Included within the general power to decide cases are the ancillary powers of courts to punish for contempts of their authority,\127\ to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction when authorized by statute,\128\ to make rules governing their process in the absence of statutory authorizations or prohibitions,\129\ to order their own process so as to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice and to protect their own jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in custody of law,\130\ to appoint masters in chancery, referees, auditors, and other investigators,\131\ and to admit and disbar attorneys.\132\

NOTES:

\123\Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).

\124\United States v. Arrendondo, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 691 (1832).

\125\General Investment Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926).

\126\William v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 566 (1933) ; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 467-468 (1944) (Justice Rutledge dissenting).

\127\Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).

\128\McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cr. (11 U.S.) 504 (1813); Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. (8 U.S.) 75 (1807).

\129\Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1 (1825).

\130\Gumble v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131 (1888).

\131\Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).

\132\Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S. ) 333, 378 (1867).

``Shall Be Vested.'' -- The distinction between judicial power and jurisdiction is especially pertinent to the meaning of the words ``shall be vested'' in Sec. 1. Whereas all the judicial power of the United States is vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts created by Congress, neither has ever been vested with all the jurisdiction which could be granted and, Justice Story to the contrary,\133\ the Constitution has not been read to mandate Congress to confer the entire jurisdiction it might.\134\ Thus, except for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which flows directly from the Constitution, two prerequisites to jurisdiction must be present: first, the Constitution must have given the courts the capacity to receive it,\135\ and, second, an act of Congress must have conferred it.\136\ The fact that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction means that litigants in them must affirmatively establish that jurisdiction exists and may not confer nonexistent jurisdiction by consent or conduct.\137\

NOTES:

\134\See, e.g., Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. (4 U.S.) 8, 10 (1799) (Justice Chase). A recent, sophisticated attempt to resurrect the core of Justice Story's argument is Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B. U. L. Rev. 205 (1985); and see Symposium: Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499 (1990) (with articles by Amar, Meltzer, and Redish). Briefly, the matter is discussed more fully infra, Professor Amar argues, in part, from the text of Article III, Sec. 2, cl. 1, that the use of the word ``all'' in each of federal question, admiralty, and public ambassador subclauses means that Congress must confer the entire judicial power to cases involving those issues, whereas it has more discretion in the other six categories.

\135\Which was, of course, the point of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. (5 U.S.) 137 (1803), once the power of the Court to hold legislation unconstitutional was established.

\136\The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 247, 252 (1868); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. (44 U.S.) 236 (1845); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. (49 U.S.) 441 (1850); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cr. (11 U.S.) 32, 33 (1812); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922). It should be noted, however, that some judges have expressed the opinion that Congress' authority is limited to some degree by the Constitution, such as by the due process clause, so that a limitation on jurisdiction which denied a litigant access to any remedy might be unconstitutional. Cf. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F. 2d 961, 965-966 (D.C.Cir. 1949), revd. on other grounds sub nom, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 335 U.S. 887 (1948); Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700. 703 n. 5 (D.N.D. Calif. 1968); Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688. 694- 695 (D.R.I. 1969). The Supreme Court has had no occasion to consider the question.

\137\Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. (4 U.S.) 8 (1799); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 382 (1798); Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 148 (1834); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934).

Since 1792, the federal courts have emphasized finality of judgment as an essential attribute of judicial power. In that year, Congress authorized Revolutionary War veterans to file pension claims in circuit courts of the United States, directed the judges to certify to the Secretary of War the degree of a claimant's disability and their opinion with regard to the proper percentage of monthly pay to be awarded, and empowered the Secretary to withhold judicially certified claimants from the pension list if he suspected ``imposition or mistake.''\138\ The Justices then on circuit almost immediately forwarded objections to the President, contending that the statute was unconstitutional because the judicial power was constitutionally committed to a separate department and the duties imposed by the act were not judicial and because the subjection of a court's opinions to revision or control by an officer of the executive or the legislature was not authorized by the Constitution.\139\ Attorney General Randolph, upon the refusal of the circuit courts to act under the new statute, filed a motion for mandamus in the Supreme Court to direct the Circuit Court in Pennsylvania to proceed on a petition filed by one Hayburn seeking a pension. Although the Court heard argument, it put off decision until the next term, presumably because Congress was already acting to delete the objectionable features of the act, and upon enactment of a new law the Court dismissed the action.\140\

NOTES:

\139\1 American State Papers: Miscellaneous Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States (Washington : 1832), 49, 51, 52. President Washington transmitted the remonstrances to Congress. 1 J. Richardson, (comp.), Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington : 1897), 123, 133. The objections are also appended to the order of the Court in Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 409, 410 (1792). Note that some of the Justices declared their willingness to perform under the act as commissioners rather than as judges. Cf. United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. (54 U.S.) 40, 52-53 (1852). The assumption by judges that they could act in some positions as individuals while remaining judges, an assumption many times acted upon, was approved in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397-408 (1989).

\140\Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 409 (1792). The new pension law was the Act of February 28, 1793, 1 Stat. 324. The reason for the Court's inaction may, on the other hand, have been doubt about the proper role of the Attorney General in the matter, an issue raised in the opinion. See Marcus & Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 4; Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There was Pragmatism, 1989 Duke L. J. 561, 590-618.

Hayburn's Case has been since followed, so that the Court has rejected all efforts to give it and the lower federal courts jurisdiction over cases in which judgment would have been subject to executive or legislative revision.\141\ Thus, in a 1948 case, the Court held that an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board denying to one citizen air carrier and granting to another a certificate of convenience and necessity for an overseas and foreign air route was not reviewable. Such an order was subject to review and confirmance or revision by the President, and the Court decided it could not review the discretion exercised by him in that situation; the lower court had thought the matter could be handled by permitting presidential review of the order after judicial review, but this the Court rejected. ``[I]f the President may completely disregard the judgment of the court, it would be only because it is one the courts were not authorized to render. Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government,''\142\ More recently, the Court avoided a similar situation by a close construction of a statute.\143\

NOTES:

\142\Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-114 (1948).

\143\Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971). Under Sec. 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973e, no State may ``enact or seek to administer'' any change in election law or practice different from that in effect on a particular date without obtaining the approval of the Attorney General or the district court in the District of Columbia, a requirement interpreted to reach reapportionment and redistricting. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971). The issue in Connor was whether a districting plan drawn up and ordered into effect by a federal district court, after it had rejected a legislatively-drawn plan, must be submitted for approval. Unanimously, on the papers without oral argument, the Court ruled that, despite the statute's inclusive language, it did not apply to court-drawn plans.

Award of Execution. -- The adherence of the Court to this proposition, however, has not extended to a rigid rule formulated by Chief Justice Taney, given its fullest expression in a posthumously- published opinion.\144\ In Gordon v. United States,\145\ the Court refused to hear an appeal from a decision of the Court of Claims; the act establishing the Court of Claims provided for appeals to the Supreme Court, after which judgments in favor of claimants were to be referred to the Secretary of the Treasury for payments out of the general appropriation for payment of private claims. But the act also provided that no funds should be paid out of the Treasury for any claims ``till after an appropriation therefor shall be estimated by the Secretary of the Treasury.''\146\ The opinion of the Court merely stated that the implication of power in the executive officer and in Congress to revise all decisions of the Court of Claims requiring payment of money denied that court the judicial power from the exercise of which ``alone'' appeals could be taken to the Supreme Court.\147\

NOTES:

\145\2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 561 (1865).

\146\Act of February 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612, as amended, Act of March 3, 1963, 12 Stat. 737.

\147\Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) 561 (1865). Following congressional repeal of the objectionable section, Act of March 17, 1866, 14 Stat. 9, the Court accepted appellate jurisdiction. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886); De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 419 (1867). But note that execution of the judgments was still dependent upon congressional appropriations. On the effect of the requirement for appropriations at a time when appropriations had to be made for judgments over $100,000, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568-571 (1962). Cf. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corp.), 419 U.S. 102, 148-149 & n. 35 (1974).

In his posthumously-published opinion, Chief Justice Taney, because the judgment of the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court depended for execution upon future action of the Secretary and of Congress, regarded any such judgment as nothing more than a certificate of opinion and in no sense a judicial judgment. Congress could not therefore authorize appeals to the Supreme Court in a case where its judicial power could not be exercised, where its judgment would not be final and conclusive upon the parties, and where processes of execution were not awarded to carry it into effect. Taney then proceeded to enunciate a rule which was rigorously applied until 1933: the award of execution is a part and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial powers and no decision was a legal judgment without an award of execution.\148\ The rule was most significant in barring the lower federal courts from hearing proceedings for declaratory judgments\149\ and in denying appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court from declaratory proceedings in state courts.\150\

NOTES:

\149\Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927).

\150\Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Marketing Assn., 276 U.S. 71 (1928).

But, in 1927, the Court began backing away from its absolute insistence upon an award of execution. Unanimously holding that a declaratory judgment in a state court was res judicata in a subsequent proceeding in federal court, the Court admitted that ``[w]hile ordinarily a case or judicial controversy results in a judgment requiring award of process of execution to carry it into effect, such relief is not an indispensable adjunct to the exercise of the judicial function.''\151\ Then, in 1933, the Court interred the award-of- execution rule in its rigid form and accepted an appeal from a state court in a declaratory proceeding.\152\ Finality of judgment, however, remains the rule in determination of what is judicial power without regard to the demise of Chief Justice Taney's formulation.

NOTES:

\152\Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). The decisions in Swope and Wallace removed all constitutional doubts previously shrouding a proposed federal declaratory judgment act, which was enacted in 1934, 48 Stat. 955, 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2201-2202, and unanimously sustained in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).

Categories of Contempt. -- Crucial to an understanding of the history of the law governing the courts' powers of contempt is an awareness of the various kinds of contempt. With a few notable exceptions,\153\ the Court has consistently distinguished between criminal and civil contempts on the basis of the vindication of the authority of the courts on the one hand and the preservation and enforcement of the rights of the parties on the other. A civil contempt has been traditionally viewed as the refusal of a person in a civil case to obey a mandatory order. It is incomplete in nature, may be purged by obedience to the court order, and does not involve a sentence for a definite period of time. The classic criminal contempt is one where the act of contempt has been completed, punishment is imposed to vindicate the authority of the court, and a person cannot by subsequent action purge himself of such contempt.\154\ In the case of Shillitani v. United States,\155\ the defendants were sentenced by their respective District Courts for two years imprisonment for contempt of court; the sentence contained a purge clause providing for the unconditional release of the contemnors upon agreeing to testify before a grand jury.

NOTES:

\154\Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-443 (1911); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). See also Bassette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327-328 (1904).

\155\384 U.S. 364 (1966).

Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the defendants were in civil contempt, notwithstanding their sentence for a definite period of time, on the grounds that the test for determining whether the contempt is civil or criminal is what the court primarily seeks to accomplish by imposing sentence.\156\ Here, the purpose was to obtain answers to the questions for the grand jury and the court provided for the defendants' release upon compliance; whereas, ``a criminal contempt proceeding would be characterized by the imposition of an unconditional sentence for punishment or deterrence.''\157\ The issue of whether a certain contempt is either civil or criminal can be of great importance as demonstrated in the dictum of Ex parte Grossman,\158\ in which Chief Justice Taft, while holding for the Court on the main issue that the President may pardon a criminal contempt, noted that he may not pardon a civil contempt. Notwithstanding the importance of distinguishing between the two, there have been instances where defendants have been charged with both civil and criminal contempt for the same act.\159\

NOTES:

\157\Id., n. 6. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (remanding for determination whether payment of child support arrearages would purge a determinate sentence, the proper characterization critical to decision on a due process claim).

\158\267 U.S. 87, 119-120 (1925). In an analogous case, the Court was emphatic in a dictum that Congress cannot require a jury trial where the contemnor has failed to perform a positive act for the relief of private parties, Michalson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, S.P., M. & Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924). But see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).

\159\See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 299 (1947).

A second but more subtle distinction, with regard to the categories of contempt, is the difference between direct and indirect contempt--albeit civil or criminal in nature. Direct contempt results when the contumacious act is committed ``in the presence of the Court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;''\160\ indirect contempt is behavior which the Court did not itself witness.\161\ The nature of the contumacious act, i.e., whether it is direct or indirect, is important because it determines the appropriate procedure for charging the contemnor. As will be evidenced in the following discussion, the history of the contempt powers of the American judiciary is marked by two trends: a shrinking of the court's power to punish a person summarily and a multiplying of the due process requirements that must otherwise be met when finding an individual to be in contempt.\162\

NOTES:

The Act of 1789. -- The summary power of the courts of the United States to punish contempts of their authority had its origin in the law and practice of England where disobedience of court orders was regarded as contempt of the King himself and attachment was a prerogative process derived from presumed contempt of the sovereign.\163\ By the latter part of the eighteenth century, summary power to punish was extended to all contempts whether committed in or out of court.\164\ In the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789 in section 17\165\ conferred power on all courts of the United States ``to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.'' The only limitation placed on this power was that summary attachment was made a negation of all other modes of punishment. The abuse of this extensive power led, following the unsuccessful impeachment of Judge James H. Peck of the Federal District Court of Missouri, to the passage of the Act of 1831 limiting the power of the federal courts to punish contempts to misbehavior in the presence of the courts, ``or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,'' to the misbehavior of officers of courts in their official capacity, and to disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, process or order of the court.\166\

NOTES:

\164\Fox, The Summary Power to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. Rev. 238, 252 (1909).

\165\1 Stat. 83 (1789).

\166\18 U.S.C. Sec. 401. For a summary of the Peck impeachment and the background of the act of 1831, see Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in ``Inferior'' Federal Courts--A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1024- 1028 (1924).

An Inherent Power. -- The validity of the act of 1831 was sustained forty-three years later in Ex parte Robinson,\167\ in which Justice Field for the Court expounded principles full of potentialities for conflict. He declared: ``The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.'' Expressing doubts concerning the validity of the act as to the Supreme Court, he declared, however, that there could be no question of its validity as applied to the lower courts on the ground that they are created by Congress and that their ``powers and duties depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction.''\168\ With the passage of time, later adjudications, especially after 1890, came to place more emphasis on the inherent power of courts to punish contempts than upon the power of Congress to regulate summary attachment.

NOTES:

\168\Id., 505-511.

By 1911, the Court was saying that the contempt power must be exercised by a court without referring the issues of fact or law to another tribunal or to a jury in the same tribunal.\169\ In Michaelson v. United States,\170\ the Court intentionally placed a narrow interpretation upon those sections of the Clayton Act\171\ relating to punishment for contempt of court by disobedience of injunctions in labor disputes. The sections in question provided for a jury upon the demand of the accused in contempt cases in which the acts committed in violation of district court orders also constituted a crime under the laws of the United States or of those of the State where they were committed. Although Justice Sutherland reaffirmed earlier rulings establishing the authority of Congress to regulate the contempt power, he went on to qualify this authority and declared that ``the attributes which inhere in the power [to punish contempt] and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.'' The Court mentioned specifically ``the power to deal summarily with contempt committed in the presence of the courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,'' and the power to enforce mandatory decrees by coercive means.\172\ This latter power, to enforce, the Court has held, includes the authority to appoint private counsel to prosecute a criminal contempt.\173\

NOTES:

\170\266 U.S. 42 (1924).

\171\38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914).

\172\266 U.S., 65-66. See, generally, Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in ``Inferior'' Federal Courts--A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010 (1924).

\173\Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 793- 801 (1987). However, the Court, invoking its supervisory power, instructed the lower federal courts first to request the United States Attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt and only if refused should they appoint a private lawyer. Id., 801-802. Still using its supervisory power, the Court held that the district court had erred in appointing counsel for a party that was the beneficiary of the court order; disinterested counsel had to be appointed. Id., 802-808. Justice Scalia contended that the power to prosecute is not comprehended within Article III judicial power and that federal judges had no power, inherent or otherwise, to initiate a prosecution for contempt or to appoint counsel to pursue it. Id., 815. See also United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988), which involved the appointment of a disinterested private attorney. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari after granting it, however, holding that only the Solicitor General representing the United States could bring the petition to the Court. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 518.

While the contempt power may be inherent, it is not unlimited. In Spallone v. United States,\174\ the Court held that a district court had abused its discretion by imposing contempt sanctions on individual members of a city council for refusing to vote to implement a consent decree remedying housing discrimination by the city. The proper remedy, the Court indicated, was to proceed first with contempt sanctions against the city, and only if that course failed should it proceed against the council members individually.

NOTE:

First Amendment Limitations on the Contempt Power. -- The phrase ``in the presence of the Court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice'' was interpreted in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States\175\ so broadly as to uphold the action of a district court judge in punishing for contempt a newspaper for publishing spirited editorials and cartoons on questions at issue in a contest between a street railway company and the public over rates. A majority of the Court held that the test to be applied in determining the obstruction of the administration of justice is not the actual obstruction resulting from an act, but ``the character of the act done and its direct tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty.'' Similarly, the test whether a particular act is an attempt to influence or intimidate a court is not the influence exerted upon the mind of a particular judge but ``the reasonable tendency of the acts done to influence or bring about the baleful result . . . without reference to the consideration of how far they may have been without influence in a particular case.''\176\ In Craig v. Hecht,\177\ these criteria were applied to sustain the imprisonment of the comptroller of New York City for writing and publishing a letter to a public service commissioner which criticized the action of a United States district judge in receivership proceedings.

NOTES:

\176\Id., 418-421.

\177\263 U.S. 255 (1923).

The decision in the Toledo Newspaper case, however, did not follow earlier decisions interpreting the act of 1831 and was grounded on historical error. For these reasons, it was reversed in Nye v. United States,\178\ and the theory of constructive contempt based on the ``reasonable tendency'' rule was rejected in a proceeding wherein defendants in a civil suit, by persuasion and the use of liquor, induced a plaintiff feeble in mind and body to ask for dismissal of the suit he had brought against them. The events in the episode occurred more than 100 miles from where the court was sitting and were held not to put the persons responsible for them in contempt of court. Although Nye v. United States was exclusively a case of statutory construction, it was significant from a constitutional point of view because its reasoning was contrary to that of earlier cases narrowly construing the act of 1831 and asserting broad inherent powers of courts to punish contempts independently of, and contrary to, congressional regulation of this power. Bridges v. California\179\ was noteworthy for the dictum of the majority that the contempt power of all courts, federal as well as state, is limited by the guaranty of the First Amendment against interference with freedom of speech or of the press.\180\

NOTES:

\179\314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).

\180\See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), further clarifying the limitations imposed by the First Amendment upon this judicial power and delineating the requisite serious degree of harm to the administration of law necessary to justify exercise of the contempt power to punish the publisher of an out-of-court statement attacking a charge to the grand jury, absent any showing of actual interference with the activities of the grand jury.
      It is now clearly established that courtroom conduct to be punishable as contempt ``must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.'' Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947); In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972).

A series of cases involving highly publicized trials and much news media attention and exploitation,\181\ however, caused the Court to suggest that the contempt and other powers of trial courts should be utilized to stem the flow of publicity before it can taint a trial. Thus, Justice Clark, speaking for the majority in Shepard v. Maxwell,\182\ noted that ``[i]f publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witness, court staff nor law enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.'' Though the regulation the Justice had in mind was presumably to be of the parties and related persons rather than of the press, the potential for conflict with the First Amendment is obvious as well as is the necessity for protection of the equally important right to a fair trial.\183\

NOTES:

\182\384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).

\183\For another approach, bar rules regulating the speech of counsel and the First Amendment standard, see Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).

Due Process Limitations on Contempt Power: Right to Notice and to a Hearing versus Summary Punishment. -- Included among the notable cases raising questions concerning the power of a trial judge to punish summarily for alleged misbehavior in the course of a trial is Ex parte Terry,\184\ decided in 1888. Terry had been jailed by the United States Circuit Court of California for assaulting in its presence a United States marshal. The Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In Cooke v. United States,\185\ however, the Court remanded for further proceedings a judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Texas sustaining the judgment of a United States district judge sentencing to jail an attorney and his client for presenting the judge a letter which impugned his impartiality with respect to their case, still pending before him. Distinguishing the case from that of Terry, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the unanimous Court, said: ``The important distinction . . . is that this contempt was not in open court. . . . To preserve order in the court room for the proper conduct of business, the court must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court when occurring in open court. There is no need of evidence or assistance of counsel before punishment, because the court has seen the offense. Such summary vindication of the court's dignity and authority is necessary. It has always been so in the courts of the common law and the punishment imposed is due process of law.''\186\

NOTES:

\185\267 U.S. 517 (1925).

\186\Id., 535, 534.

As to the timeliness of summary punishment, the Court at first construed Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was designed to afford judges clearer guidelines as to the exercise of their contempt power, in Sacher v. United States,\187\ as to allow ``the trial judge, upon the occurrence in his presence of a contempt, immediately and summarily to punish it, if, in his opinion, delay [would] prejudice the trial. . . . [On the other hand,] if he believes the exigencies of the trial require that he defer judgment until its completion he may do so without extinguishing his power.''\188\ However, subsequently, interpreting the due process clause and thus binding both federal and state courts, the Court held that, although the trial judge may summarily and without notice or hearing punish contemptuous conduct committed in his presence and observed by him, if he does choose to wait until the conclusion of the proceeding he must afford the alleged contemnor at least reasonable notice of the specific charge and opportunity to be heard in his own defense. Apparently, a ``full scale trial'' is not contemplated.\189\

NOTES:

\188\Id., 11.

\189\Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). In a companion case, the Court observed that although its rule conceivably encourages a trial judge to proceed immediately rather than awaiting a calmer moment, ``[s]ummary convictions during trials that are unwarranted by the facts will not be invulnerable to appellate review.'' Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).

Curbing the judge's power to consider conduct as occurring in his presence, the Court, in Harris v. United States,\190\ held that summary contempt proceedings in aid of a grand jury probe, achieved through swearing the witness and repeating the grand jury's questions in the presence of the judge, did not constitute contempt ``in the actual presence of the court'' for purposes of Rule 42(a); rather, the absence of a disturbance in the court's proceedings or of the need to immediately vindicate the court's authority makes the witness' refusal to testify an offense punishable only after notice and a hearing.\191\ Moreover, when it is not clear the judge was fully aware of the contemptuous behavior when it occurred, notwithstanding the fact it occurred during the trial, ``a fair hearing would entail the opportunity to show that the version of the event related to the judge was inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete.''\192\

NOTES:

\191\But see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (noncompliance with order directing defendants to surrender to marshal for execution of their sentence is an offense punishable summarily as a criminal contempt); Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960).

\192\Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-276 (1948)).

Due Process Limitations on Contempt Power: Right to Jury Trial. -- Until recently, it was the rule that the right to a jury trial was not available in criminal contempt cases.\193\ But in Cheff v. Schnackenberg,\194\ it was held that when the punishment in a criminal contempt case in federal court is more than the sentence for a petty offense, the Court drew the traditional line at six months, a defendant is entitled to trial by jury. Although the ruling was made pursuant to the Supreme Court's supervisory powers and was thus inapplicable to state courts and presumably subject to legislative revision, two years later the Court held that the Constitution did require jury trials in criminal contempt cases in which the offense was more than a petty one.\195\ Whether an offense is petty or not is determined by the maximum sentence authorized by the legislature or, in the absence of a statute, by the sentence actually imposed. Again the Court drew the line between petty offenses and more serious ones at six months imprisonment. Although this case involved an indirect criminal contempt, willful petitioning to admit to probate a will known to be falsely prepared, the majority in dictum indicated that even in cases of direct contempt a jury will be required in appropriate instances. ``When a serious contempt is at issue, considerations of efficiency must give way to the more fundamental interest of ensuring the even-handed exercise of judicial power.''\196\ Presumably, there is no equivalent right to a jury trial in civil contempt cases,\197\ although one could spend much more time in jail pursuant to a judgment of civil contempt than would be the case with most criminal contempts;\198\ however, the Court has expanded the right to jury trials in federal civil cases on nonconstitutional grounds,\199\ so that it is possible the process followed in criminal contempts could be repeated.

NOTES:

\194\384 U.S. 373 (1966).

\195\Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).

\196\Id., 209. In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974) the Court held required a jury trial when the trial judge awaits the conclusion of the proceeding and then imposes separate sentences in which the total aggregated more than six months. For a tentative essay at defining a petty offense when a fine is levied, see Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-477 (1975).

\197\The Sixth Amendment is applicable only to criminal cases and the Seventh to suits at common law, but the due process clause is available if needed.

\198\Note that under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1826 a recalcitrant witness before a grand jury may be imprisoned for the term of the grand jury, which can be 36 months. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3331(a).

\199\E.g., Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). However, the Court's expansion of jury trial rights may have halted with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).

Due Process Limitations on Contempt Powers: Impartial Tribunal. -- In Cooke v. United States,\200\ Chief Justice Taft uttered some cautionary words to guide trial judges in the utilization of their contempt powers. ``The power of contempt which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court is most important and indispensable. But its exercise is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. This rule of caution is more mandatory where the contempt charged has in it the element of personal criticism or attack upon the judge. The judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but he should not bend backward and injure the authority of the court by too great leniency. The substitution of another judge would avoid either tendency but it is not always possible. Of course, where acts of contempt are palpably aggravated by a personal attack upon the judge in order to drive the judge out of the case for ulterior reasons, the scheme should not be permitted to succeed. But attempts of this kind are rare. All of such cases, however, present difficult questions for the judge. All we can say upon the whole matter is that where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public or private right, a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place. Cornish v. United States, 299 F. 283, 285; Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 237 F. 986, 988. The case before us is one in which the issue between the judge and the parties had come to involve marked personal feeling that did not make for an impartial and calm judicial consideration and conclusion, as the statement of the proceedings abundantly shows.''

NOTE:

Sacher v. United States\201\ grew out of a tempestuous trial of eleven Communist Party leaders in which Sacher and others were counsel for the defense. Upon the conviction of the defendants, the trail judge at once found counsel guilty of criminal contempt and imposed jail terms of up to six months. At issue directly was whether the contempt charged was one which the judge was authorized to determine for himself or whether it was one which under Rule 42(b) could only be passed upon by another judge and after notice and hearing, but behind this issue loomed the applicability and nature of due process requirements, in particular whether the defense attorneys were constitutionally entitled to trial before a different judge. A divided Court affirmed most of the convictions, setting aside others, and denied that due process required a hearing before a different judge. ``We hold that Rule 42 allows the trial judge, upon the occurrence in his presence of a contempt, immediately and summarily to punish it, if, in his opinion, delay will prejudice the trial. We hold, on the other hand, that if he believes the exigencies of the trial require that he defer judgment until its completion, he may do so without extinguishing his power. . . . We are not unaware or unconcerned that persons identified with unpopular causes may find it difficult to enlist the counsel of their choice. But we think it must be ascribed to causes quite apart from fear of being held in contempt, for we think few effective lawyers would regard the tactics condemned here as either necessary or helpful to a successful defense. That such clients seem to have thought these tactics necessary is likely to contribute to the bar's reluctance to appear for them rather more than fear of contempt. But that there may be no misunderstanding, we make clear that this Court, if its aid be needed, will unhesitatingly protect counsel in fearless, vigorous and effective performance of every duty pertaining to the office of the advocate on behalf of any person whatsoever. But it will not equate contempt with courage or insults with independence. It will also protect the processes of orderly trial, which is the supreme object of the lawyers calling.\202\

NOTES:

\202\Id., 13-14.

In Offutt v. United States,\203\ acting under its supervisory powers over the lower federal courts, the Court set aside a criminal contempt conviction imposed on a lawyer after a trial marked by highly personal recriminations between the trial judge and the lawyer. In a situation in which the record revealed that the contumacious conduct was the product of both lack of self-restraint on the part of the contemnor and a reaction to the excessive zeal and personal animosity of the trial judge, the majority felt that any contempt trial must be held before another judge. This holding that when a judge becomes personally embroiled in the controversy with an accused he must defer trial of his contempt citation to another judge, founded on the Court's supervisory powers, was constitutionalized in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,\204\ in which a defendant acting as his own counsel engaged in quite personal abuse of the trial judge. The Court appeared to leave open the option of the trial judge to act immediately and summarily to quell contempt by citing and convicting an offender, thus empowering the judge to keep the trial going,\205\ but if he should wait until the conclusion of the trial he must defer to another judge.

NOTES:

\204\400 U.S. 455 (1971). See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965). Even in the absence of a personal attack on a judge that would tend to impair his detachment, the judge may still be required to excuse himself and turn a citation for contempt over to another judge if the response to the alleged misconduct in his courtroom partakes of the character of ``marked personal feelings'' being abraded on both sides, so that it is likely the judge has felt a ``sting'' sufficient to impair his objectivity. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).

\205\See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), in which the Court affirmed that summary contempt or expulsion may be used to keep a trial going.

Contempt by Disobedience of Orders. -- Disobedience of injunctive orders, particularly in labor disputes, has been a fruitful source of cases dealing with contempt of court. In United States v. United Mine Workers,\206\ the Court held that disobedience of a temporary restraining order issued for the purpose of maintaining existing conditions, pending the determination of the court's jurisdiction, is punishable as criminal contempt where the issue is not frivolous but substantial. Second, the Court held that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings, even though the statute under which the order is issued is unconstitutional.\207\ Third, on the basis of United States v. Shipp,\208\ it was held that violations of a court's order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal as in excess of the court's jurisdiction or though the basic action has become moot. Finally, the Court held that conduct can amount to both civil and criminal contempt, and the same acts may justify a court in resorting to coercive and punitive measures, which may be imposed in a single proceeding.\209\

NOTES:

\207\See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).

\208\203 U.S. 563 (1906).

\209\See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 299 (1947). But see Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 273 (1966), and supra, 630-631, as to due process limitations.

Contempt Power in Aid of Administrative Power. -- Proceedings to enforce the orders of administrative agencies and subpoenas issued by them to appear and produce testimony have become increasingly common since the leading case of ICC v. Brimson,\210\ where it was held that the contempt power of the courts might by statutory authorization be utilized in aid of the Interstate Commerce Commission in enforcing compliance with its orders. In 1947, a proceeding to enforce a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission during the course of an investigation was ruled to be civil in character on the ground that the only sanction was a penalty designed to compel obedience. The Court then enunciated the principle that where a fine or imprisonment imposed on the contemnor is designed to coerce him to do what he has refused to do, the proceeding is one for civil con tempt.\211\ Notwithstanding the power of administrative agencies to cite an individual for contempt, however, such bodies must be acting within the authority that has been lawfully delegated to them.\212\

NOTES:

\211\Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947). Note the dissent of Justice Frankfurter. For delegations of the subpoena power to administrative agencies and the use of judicial process to enforce them, see also McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).

\212\Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966). See also supra for a discussion on Congress' power to cite an individual for contempt by virtue of its investigatory duties, which is applicable, at least by analogy, to administrative agencies.

Long recognized by the courts as inherent powers are those authorities that are necessary to the administration of the judicial system itself, of which the contempt power just discussed is only the most controversial.\213\ Courts, as an independent and coequal branch of government, once they are created and their jurisdiction established, have the authority to do what courts have traditionally done in order to accomplish their assigned tasks.\214\ Of course, these inherent powers may be limited by statutes and by rules,\215\ but, just as was noted in the discussion of the same issue with respect to contempt, the Court asserts both the power to act in areas not covered by statutes and rules but also the power to act unless Congress has not only provided regulation of the exercise of the power but also unmistakably enunciated its intention to limit the inherent powers.\216\

NOTES:

\214\See Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204, 227 (1821); Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 505, 510 (1874); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 (1962); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); and id., 58 (Justice Scalia dissenting), 60, 62-67 (Justice Kennedy dissenting).

\215\Id., 47.

\216\Id., 46-51. But see id., 62-67 (Justice Kennedy dissenting).

Thus, in the cited Chambers case, the Court upheld the imposition of monetary sanctions against a litigant and his attorney for bad-faith litigation conduct in a diversity case. Some of the conduct was covered by a federal statute and several sanction provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but some was not, and the Court held that, absent a showing that Congress had intended to limit the courts, they could utilize inherent powers to sanction for the entire course of conduct, including shifting attorney fees, ordinarily against the American rule.\217\ In another case, a party failed to comply with discovery orders and a court order concerning a schedule for filing briefs. The Supreme Court held that the attorney's fees statute did not allow assessment of such fees in that situation, but it remanded for consideration of sanctions under both the Federal Rule and the trial court's inherent powers, subject to a finding of bad faith.\218\ But bad faith is not always required for the exercise of some inherent powers. Thus, courts may dismiss an action for an unexplained failure of the moving party to prosecute it.\219\

NOTES:

\218\Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).

\219\Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).

From the beginning of government under the Constitution of 1789, Congress has assumed, under the necessary and proper clause, its power to establish inferior courts, its power to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts and the power to regulate the issuance of writs.\220\ The Thirteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the circuit courts to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts and the Supreme Court to issue such writs to the circuit courts. The Supreme Court was also empowered to issue writs of mandamus ``in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.''\221\ Section 14 provided that all courts of the United States should ``have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdiction, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.''\222\ Although the Act of 1789 left the power over writs subject largely to the common law, it is significant as a reflection of the belief, in which the courts have on the whole concurred, that an act of Congress is necessary to confer judicial power to issue writs.\223\

NOTES:

\221\1 Stat. 73, Sec. 81.

\222\Id., Sec. Sec. 81-82. See also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), holding that the All Writs section of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a), gives federal courts the power to employ the ancient writ of coram nobis.

\223\This proposition was recently reasserted in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34 (1985) (holding that a federal district court lacked authority to order U.S. marshals to transport state prisoners, such authority not being granted by the relevant statutes).

Whether Article III itself is an independent source of the power of federal courts to fashion equitable remedies for constitutional violations or whether such remedies must fit within congressionally authorized writs or procedures is often left unexplored. In Missouri v. Jenkins,\224\ for example, the Court, rejecting a claim that a federal court exceeded judicial power under Article III by ordering local authorities to increase taxes to pay for desegregation remedies, declared that ``a court order directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal court.\225\ In the same case, the Court refused to rule on ``the difficult constitutional issues'' presented by the State's claim that the district court had exceeded its constitutional powers in a prior order directly raising taxes, instead ruling that this order had violated principles of comity.\226\

NOTES:

\225\Id., 55 (citing Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233-234 (1964) (an order that local officials ``exercise the power that is theirs'' to levy taxes in order to open and operate a desegregated school system ``is within the court's power if required to assure . . . petitioners that their constitutional rights will no longer be denied them'')).

\226\Id., 50-52.

Common Law Powers of District of Columbia Courts. -- That portion of Sec. 13 which authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction was held invalid in Marbury v. Madison,\227\ as an unconstitutional enlargement of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. After two more futile efforts to obtain a writ of mandamus, in cases in which the Court found that power to issue the writ had not been vested by statute in the courts of the United States except in aid of already existing jurisdiction,\228\ a litigant was successful in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,\229\ in finding a court that would take jurisdiction in a mandamus proceeding. This was the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia, which was held to have jurisdiction, on the theory that the common law, in force in Maryland when the cession of that part of the State that became the District of Columbia was made to the United States, remained in force in the District. At an early time, therefore, the federal courts established the rule that mandamus can be issued only when authorized by a constitutional statute and within the limits imposed by the common law and the separation of powers.\230\

NOTES:

\228\McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cr. (11 U.S.) 504 (1813); McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 598 (1821).

\229\12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 524 (1838).

\230\In 1962, Congress conferred upon all federal district courts the same power to issue writs of mandamus as was hitherto exercisable by federal courts in the District of Columbia. 76 Stat. 744, 28 U.S..C Sec. 1361.

Habeas Corpus: Congressional and Judicial Control. -- Although the writ of habeas corpus\231\ has a special status because its suspension is forbidden, except in narrow circumstances, by Article I. Sec. 9, cl. 2, nowhere in the Constitution is the power to issue the writ vested in the federal courts. Could it be that despite the suspension clause restriction Congress could suspend de facto the writ simply by declining to authorize its issuance? Is a statute needed to make the writ available or does the right to habeas corpus stem by implication from the suspension clause or from the grant of judicial power without need of a statute?\232\ Since Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Ex parte Bollman,\233\ it has been generally accepted that ``the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law.''\234\ The suspension clause, Marshall explained, was an ``injunction,'' an ``obligation'' to provide ``efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.''\235\ And so it has been understood since,\236\ with a few judicial voices raised to suggest that what Congress could not do directly it could not do by omission,\237\ but inasmuch as statutory authority has always existed authorizing the federal courts to grant the relief they deemed necessary under habeas corpus the Court has never had to face the question.\238\

NOTES:

\232\Professor Chafee contended that by the time of the Constitutional Convention the right to habeas corpus was so well established no affirmative authorization was needed. The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. Rev. 143, 146 (1952). But compare Collins, Habeas Corpus for Convicts--Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 335, 344-345 (1952).

\233\4 Cr. (8 U.S.) 75 (1807).

\234\Id., 94. And see Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. (44 U.S.) 103 (1845).

\235\Id., 95. Note that in quoting the clause, Marshall renders ``shall not be suspended'' as ``should not be suspended.''

\236\See Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 506 (1869). Cf. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 614 (1961).

\237\E.g., Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F. 2d 961, 966 (D.C.Cir. 1949), revd. on other grounds sub nom., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); and see Justice Black's dissent, id., 791, 798: ``Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect against illegal imprisonment, is written into the Constitution. Its use by courts cannot in my judgment be constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress.'' And in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963), the Court said: ``The habeas corpus jurisdictional statute implements the constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be made available.'' (Emphasis supplied).

\238\Cf. Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 506 (1869).

Having determined that a statute was necessary before the federal courts had power to issue writs of habeas corpus, Chief Justice Marshall pointed to Sec. 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as containing the necessary authority.\239\ As the Chief Justice read it, the authorization was limited to persons imprisoned under federal authority, and it was not until 1867, with two small exceptions,\240\ that legislation specifically empowered federal courts to inquire into the imprisonment of persons under state authority.\241\ Pursuant to this authorization, the Court expanded the use of the writ into a major instrument to reform procedural criminal law in federal and state jurisdictions.

NOTES:

\240\Act of March 2, 1833, Sec. 7, 4 Stat. 634 (federal officials imprisoned for enforcing federal law); Act of August 29, 1842, 5 Stat. 539 (foreign nationals detained by a State in violation of a treaty). See also Bankruptcy Act of April 4, 1800, Sec. 38, 2 Stat. 19, 32 (habeas corpus for imprisoned debtor discharged in bankruptcy), repealed by Act of December 19, 1803, 2 Stat. 248.

\241\Act of February 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385, conveyed power to federal courts ``to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States. . . .'' On the law with respect to state prisoners prior to this statute, see Ex Parte Dorr, 3 How, (44 U.S.) 103 (1845); cf. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8. Fed. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (Justice Johnson); Ex parte Cabrera, 4 Fed. Cas. 964 (No. 2278) (C.C.D.Pa. 1805) (Justice Washington).

Habeas Corpus: The Process of the Writ. -- A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed by or on behalf of a person in ``custody,'' a concept which has been expanded so much that it is no longer restricted to actual physical detention in jail or prison.\242\ Traditionally, the proceeding could not be used to secure an adjudication of a question which if determined in the petitioner's favor would not result in his immediate release, since a discharge from custody was the only function of the writ,\243\ but this restraint too the Court has abandoned in an emphasis upon the statutory language directing the habeas court to ``dispose of the matter as law and justice require.''\244\ Thus, even if a prisoner has been released from jail, the presence of collateral consequences flowing from his conviction gives the court jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the conviction.\245\

NOTES:

\243\McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934); Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960).

\244\28 U.S.C. Sec. 2243. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). See also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989).

\245\Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), overruling Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960). In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), the Court overruled McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), and held that a prisoner may attack on habeas the second of two consecutive sentences while still serving the first. See also Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968) (prisoner may attack the first of two consecutive sentences although the only effect of a successful attack would be immediate confinement on the second sentence). Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), held that one sufficiently in custody of a State could use habeas to challenge the State's failure to bring him to trial on pending charges.

Petitioners coming into federal habeas must first exhaust their state remedies, a limitation long settled in the case law and codified in 1948.\246\ It is only required that prisoners once present their claims in state court, either on appeal or collateral attack, and they need not return time and again to raise their issues before coming to federal court.\247\ While they were once required to petition the Supreme Court on certiorari to review directly their state convictions, prisoners have been relieved of this largely pointless exercise,\248\ although if the Supreme Court has taken and decided a case its judgment is conclusive in habeas on all issues of fact or law actually adjudicated.\249\

NOTES:

\247\Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-450 (1953); id., 502 (Justice Frankfurter concurring); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989).

\248\Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963), overruling Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).

\249\28 U.S.C. Sec. 2244(c). But an affirmance of a conviction by an equally divided Court is not an adjudication on the merits. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

A federal prisoner in a Sec. 2255 proceeding will file his motion in the court which sentenced him;\250\ a state prisoner in a federal habeas action may file either in the district of the court in which he was sentenced or in the district in which he is in custody.\251\

NOTES:

\251\28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(d). Cf. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), overruling Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), and holding a petitioner may file in the district in which his custodian is located although the prisoner may be located elsewhere.

Habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal.\252\ It is not a method to test ordinary procedural errors at trial or violations of state law but only to challenge alleged errors which if established would go to make the entire detention unlawful under federal law.\253\ If after appropriate proceedings, the habeas court finds that on the facts discovered and the law applied the prisoner is entitled to relief, it must grant it, ordinarily ordering the government to release the prisoner unless he is retried within a certain period.\254\

NOTES:

\253\Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1984)

\254\28 U.S.C. Sec. 2244(b). See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 569 (1971); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).

Although the speculations of some publicists and some judicial dicta\255\ support the idea of an inherent power of the federal courts sitting in equity to issue injunctions independently of statutory limitations, neither the course taken by Congress nor the specific rulings of the Supreme Court support any such principle. Congress has repeatedly exercised its power to limit the use of the injunction in federal courts. The first limitation on the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is to be found in Sec. 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that no equity suit should be maintained where there was a full and adequate remedy at law. Although this provision did no more than declare a pre-existing rule long applied in chancery courts,\256\ it did assert the power of Congress to regulate the equity powers of the federal courts. The Act of March 2, 1793,\257\ prohibited the issuance of any injunction by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in state courts except where such injunctions may be authorized by any law relating to bankruptcy proceedings. In subsequent statutes, Congress prohibited the issuance of injunctions in the federal courts to restrain the collection of taxes,\258\ provided for a three-judge court as a prerequisite to the issuance of injunctions to restrain the enforcement of state statutes for unconstitutionality,\259\ for enjoining federal statutes for unconstitutionality,\260\ and for enjoining orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission,\261\ limited the power to issue injunctions restraining rate orders of state public utility commissions,\262\ and the use of injunctions in labor disputes,\263\ and placed a very rigid restriction on the power to enjoin orders of the Administrator under the Emergency Price Control Act.\264\

NOTES:

\256\Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 210 (1830).

\257\1 Stat. 333, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2283.

\258\26 U.S.C. Sec. 7421(a).

\259\This provision was repealed in 1976, save for apportionment and districting suits and when otherwise required by an Act of Congress. P. L. 94-381, Sec. 1, 90 Stat. 1119, and Sec. 3, id., 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2284. Congress occasionally provides for such courts, as in the Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1971, 1973c.

\260\Repealed by P. L. 94-381, Sec. 2, 90 Stat. 1119. Congress occasionally provides for such courts now, in order to expedite Supreme Court consideration of constitutional challenges to critical federal laws. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719-721 (1986) (3-judge court and direct appeal to Supreme Court in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985).

\261\Repealed by P. L. 93-584, Sec. 7, 88 Stat. 1918.

\262\28 U.S.C. Sec. 1342.

\263\29 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 52, 101-110.

\264\56 Stat. 31, 204 (1942).

All of these restrictions have been sustained by the Supreme Court as constitutional and applied with varying degrees of thoroughness. The Court has made exceptions to the application of the prohibition against the stay of proceedings in state courts,\265\ but it has on the whole adhered to the statute. The exceptions raise no constitutional issues, and the tendency has been alternately to contract and to expand the scope of the exceptions.\266\

NOTES:

\266\Infra, pp.801-802.

In Duplex Printing Press v. Deering,\267\ the Supreme Court placed a narrow construction upon the labor provisions of the Clayton Act and thereby contributed in part to the more extensive restriction by Congress on the use of injunctions in labor disputes in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which has not only been declared constitutional\268\ but has been applied liberally\269\ and in such a manner as to repudiate the notion of an inherent power to issue injunctions contrary to statutory provisions.

NOTES:

\268\Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).

\269\Ibid.; see also Drivers' Union v. Valley Co., 311 U.S. 91. 100-103 (1940), and compare Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), with Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).

Injunctions Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. -- Lockerty v. Phillips\270\ justifies the same conclusion. Here the validity of the special appeals procedure of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was sustained. This act provided for a special Emergency Court of Appeals, which, subject to review by the Supreme Court, was given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of regulations, orders, and price schedules issued by the Office of Price Administration. The Emergency Court and the Emergency Court alone was permitted to enjoin regulations or orders of OPA, and even it could enjoin such orders only after finding that the order was not in accordance with law or was arbitrary or capricious. The Emergency Court was expressly denied power to issue temporary restraining orders or interlocutory decrees, and in addition the effectiveness of any permanent injunction it might issue was to be postponed for thirty days. If review was sought in the Supreme Court by certiorari, effectiveness was to be postponed until final disposition. A unanimous Court, speaking through Chief Justice Stone, declared that there ``is nothing in the Constitution which requires Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on any particular inferior federal court.'' All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, it was asserted, derive their jurisdiction solely from the exercise of the authority to ordain and establish inferior courts conferred on Congress by Article III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution. This power, which Congress is left free to exercise or not, was held to include the power ``of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.''\271\ Although the Court avoided passing upon the constitutionality of the prohibition against interlocutory decrees, the language of the Court was otherwise broad enough to support it, as was the language of Yakus v. United States,\272\ which sustained a different phase of the special procedure for appeals under the Emergency Price Control Act.

NOTES:

\271\Id., 187 (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. (44 U.S.) 236, 245 (1845)). See South Carolina v. Katzenback, 383 U.S. 301, 331-332 (1966), upholding a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that made the district court for the District of Columbia the only avenue of relief for States seeking to remove the coverage of the Act.

\272\321 U.S. 414 (1944). But compare Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (construing statute in way to avoid the constitutional issue raised in Yakus). In United States v. Mendoza- Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), the Court held that, when judicial review of a deportation order had been precluded, due process required that the alien be allowed to make a collateral challenge to the use of that proceeding as an element of a subsequent criminal proceeding.

Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all necessary rules governing their process and practice and for the orderly conduct of their business.\273\ However, this power too is derived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them. The landmark case is Wayman v. Southard,\274\ which sustained the validity of the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792 as a valid exercise of authority under the necessary and proper clause. Although Chief Justice Marshall regarded the rule-making power as essentially legislative in nature, he ruled that Congress could delegate to the courts the power to vary minor regulations in the outlines marked out by the statute. Fifty-seven years later, in Fink v. O'Neil,\275\ in which the United States sought to enforce by summary process the payment of a debt, the Supreme Court ruled that under the process acts the law of Wisconsin was the law of the United States, and hence the Government was required to bring a suit, obtain a judgment, and cause execution to issue. Justice Matthews for a unanimous Court declared that the courts have ``no inherent authority to take any one of these steps, except as it may have been conferred by the legislative department; for they can exercise no jurisdiction, except as the law confers and limits it.''\276\ Conceding, in 1934, the limited competence of legislative bodies to establish a comprehensive system of court procedure, and acknowledging the inherent power of courts to regulate the conduct of their business, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the lower federal courts not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes.\277\ Their operation being restricted, in conformity with the proviso attached to the congressional authorization, to matters of pleading and practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus judicially promulgated neither affect the substantive rights of litigants\278\ nor alter the jurisdiction\279\ of federal courts and the venue of actions therein\280\ and, thus circumscribed, have been upheld as valid.

NOTES:

\274\10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1 (1825).

\275\106 U.S. 272, 280 (1882).

\276\See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960), holding that a federal district court, sitting in admiralty, has no inherent power, independent of any statute or the Supreme Court's Admiralty Rules, to order the taking of deposition for the purpose of discovery. See also Harris v. Nelson. 394 U.S. 286 (1969), in which the Court found statutory authority in the ``All Writs Statute'' for a habeas corpus court to propound interrogatories.

\277\In the Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, and contained in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2072, Congress, in authorizing promulgation of rules of civil procedure, reserved the power to examine and override or amend rules proposed pursuant to the act which it found to be contrary to its legislative policy. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1941). Congress also has authorized promulgation of rules of criminal procedure, habeas, evidence, admiralty, bankruptcy, and appellate procedure. Congress in the 1970s disagreed with the direction of proposed rules of evidence and of habeas practice, and, first postponing their effectiveness, enacted revised rules. P.L. 93-505, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974); P.L. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334 (1976).

\278\However, the abolition of old rights and the creation of new ones in the course of litigation conducted in conformance with these judicially prescribed federal rules has been sustained as against the contention of a violation of substantive rights. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).

\279\Cf. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589-590 (1941).

\280\Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).

Limitations to This Power. -- The principal function of court rules is that of regulating the practice of courts as regards forms, the operation and effect of process, and the mode and time of proceedings. However, rules are sometimes employed to state in convenient form principles of substantive law previously established by statutes or decisions. But no such rule ``can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law.'' This rule is applicable equally to courts of law, equity, and admiralty, to rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for the guidance of lower courts, and to rules ``which lower courts make for their own guidance under authority conferred.''\281\ As incident to the judicial power, courts of the United States possess inherent authority to supervise the conduct of their officers, parties, witnesses, counsel, and jurors by self- preserving rules for the protection of the rights of litigants and the orderly administration of justice.\282\

NOTES:

\282\McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915); Griffin v. Thompson, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 244, 257 (1844). See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (court of appeal rule conditioning appeal on having filed with the district court timely objections to a master's report). In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956), the Court, citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), asserted that this supervisory power extends to policing the requirements of the Court's rules with respect to the law enforcement practices of federal agents. But compare United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).

The courts of the United States possess inherent equitable powers over their process to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice, and to protect their jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in the custody of law.\283\ Such powers are said to be essential to and inherent in the organization of courts of justice.\284\ The courts of the United States also possess inherent power to amend their records, correct the errors of the clerk or other court officers, and to rectify defects or omissions in their records even after the lapse of a term, subject, however, to the qualification that the power to amend records conveys no power to create a record or re-create one of which no evidence exists.\285\

NOTES:

\284\Eberly v. Moore, 24 How. (65 U.S.) 147 (1861); Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 134 (1919).

\285\Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451, 458 (1904).

The administration of insolvent enterprises, investigations into the reasonableness of public utility rates, and the performance of other judicial functions often require the special services of masters in chancery, referees, auditors, and other special aids. The practice of referring pending actions to a referee was held in Heckers v. Fowler\286\ to be coequal with the organization of the federal courts. In the leading case of Ex parte Peterson,\287\ a United States district court appointed an auditor with power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of testimony. The court authorized him to conduct a preliminary investigation of facts and file a report thereon for the purpose of simplifying the issues for the jury. This action was neither authorized nor prohibited by statute. In sustaining the action of the district judge, Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, declared: ``Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties. . . . This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause.''\288\ The power to appoint auditors by federal courts sitting in equity has been exercised from their very beginning, and here it was held that this power is the same whether the court sits in law or equity.

NOTES:

\287\253 U.S. 300 (1920).

\288\Id., 312.

Subject to general statutory qualifications for attorneys, the power of the federal courts to admit and disbar attorneys rests on the common law from which it was originally derived. According to Chief Justice Taney, it was well settled by the common law that ``it rests exclusively with the Court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.'' Such power, he made clear, however, ``is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the Court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the Court, as the right and dignity of the Court itself.''\289\ The Test-Oath Act of July 2, 1862, which purported to exclude former Confederates from the practice of law in the federal courts, was invalidated in Ex parte Garland.\290\ In the course of his opinion for the Court, Justice Field discussed generally the power to admit and disbar attorneys. The exercise of such a power, he declared, is judicial power. The attorney is an officer of the court, and though Congress may prescribe qualifications for the practice of law in the federal courts, it may not do so in such a way as to inflict punishment contrary to the Constitution or to deprive a pardon of the President of its legal effect.\291\

NOTES:

\290\4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1867).

\291\Id., 378-380. Although a lawyer is admitted to practice in a federal court by way of admission to practice in a state court, he is not automatically sent out of the federal court by the same route, when ``principles of right and justice'' require otherwise. A determination of a state court that an accused practitioner should be disbarred is not conclusively binding on the federal courts. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957), citing Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917). Cf. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 288 (1953), where it was acknowledged that upon disbarment by a state court, Rule 2, par. 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court imposes upon the attorney the burden of showing cause why he should not be disbarred in the latter, and upon his failure to meet that burden, the Supreme Court will ``follow the finding of the state that the character requisite for membership in the bar is lacking.'' In 348 U.S. 1 (1954), Isserman's disbarment was set aside for reason of noncompliance with Rule 8 requiring concurrence of a majority of the Justices participating in order to sustain a disbarment. See also In re Disbarment of Crow, 359 U.S. 1007 (1959). For an extensive treatment of disbarment and American and English precedents thereon, see Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883).

Article III, Section 2, Clause 1. The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States,--between Citizens of the same State claiming Land under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

Late in the Convention, a delegate proposed to extend the judicial power to cases arising under the Constitution of the United States as well as under its laws and treaties. Madison's notes continue: ``Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising under the Constitution, and whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given to that Department.

``The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem : con : it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature--''.\292\

NOTE:

That the Framers did not intend for federal judges to roam at large in construing the Constitution and laws of the United States but rather preferred and provided for resolution of disputes arising in a ``judicial'' manner is revealed not only in the language of Sec. 2 and the passage quoted above but as well in the refusal to associate the judges in the extra-judicial functions which some members of the Convention -- Madison and Wilson notably -- conceived for them. Thus, four times proposals for associating the judges in a council of revision to pass on laws generally were voted down,\293\ and similar fates befell suggestions that the Chief Justice be a member of a privy council to assist the President\294\ and that the President or either House of Congress be able to request advisory opinions of the Supreme Court.\295\

NOTES:

\294\Id., 328-329, 342-344. Although a truncated version of the proposal was reported by the Committee of Detail, id., 367, the Convention never took it up.

\295\Id., 340-341. The proposal was referred to the Committee of Detail and never heard of again.

This intent of the Framers was early effectuated when the Justices declined a request of President Washington to tender him advice respecting legal issues growing out of United States neutrality between England and France in 1793.\296\ Moreover, the refusal of the Justices to participate in the congressional plan for awarding veterans' pensions\297\ bespoke a similar adherence to the restricted role of courts. These restrictions have been encapsuled in a series of principles or doctrines, the application of which determines whether an issue is meet for judicial resolution and whether the parties raising it are entitled to have it judicially resolved. Constitutional restrictions are intertwined with prudential considerations in the expression of these principles and doctrines, and it is seldom easy to separate out the two strands.\298\

NOTES:

\297\Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 409 (1792), discussed supra, pp.620-621.

\298\See, e.g., Justice Brandeis dissenting in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345-348 (1936). Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-575 (1947).

By the terms of the foregoing section, the judicial power extends to nine classes of cases and controversies, which fall into two general groups. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia:\299\ ``In the first, jurisdiction depends on the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties. This class comprehends `all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.' This cause extends the jurisdiction of the Court to all the cases described, without making in its terms any exception whatever, and without any regard to the condition of the party. If there be any exception, it is to be implied, against the express words of the article. In the second class, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties. In this are comprehended controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State,' and `between a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects.' If these be the parties, it is entirely unimportant, what may be the subject of controversy. Be it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the courts of the Union.''\300\

NOTES:

\300\Id., 378.

Judicial power is ``the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision.''\301\ The meaning attached to the terms ``cases'' and ``controversies''\302\ determines therefore the extent of the judicial power as well as the capacity of the federal courts to receive jurisdiction. According to Chief Justice Marshall, judicial power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted in a case and a case arises only when a party asserts his rights ``in a form prescribed by law.''\303\ ``By cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants brought before the courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs. Whenever the claim of a party under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States takes such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case. The term implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to the Court for adjudication.''\304\

NOTES:

\302\The two terms may be used interchangeably, inasmuch as a ``controversy,'' if distinguishable from a ``case'' at all, is so only because it is a less comprehensive word and includes only suits of a civil nature. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937).

\303\Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738, 819 (1824).

\304\In re Pacific Ry. Comm., 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C. Calif. 1887) (Justice Field). See also Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 173-174 (1889).

Chief Justice Hughes once essayed a definition, which, however, presents a substantial problem of labels. ``A `controversy' in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical character; from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.''\305\ Of the ``case'' and ``controversy'' requirement, Chief Justice Warren admitted that ``those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government. Embodied in the words `cases' and `controversies' are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case and controversy doctrine.''\306\ Justice Frankfurter perhaps best captured the flavor of the ``case'' and ``controversy'' requirement by noting that it takes the ``expert feel of lawyers'' often to note it.\307\

NOTES:

\306\Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968).

\307\``The jurisdiction of the federal courts can be invoked only under circumstances which to the expert feel of lawyers constitute a `case or controversy.''' Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149, 150 (1951).

From these quotations may be isolated several factors which, in one degree or another, go to make up a ``case'' and ``controversy.''

The presence of adverse litigants with real interests to contend for is a standard which has been stressed in numerous cases,\308\ and the requirement implicates a number of complementary factors making up a justiciable suit. A concrete example of the requirement being one of the decisive factors, if not the decisive one, is Muskrat v. United States,\309\ a case not now deemed of great importance, in which the Court struck down a statute authorizing certain named Indians to bring a test suit against the United States to determine the validity of a law affecting the allocation of Indian lands. Attorneys' fees of both sides were to be paid out of tribal funds deposited in the United States Treasury. ``The judicial power,'' said the Court,``. . . is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction. . . . It is true the United States is made a defendant to this action, but it has no interest adverse to the claimants. The object is not to assert a property right as against the government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs because of action upon its part. The whole purpose of the law is to determine the constitutional validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not arising between parties concerning a property right necessarily involved in the decision in question, but in a proceeding against the government in its sovereign capacity, and concerning which the only judgment required is to settle the doubtful character of the legislation in question.''\310\

NOTES:

\309\219 U.S. 346 (1911).

\310\Id., 361-362. The Indians obtained the sought-after decision the following year by the simple expedient of suing to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing the disputed statute. Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912). Other cases have involved similar problems, but they resulted in decisions on the merits. E.g., Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 455-463 (1899); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966); but see id., 357 (Justice Black dissenting). The principal effect of Muskrat was to put in doubt for several years the validity of any sort of declaratory judgment provision in federal law.

Collusive and Feigned Suits. -- Prime among the cases in which adverse litigants are required are those suits in which two parties have gotten together to bring a friendly suit to settle a question of interest to them. Thus, in Lord v. Veazie,\311\ the latter had executed a deed to the former warranting that he had certain rights claimed by a third person and suit was instituted to decide the ``dispute.'' Declaring that ``the whole proceeding was in contempt of the court, and highly reprehensible,'' the Court observed: ``The contract set out in the pleadings was made for the purpose of instituting this suit. . . . The plaintiff and defendant are attempting to procure the opinion of this court upon a question of law, in the decision of which they have a common interest opposed to that of other persons, who are not parties to the suit. . . . And their conduct is the more objectionable, because they have brought up the question upon a statement of facts agreed upon between themselves . . . and upon a judgment pro forma entered by their mutual consent, without any actual judicial decision. . . .''\312\ ``Whenever,'' said the Court in another case, ``in pursuance of an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights by one individual against another, there is presented a question involving the validity of any act of any legislature, State or federal, and the decision necessarily rests on the competency of the legislature to so enact, the court must . . . determine whether the act be constitutional or not; but such an exercise of power is the ultimate and supreme function of courts. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.''\313\ Yet, several widely known constitutional decisions have been rendered in cases in which friendly parties contrived to have the actions brought and in which the suits were supervised and financed by one side.\314\ And there are instances in which there may not be in fact an adverse party at certain stages, that is, some instances when the parties do not actually disagree, but in which the Court and the lower courts are empowered to adjudicate.\315\

NOTES:

\312\Id., 254-255.

\313\Chicago & G.T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892).

\314\E.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 171 (1796); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. (10 U.S.) 87 (1810); Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857); Cf. 1 C. Warren, op. cit., n. 18, 147, 392-395; 2 id., 279-282. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court adjudicated on the merits a challenge to the constitutionality of criminal treatment of chronic alcoholics although the findings of the trial court, agreed to by the parties, appeared rather to be ``the premises of a syllogism transparently designed to bring this case' within the confines of an earlier enunciated constitutional principle. But adversity arguably still existed.

\315\Examples are naturalization cases, Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926), entry of judgment by default or on a plea of guilty, In re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U.S. 90 (1908), and consideration by the Court of cases in which the Solicitor General confesses error below. Cf. Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258-259 (1942); Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808 (1952); Rosengart v. Laird, 404 U.S. 908 (1972) (Justice White dissenting). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58-59 (1968).

Stockholder Suits.--Moreover, adversity in parties has often been found in suits by stockholders against their corporation in which the constitutionality of a statute or a government action is drawn in question, even though one may suspect that the interests of plaintiffs and defendant are not all that dissimilar. Thus, in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,\316\ the Court sustained the jurisdiction of a district court which had enjoined the company from paying an income tax even though the suit was brought by a stockholder against the company, thereby circumventing a statute which forbade the maintenance in any court of a suit to restrain the collection of any tax.\317\ Subsequently, the Court sustained jurisdiction in cases brought by a stockholder to restrain a company from investing its funds in farm loan bonds issued by federal land banks\318\ and by preferred stockholders against a utility company and the TVA to enjoin the performance of contracts between the company and TVA on the ground that the statute creating it was unconstitutional.\319\ Perhaps most notorious was Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,\320\ in which the president of the company brought suit against the company and its officials, among whom was Carter's father, a vice president of the company, and in which the Court entertained the suit and decided the case on the merits.\321\

NOTES:

\317\Cf. Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883).

\318\Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).

\319\Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). See id., 341 (Justice Brandeis dissenting in part).

\320\298 U.S. 238 (1936).

\321\Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 667-668 (1948) (detailing the framing of the suit).

Perhaps the most important element of the requirement of adverse parties may be found in the ``complexities and vagaries'' of the standing doctrine. ``The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.''\322\ The ``gist of the question of standing'' is whether the party seeking relief has ``alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.''\323\ This practical conception of standing has now given way to a primary emphasis upon separation of powers as the guide. ``[T]he `case or controversy' requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded. The several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are `founded in concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society.'''\324\

NOTES:

\323\Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). That persons or organizations have a personal, ideological interest sufficiently strong to create adverseness is not alone enough to confer standing; rather, the adverseness is the consequence of one being able to satisfy the Article III requisite of injury in fact. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 482-486 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Com. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225-226 (1974). Nor is the fact that if plaintiffs have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, a sufficient basis for finding standing. Id., 227.

\324\Allen v. Wright,468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). All the standards relating to whether a plaintiff is entitled to adjudication of his claims must be evaluated ``by reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise power only in the last resort, and as a necessity,' . . . and only when adjudication is `consistent with a system of separated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.''' Id., 752 (quoting, respectively, Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)). For the strengthening of the separation-of-powers barrier to standing, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2135-2136, 2142-2146 (1992).

Standing as a doctrine is composed of both constitutional and prudential restraints on the power of the federal courts to render decisions,\325\ and is almost exclusively concerned with such public law questions as determinations of constitutionality and review of administrative or other governmental action.\326\ As such, it is often interpreted according to the prevailing philosophies of judicial activism and restraint and narrowly or broadly in terms of the viewed desirability of access to the courts by persons seeking to challenge legislation or other governmental action. The trend in the 1960s was to broaden access; in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, it was to stiffen the requirements of standing, although Court majorities were not entirely consistent. The major difficulty in setting forth the standards is that the Court's generalizations and the results it achieves are often at variance.\327\

NOTES:

\326\C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts (St. Paul: 4th ed. 1983), 60.

\327\``[T]he concept of `Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court . . . [and] this very fact is probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition.'' Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). ``Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.'' Assn. of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). For extensive consideration of the doctrine, see Hart & Wechsler, op. cit., n.250, 107-196.

The standing rules apply to actions brought in federal courts, and they have no direct application to actions brought in state courts.\328\

NOTE:

Citizen Suits. -- Persons do not have standing to sue to enforce a constitutional provision when all they can show or claim is that they have an interest or have suffered an injury that is shared by all members of the public. Thus, a group of persons suing as citizens to litigate a contention that membership of Members of Congress in the military reserves constituted a violation of Article I, Sec. 6, cl. 2, was denied standing.\329\ ``The only interest all citizens share in the claim advanced by respondents is one which presents injury in the abstract. . . . [The] claimed nonobservance [of the clause], standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.''\330\

NOTES:

\330\Id., 217. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-177 (1974); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984); Whitmore v. 495 U.S. 149 (1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2143-2145 (1992). Cf. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).

Taxpayer Suits. -- Save for a narrowly cabined exception, standing is also lacking when a litigant attempts to sue to contest governmental action that he claims injures him as a taxpayer. In Frothingham v. Mellon,\331\ the Court denied standing to a taxpayer suing to restrain disbursements of federal money to those States that chose to participate in a program to reduce maternal and infant mortality; her claim was that Congress lacked power to appropriate funds for those purposes and that the appropriations would increase her taxes in future years in an unconstitutional manner. Noting that a federal taxpayer's ``interest in the moneys of the Treasury . . . is comparatively minute and indeterminate'' and that ``the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds . . . [is] remote, fluctuating and uncertain,'' the Court ruled that plaintiff had failed to allege the type of ``direct injury'' necessary to confer standing.\332\

NOTES:

\332\Id., 487, 488.

Taxpayers were found to have standing, however, in Flast v. Cohen,\333\ to contest the expenditure of federal moneys to assist religious-affiliated organizations. The Court asserted that the answer to the question whether taxpayers have standing depends on whether the circumstances of each case demonstrate that there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated. First, there must be a logical link between the status of taxpayer and the type of legislative enactment attacked; this means, a taxpayer must allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Article I, Sec. 8, rather than also of incidental expenditure of funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. Second, there must be a logical nexus between the status of taxpayer and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged; this means, the taxpayer must show the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power, rather than simply to argue the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress. Both Frothingham and Flast met the first test, because they attacked a spending program. Flast met the second test, because the establishment clause of the First Amendment operates as a specific limitation upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power, while Frothingham had alleged only that the Tenth Amendment had been exceeded. Reserved was the question whether other specific limitations constrained the taxing and spending clause in the same manner as the establishment clause.\334\

NOTES:

\334\Id., 105.

Since Flast, the Court has refused to expand it. Litigants seeking standing as taxpayers to challenge legislation permitting the CIA to withhold from the public detailed information about its expenditures as a violation of Article I, Sec. 9, cl. 7, and to challenge certain Members of Congress from holding commissions in the reserves as a violation of Article I, Sec. 6, cl. 2, were denied standing, in the former cases because their challenge was not to an exercise of the taxing and spending power and in the latter because their challenge was not to legislation enacted under Article I, Sec. 8, but rather was to executive action in permitting Members to maintain their reserve status.\335\ An organization promoting church-state separation was denied standing to challenge an executive decision to donate surplus federal property to a church-related college, both because the contest was to executive action under a valid piece of legislation and because the property transfer was not pursuant to a taxing and spending clause exercise but was taken under the property clause of Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2.\336\ It seems evident that for at least the foreseeable future taxpayer standing will be restricted to establishment clause limitations on spending programs.

NOTES:

\336\Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).

Local taxpayers attacking local expenditures have generally been permitted more leeway than federal taxpayers insofar as standing is concerned. Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education,\337\ such a taxpayer was found to have standing to challenge the use of public funds for transportation of pupils to parochial schools.\338\ But in Doremus v. Board of Educ.,\339\ the Court refused an appeal from a state court for lack of standing of a taxpayer challenging Bible reading in the classroom. No measurable disbursement of public funds was involved in this type of activity, so that there was no direct injury to the taxpayer, a rationale similar to the spending program-regulatory program distinction of Flast.

NOTES:

\338\See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295 (1899); Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1880); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). See also Illinois ex rel. McCollom v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (plaintiffs suing as parents and taxpayers).

\339\342 U.S. 429 (1952). Compare Alder v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).

Constitutional Standards: Injury in Fact, Causation, and Redressability. -- While the Court has been inconsistent over time, it has now settled upon the rule that, ``at an irreducible minimum,'' the constitutional requisites under Article III for the existence of standing are that the party seeking to sue must personally have suffered some actual or threatened injury that can fairly be traced to the challenged action of defendant and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.\340\

NOTE:

For some time, injury alone was not sufficient; rather, the injury had to be ``a wrong which directly results in the violation of a legal right,''\341\ that is, ``one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded in a statute which confers a privilege.''\342\ The problem was that the ``legal right'' language was ``demonstrably circular: if the plaintiff is given standing to assert his claims, his interest is legally protected; if he is denied standing, his interest is not legally protected.''\343\ The observable tendency of the Court, however, was to find standing frequently in cases distinctly not grounded in property rights.\344\

NOTES:

\342\Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-138 (1939).

\343\C. Wright, op. cit., n. 326, 65-66.

\344\E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (indirect injury to organization and members by governmental maintenance of list of subversive organizations); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (same); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n. 9 (1963) (parents and school children challenging school prayers); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-431 (1961) (merchants challenging Sunday closing laws); Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, 204-208 (1962) (voting rights).

In any event, the ``legal rights'' language has now been dispensed with. Rejection occurred in two administrative law cases in which the Court announced that parties had standing when they suffered ``injury in fact'' to some interest, ``economic or otherwise,'' that is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision in question.\345\ Now, environmental, aesthetic, and social interests, when impaired, afford a basis for making constitutional attacks upon governmental action.\346\ The breadth of the injury in fact concept may be discerned in a series of cases involving the right of private parties to bring actions under the Fair Housing Act to challenge alleged discriminatory practices. The subjective and intangible interests of persons in enjoying the benefits of living in integrated communities were found sufficient to permit them to attack actions which threatened or harmed those interests even though the actions were not directed at them.\347\ Similarly, the interests of individuals and associations of individuals in using the environment afforded them the standing to challenge actions which threatened those environmental conditions.\348\ Nonetheless, the Court has also in constitutional cases been wary of granting standing to persons who alleged threats or harm to interests which they shared with the larger community of people at large, a rule against airing ``generalized grievances'' through the courts,\349\ although it is unclear whether this rule (or subrule) has a constitutional or a prudential basis.\350\ And in a number of cases, the Court has refused standing apparently in the belief that the assertion of harm is too speculative or too remote to credit.\351\

NOTES:

\349\See supra, nn.329-330.

\350\Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (prudential), with Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 485, 490 (1982) (apparently constitutional). In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), it is again prudential.

\351\E.g. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (``allegations of a subjective `chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.''). See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); California Bankers Assn. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 262, 371- 373 (1976). In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the Court held that victim of police chokehold seeking injunctive relief was unable to show sufficient likelihood of recurrence as to him.

Of increasing importance are the second and third element of standing, recently developed and held to be of constitutional requisite. Thus, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; that is, the Court insists that the plaintiff show that ``but for'' the action, she would not have been injured. And the Court has insisted that there must be a ``substantial likelihood'' that the relief sought from the court if granted would remedy the harm.\352\ Thus, poor people who had been denied service at certain hospitals were held to lack standing to challenge IRS policy of extending tax benefits to hospitals that did not serve indigents, since they could not show that alteration of the tax policy would cause the hospitals to alter their policies and treat them.\353\ Low-income persons seeking the invalidation of a town's restrictive zoning ordinance were held to lack standing, because they had failed to allege with sufficient particularity that the complained-of injury, inability to obtain adequate housing within their means, was fairly attributable to the ordinance instead of to other factors, so that voiding of the ordinance might not have any effect upon their ability to find affordable housing.\354\ Similarly, the link between fully integrated public schools and allegedly lax administration of tax policy permitting benefits to discriminatory private schools was deemed too tenuous, the harm flowing from private actors not before the courts and the speculative possibility that directing denial of benefits would result in any minority child being admitted to a school.\355\ But the Court did permit plaintiffs to attack the constitutionality of a law limiting the liability of private utilities in the event of nuclear accidents and providing for indemnification, on a showing that ``but for'' the passage of the law there was a ``substantial likelihood,'' based upon industry testimony and other material in the legislative history, that the nuclear power plants would not be constructed and that therefore the environmental and aesthetic harm alleged by plaintiffs would not occur; thus, a voiding of the law would likely relieve the plaintiffs of the complained of injuries.\356\ Operation of these requirements makes difficult but not impossible the establishment of standing by persons indirectly injured by governmental action, that is, action taken as to third parties that is alleged to have as a consequence injured the claimants.\357\

NOTES:

\353\Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (mother of illegitimate child lacked standing to contest prosecutorial policy of utilizing child support laws to coerce support of legitimate children only, since it was ``only speculative'' that prosecution of father would result in support rather than jailing).

\354\Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). But in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1974), a person who alleged he was seeking housing in the community and that he would qualify if the organizational plaintiff were not inhibited by allegedly racially discriminatory zoning laws from constructing housing for low-income persons like himself was held to have shown a ``substantial probability'' that voiding of the ordinance would benefit him.

\355\Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). But compare Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), where persons denied equal treatment in conferral of benefits were held to have standing to challenge the treatment, although a judicial order could only have terminated benefits to the favored class. In that event, members would have secured relief in the form of equal treatment, even if they did not receive benefits. And see Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271-273 (1979).

\356\Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-78 1978). The likelihood of relief in some cases appears to be rather speculative at best. E.g., Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-368 (1980); Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U.S. 151, 160-162 (1981).

\357\Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-761 (1984).

Prudential Standing Rules. -- Even when Article III constitutional standing rules have been satisfied, the Court has held that principles of prudence may counsel the judiciary to refuse to adjudicate some claims.\358\ With respect to the prudential rules, it is clear that the Court feels free to disregard any of these principles in cases in which it thinks exceptionable circumstances exists,\359\ and Congress is free to legislate away prudential restraints upon the Court's jurisdiction and confer standing to the furtherest extent permitted by Article III.\360\ The Court has identified three rules as prudential ones,\361\ only one of which has been a significant factor in the jurisprudence of standing. The first two rules are that the plaintiff's interest, to which she asserts an injury, must come within the ``zone of interest'' arguably protected by the constitutional provision or statute in question\362\ and that plaintiffs may not air ``generalized grievances'' shared by all or a large class of citizens.\363\ The important rule concerns the ability of a plaintiff to represent the constitutional rights of third parties not before the court.

NOTES:

\359\Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-501 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-194 (1976). \360\``Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III's requirement remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.'' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). That is, the actual or threatened injury required may exist solely by virtue of ``statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.'' Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n. 2 (1974). Examples include United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co ., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 n. 4, 11-12 (1976). For a good example of the congressionally- created interest and the injury to it, see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-375 (1982) (Fair Housing Act created right to truthful information on availability of housing; black tester's right injured through false information, but white tester not injured because he received truthful information). It is clear, however, that the Court will impose separation-of-powers restraints on the power of Congress to create interests to which injury would give standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2142-2146 (1992).

\361\Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 474-475 (1982); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).

\362\Assn. of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org ., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n. 19 (1976); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.S. 388 (1987).

\363\United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173, 174-176 (1974); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687-688 (1973), a congressional conferral case, the Court agreed that the interest asserted was one shared by all, but the Court has disparaged SCRAP, asserting that it ``surely went to the very outer limit of the law,'' Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159 (1990).

Standing to Assert the Constitutional Rights of Others. -- Usually, one may assert only one's interest in the litigation and not challenge the constitutionality of a statute or a governmental action because it infringes the protectable rights of someone else.\364\ In Tileston v. Ullman,\365\ an early round in the attack on a state anticontraceptive law, a doctor sued, charging that he was prevented from giving his patients needed birth control advice. The Court held he had no standing; no right of his was infringed, and he could not represent the interests of his patients. But there are several exceptions to this part of the standing doctrine that make generalization misleading. Many cases allow standing to third parties if they demonstrate a requisite degree of injury to themselves and if under the circumstances the injured parties whom they seek to represent would likely not be able to assert their rights. Thus, in Barrows v. Jackson,\366\ a white defendant who was being sued for damages for breach of a restrictive covenant directed against African Americans--and therefore able to show injury in liability for damages--was held to have standing to assert the rights of the class of persons whose constitutional rights were infringed.\367\ Similarly, the Court has permitted defendants who have been convicted under state law--giving them the requisite injury--to assert the rights of those persons not before the Court whose rights would be adversely affected through enforcement of the law in question.\368\ In fact, the Court has permitted persons who would be subject to future prosecution or future legal action--thus satisfying the injury requirement--to represent the rights of third parties with whom the challenged law has interfered with a relationship.\369\ It is also possible, of course, that one's own rights can be affected by action directed at someone from another group.\370\

NOTES:

\365\318 U.S. 44 (1943). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508- 510 (1975) (challenged law did not adversely affect plaintiffs and did not adversely affect a relationship between them and persons they sought to represent).

\366\346 U.S. 249 (1953).

\367\See also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (white plaintiff suing for specific performance of a contract to convey property to a Negro had standing to contest constitutionality of ordinance barring sale of property to African Americans, inasmuch as black defendant was relying on ordinance as his defense); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (white assignor of membership in discriminatory private club could raise rights of black assignee in seeking injunction against expulsion from club).

\368\E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (persons convicted of prescribing contraceptives for married persons and as accessories to crime of using contraceptives have standing to raise constitutional rights of patients with whom they had a professional relationship; while use of contraceptives was a crime, it was doubtful any married couple would be prosecuted so that they could challenge the statute); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (advocate of contraception convicted of giving device to unmarried woman had standing to assert rights of unmarried persons denied access; unmarried persons not subject to prosecution and were thus impaired in ability to obtain them or gain forum to assert rights).

\369\E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-189 (1973) (doctors have standing to challenge abortion statute since it operates directly against them and they should not have to await criminal prosecution in order to determine their validity); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976) (same); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-197 (1976) (licensed beer distributor could contest sex discriminatory alcohol laws because it operated on him, he suffered injury in fact, and was ``obvious claimant'' to raise issue); Carey v. Population Services Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 682-684 (1977) (vendor of contraceptives had standing to bring action to challenge law limiting distribution). Older cases support the proposition. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).

\370\Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (white defendant had standing to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to exclusion of blacks from his jury, since defendant had a right to a jury comprised of a fair cross section of the community).

A substantial dispute was occasioned in Singleton v. Wulff,\371\ over the standing of doctors, who were denied Medicaid funds for the performance of abortions not ``medically indicated,'' to assert the rights of absent women to compensated abortions. All the Justices thought the Court should be hesitant to resolve a controversy on the basis of the rights of third parties, but they divided with respect to the standards exceptions. Four Justices favored a lenient standard, permitting third party representation when there is a close, perhaps confidential, relationship between the litigant and the third parties and when there is some genuine obstacle to third party assertion of their rights; four Justices would have permitted a litigant to assert the rights of third parties only when government directly interdicted the relationship between the litigant and the third parties through the criminal process and when litigation by the third parties is in all practicable terms impossible.\372\

NOTES:

\372\Compare id., 112-118 (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Marshall), with id., 123-131 (Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger). Justice Stevens concurred with the former four Justices on narrower grounds limited to this case.

Following Wulff, the Court emphasized the close attorney-client relationship in holding that a lawyer had standing to assert his client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel in challenging application of a drug-forfeiture law to deprive the client of the means of paying counsel.\373\ However, a ``next friend'' whose stake in the outcome is only speculative must establish that the real party in interest is unable to litigate his own cause because of mental incapacity, lack of access to courts, or other disability.\374\

NOTES:

\374\Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (death row inmate's challenge to death penalty imposed on a fellow inmate who knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily chose not to appeal cannot be pursued).

A variant of the general rule is that one may not assert the unconstitutionality of a statute in other respects when the statute is constitutional as to him.\375\ Again, the exceptions may be more important than the rule. Thus, an overly broad statute, especially one that regulates speech and press, may be considered on its face rather than as applied, and a defendant to whom the statute constitutionally applies may be enabled to assert its unconstitutionality thereby.\376\

NOTES:

\376\Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-487 (1965); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974). The Court has narrowed its overbreadth doctrine, though not consistently, in recent years. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 59-60 (1976), and id., 73 (Justice Powell concurring); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771-773 (1982). But the exception as stated in the text remains strong. E.g., Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., 484 U.S. 383 (1988).

Organizational Standing. -- Organizations do not have standing as such to represent their particular concept of the public interest,\377\ but organizations have been permitted to assert the rights of their members.\378\ In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm.,\379\ the Court promulgated elaborate standards, holding that an organization or association ``has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.'' Similar considerations arise in the context of class actions, in which the Court holds that a named representative with a justiciable claim for relief is necessary when the action is filed and when the class is certified, but that following class certification there need be only a live controversy with the class, provided the adequacy of the representation is sufficient.\380\

NOTES:

\378\E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967); United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).

\379\432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). The organization here was not a voluntary membership entity but a state agency charged with furthering the interests of apple growers who were assessed annual sums to support the Commission. Id., 341-345. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510-517 (1975); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39-40 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-264 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321 (1980); International Union, UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986).

\380\United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). Geraghty was a mootness case.

Standing of States to Represent Their Citizens. -- The right of a State to sue as parens patriae, in behalf of its citizens, has long been recognized.\381\ No State, however, may be parens patriae of her citizens ``as against the Federal Government.''\382\ But a State may sue on behalf of the economic welfare of its citizens to protect them from environmental harm\383\ and to enjoin other States and private parties from engaging in actions harmful to the economic or other well- being of its citizens.\384\ The State must be more than a nominal party without a real interest of its own, merely representing the interests of particular citizens who cannot represent themselves;\385\ it must articulate an interest apart from those of private parties that partakes of a ``quasi-sovereign interest'' in the health and well-being, both physical and economic, of its residents in general, although there are suggestions that the restrictive definition grows out of the Court's wish to constrain its original jurisdiction and may not fit such suits brought in the lower federal courts.\386\

NOTES:

\382\Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-486 (1923). But see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (denying such standing to raise two constitutional claims against the United States but deciding a third); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 n. 1 (1970) (no question raised about standing or jurisdiction; claims adjudicated).

\383\Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923).

\384\Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (antitrust); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737-739 (1981) (discriminatory state taxation of natural gas shipped to out-of-state customers); Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (discrimination by growers against Puerto Rican migrant workers and denial of Commonwealth's opportunity to participate in federal employment service laws).

\385\New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 376 (1923); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976).

\386\Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607-608 (1982). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, argued that the Court's standards should apply only in original actions and not in actions filed in federal district courts, where, they contended, the prerogative of a State to bring suit on behalf of its citizens should be commensurate with the ability of private organizations to do so. Id., 610. The Court admitted that different considerations might apply between original actions and district court suits. Id., 603 n. 12.

Standing of Members of Congress. -- The lower federal courts have of late developed a body of law with respect to the standing of Members of Congress, as Members, to bring court actions, usually to challenge actions of the executive branch. Most of the law has developed in the District of Columbia Circuit,\387\ and the Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue on the merits.\388\

It seems clear that a legislator ``receives no special consideration in the standing inquiry,''\389\ and that he, along with every other person attempting to invoke the aid of a federal court, must show ``injury in fact'' as a predicate to standing. What that injury in fact may consist of, however, is the basis of the controversy.

NOTES:

\388\In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), the Court recognized that legislators can in some instances suffer an injury in respect to the effectiveness of their votes that will confer standing. In Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978), affg. 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976) (three-judge court), the Court affirmed a decision in which the lower court had found Member standing but had then decided against the Member on the merits. The ``unexplicated affirmance'' could have reflected disagreement with the lower court on standing or agreement with it on the merits. Note Justice Rehnquist's appended statement. Ibid. In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), the Court vacated a decision, in which the lower Court had found Member standing, and directed dismissal, but none of the Justices who set forth reasons addressed the question of standing. The opportunity to consider Member standing was strongly pressed in Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987), but the expiration of the law in issue mooted the case.

\389\Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C.Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 997 (1978).

A suit by Members for an injunction against continued prosecution of the Indochina war was held maintainable on the theory that if the court found the President's actions to be beyond his constitutional authority, the holding would have a distinct and significant bearing upon the Members' duties to vote appropriations and other supportive legislation and to consider impeachment.\390\ The breadth of this rationale was disapproved in subsequent cases. The leading decision is Kennedy v. Sampson,\391\ in which a Member was held to have standing to contest the alleged improper use of a pocket veto to prevent from becoming law a bill the Senator had voted for. Thus, Congressmen were held to have a derivative rather than direct interest in protecting their votes, which was sufficient for standing purposes, when some ``legislative disenfranchisement'' occurred.\392\ In a comprehensive assessment of its position, the Circuit distinguished between (1) a diminution in congressional influence resulting from executive action that nullifies a specific congressional vote or opportunity to vote in an objectively verifiable manner, which will constitute injury in fact, and (2) a diminution in a legislator's effectiveness, subjectively judged by him, resulting from executive action, such a failing to obey a statute, where the plaintiff legislator has power to act through the legislative process, in which injury in fact does not exist.\393\ Having thus established a fairly broad concept of Member standing, the Circuit then proceeded to curtail it by holding that the equitable discretion of the court to deny relief should be exercised in many cases in which a Member had standing but in which issues of separation of powers, political questions, and other justiciability considerations counseled restraint.\394\ The status of this issue thus remains in confusion.

NOTES:

\391\511 F.2d 430 (D.C.Cir. 1974). In Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C.Cir. 1985), the court again found standing by Members challenging a pocket veto, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot. Sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). Whether the injury was the nullification of the past vote on passage only or whether it was also the nullification of an opportunity to vote to override the veto has divided the Circuit, with the majority favoring the broader interpretation. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.), and id., 711-712 (Judge Wright), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)

\392\Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-436 (D.C.Cir. 1974). See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n. 41 (D.C.Cir. 1977). Harrington found no standing in a Member's suit challenging CIA failure to report certain actions to Congress, in order that Members could intelligently vote on certain issues. See also Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C.Cir.), cert. den., 439 U.S. 997 (1978).

\393\Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702, 703 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The failure of the Justices to remark on standing is somewhat puzzling, since it has been stated that courts ``turn initially, although not invariably, to the question of standing to sue.'' Schlesinger v. Reservists Com. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974). But see Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 207 (D.C.Cir. 1977). In any event, the Supreme Court's decision vacating Goldwater deprives the Circuit's language of precedential effect. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n. 12 (1975).

\394\Riegle v. FOMC, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C.Cir.), cert. den., 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).

Standing to Challenge Nonconstitutional Governmental Action. -- Standing in this sense has a constitutional content to the degree that Article III requires a ``case'' or ``controversy,'' necessitating a litigant who has sustained or will sustain an injury so that he will be moved to present the issue ``in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.''\395\ Liberalization of the law of standing in this field has been notable. The ``old law'' required that in order to sue to contest the lawfulness of agency administrative action, one must have suffered a ``legal wrong,'' that is, ``the right invaded must be a legal right,''\396\ requiring some resolution of the merits preliminarily. An injury-in-fact was insufficient.

NOTES:

\396\Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-138 (1939). See also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).

A ``legal right'' could be established in one of two ways. It could be a common-law right, such that if the injury were administered by a private party, one could sue on it;\397\ or it could be a right created by the Constitution or a statute.\398\ The statutory right most relied on was the judicial review section of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provided that ``[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.''\399\ Early decisions under this statute interpreted the language as adopting the ``legal interest'' and ``legal wrong'' standard then prevailing as constitutional requirements of standing, which generally had the effect of limiting the type of injury cognizable in federal court to economic ones.\400\

NOTES:

\398\Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter concurring). The Court approached this concept in two interrelated ways. (1) It might be that a plaintiff had an interest that it was one of the purposes of the statute in question to protect in some degree. Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924); Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930); Alton R.R. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942). Thus, in Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), a private utility was held to have standing to contest allegedly illegal competition by TVA on the ground that the statute was meant to give private utilities some protection from certain forms of TVA competition. (2) It might be that a plaintiff was a ``person aggrieved'' within the terms of a judicial review section of an administrative or regulatory statute. Injury to an economic interest was sufficient to ``aggrieve'' a litigant. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), cert. dismd. as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).

\399\5 U.S.C. Sec. 702. See also 47 U.S.C. Sec. 202(b)(6)(FCC); 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77i(a) (SEC); 16 U.S.C. Sec. 825a(b)(FPC).

\400\FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940); City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 83 (1958); Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1968).

More recently, however, the Court promulgated a two-pronged standing test: if the litigant (1) has suffered injury-in-fact and if he (2) shows that the interest he seeks to protect is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statutory guarantee in question, he has standing.\401\ Of even greater importance was the expansion of the nature of the injury required beyond economic injury, which followed logically to some extent from the revision of the standard, to encompass ``aesthetic, conservational, and recreational'' interests as well.\402\ ``Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.''\403\ Thus, plaintiffs, who had pleaded that they used the natural resources of the Washington area, that rail freight rates would deter the recycling of used goods, and that their use of natural resources would be disturbed by the adverse environmental impact caused by the nonuse of recyclable goods, had standing as ``persons aggrieved'' to challenge the rates set. Neither the large numbers of persons allegedly injured nor the indirect and less perceptible harm to the environment was justification to deny standing. The Court granted that the plaintiffs might never be able to establish the ``attenuated line of causation'' from rate setting to injury, but that was a matter for proof at trial, whereas in the instant case the Court dealt only with the pleadings.\404\

NOTES:

\402\Assn. of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).

\403\Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972), Moreover, said the Court, once a person establishes that he has standing to seek judicial review of an action because of particularized injury to him, he may argue the public interest as a ``representative of the public interest,'' as a ``private attorney general,'' so that he may contest not only the action which injures him but the entire complex of actions of which his injury-inducing action is a part. Id., 737-738, noting Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. (1940). See also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n. (1979); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376 n.16 (1982) (noting ability of such party to represent interests of third parties).

\404\United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 683-690 (1973). As was noted above, this case has been disparaged by the later Court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2139-2140 (1992); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158-160 (1990).

Much debate has occurred in recent years with respect to the validity of ``citizen suit'' provisions in the environmental laws, especially in light of the Court's retrenchment in constitutional standing cases. The Court in insisting on injury in fact as well as causation and redressability has curbed access to citizen suits,\405\ but that Congress may expansively confer substantial degrees of standing through statutory creations of interests remains true.

NOTE:

Almost inseparable from the requirements of adverse parties and substantial enough interests to confer standing is the requirement that a real issue be presented, as contrasted with speculative, abstract, hypothetical, or moot issues. It has long been the Court's ``considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions.''\406\ A party cannot maintain a suit ``for a mere declaration in the air.''\407\ In Texas v. ICC,\408\ the State attempted to enjoin the enforcement of the Transportation Act of 1920 on the ground that it invaded the reserved rights of the State. The Court dismissed the complaint as presenting no case or controversy, declaring: ``It is only where rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of judicial cognizance, are being, or about to be, affected prejudicially by the application or enforcement of a statute that its validity may be called in question by a suitor and determined by an exertion of the judicial power.''\409\ And in Ashwander v. TVA,\410\ the Court refused to decide any issue save that of the validity of the contracts between the Authority and the Company. ``The pronouncements, policies and program of the Tennessee Valley Authority and its directors, their motives and desires, did not give rise to a justiciable controversy save as they had fruition in action of a definite and concrete character constituting an actual or threatened interference with the rights of the person complaining.''\411\

NOTES:

\407\Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903).

\408\258 U.S. 158 (1922).

\409\Id., 162.

\410\297 U.S. 288 (1936).

\411\Id., 324. Chief Justice Hughes cited New York v. Illinois, 274 U.S. 488 (1927), in which the Court dismissed as presenting abstract questions a suit about the possible effects of the diversion of water from Lake Michigan upon hypothetical water power developments in the indefinite future, and Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), in which it was held that claims based merely upon assumed potential invasions of rights were insufficient to warrant judicial intervention. See also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-485 (1923); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 338-340 (1926); Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 50, 76 (1868).

Concepts of real interest and abstract questions appeared prominently in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,\412\ an omnibus attack on the constitutionality of the Hatch Act prohibitions on political activities by governmental employees. With one exception, none of the plaintiffs had violated the Act, though they stated they desired to engage in forbidden political actions. The Court found no justiciable controversy except in regard to the one, calling for ``concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions'', and seeing the suit as really an attack on the political expediency of the Act.\413\

NOTES:

\413\Id., 89-91. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, contending that the controversy was justiciable. Justice Douglas could not agree that the plaintiffs should have to violate the act and lose their jobs in order to test their rights. In CSC v. National Assn. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), the concerns expressed in Mitchell were largely ignored as the Court reached the merits in an anticipatory attack on the Act. Compare Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

Advisory Opinion. -- In 1793, the Court unanimously refused to grant the request of President Washington and Secretary of State Jefferson to construe the treaties and laws of the United States pertaining to questions of international law arising out of the wars of the French Revolution.\414\ Noting the constitutional separation of powers and functions in his reply, Chief Justice Jay said: ``These being in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being Judges of a Court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seem to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the Executive departments.''\415\ Although the Court has generally adhered to its refusal, Justice Jackson was not quite correct when he termed the policy a ``firm and unvarying practice. . . .''\416\ The Justices in response to a letter calling for suggestions on improvements in the operation of the courts drafted a letter suggesting that circuit duty for the Justices was unconstitutional, but they apparently never sent it;\417\ Justice Johnson communicated to President Monroe, apparently with the knowledge and approval of the other Justices, the views of the Justices on the constitutionality of internal improvements legislation;\418\ and Chief Justice Hughes in a letter to Senator Wheeler on President Roosevelt's Court Plan questioned the constitutionality of a proposal to increase the membership and have the Court sit in divisions.\419\ Other Justices have individually served as advisers and confidants of Presidents in one degree or another.\420\

NOTES:

\415\Id., 488.

\416\Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).

\417\See supra, p.599 n.21.

\418\1 C. Warren, op. cit., n. 18, 595-597.

\419\Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1392, Reorganization of the Judiciary, 75th Congress, 1st sess. (1937), pt. 3, 491. See also Chief Justice Taney's private advisory opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury that a tax levied on the salaries of federal judges violated the Constitution. S. Tyler, Memoirs of Roger B. Taney (Baltimore: 1876), 432-435.

\420\E.g., Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A.J. 919 (1969); Jaffe, Professors and Judges as Advisors to Government: Reflections on the Roosevelt-Frankfurter Relationship, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 366 (1969). The issue has lately earned the attention of the Supreme Court, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397-408 (1989) (citing examples and detailed secondary sources), when it upheld the congressionally-authorized service of federal judges on the Sentencing Commission.

Nonetheless, the Court has generally adhered to the early precedent and would no doubt have developed the rule in any event, as a logical application of the case and controversy doctrine. As stated by Justice Jackson, when the Court refused to review an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which in effect was a mere recommendation to the President for his final action: ``To revise or review an administrative decision which has only the force of a recommendation to the President would be to render an advisory opinion in its most obnoxious form--advice that the President has not asked, tendered at the demand of a private litigant, on a subject concededly within the President's exclusive, ultimate control. This Court early and wisely determined that it would not give advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive. It has also been the firm and unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.''\421\ The early refusal of the Court to render advisory opinions has discouraged direct requests for advice so that the advisory opinion has appeared only collaterally in cases where there was a lack of adverse parties,\422\ or where the judgment of the Court was subject to later review or action by the executive or legislative branches of Government,\423\ or where the issues involved were abstract or contingent.\424\

NOTES:

\422\Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

\423\United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. (54 U.S.) 40 (1852).

\424\United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

Declaratory Judgments. -- Rigid emphasis upon such elements of judicial power as finality of judgment and award of execution coupled with equally rigid emphasis upon adverse parties and real interests as essential elements of a case and controversy created serious doubts about the validity of any federal declaratory judgment procedure.\425\ These doubts were largely dispelled by Court decisions in the late 1920s and early 1930s,\426\ and Congress quickly responded with the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934.\427\ Quickly tested, the Act was unanimously sustained.\428\ ``The principle involved in this form of procedure,'' the House Report said, ``is to confer upon the courts the power to exercise in some instances preventive relief; a function now performed rather clumsily by our equitable proceedings and inadequately by the law courts.''\429\ Said the Senate Report: ``The declaratory judgment differs in no essential respect from any other judgment except that it is not followed by a decree for damages, injunction, specific performance, or other immediately coercive decree. It declares conclusively and finally the rights of parties in litigations over a contested issue, a form of relief which often suffices to settle controversies and fully administer justice.''\430\

NOTES:

\426\Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1963).

\427\48 Stat. 955, as amended, 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2201-2202.

\428\Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).

\429\H. Rept. No. 1264, 73d Congress, 2d sess. (1934), 2.

\430\S. Rept. No. 1005, 73d Congress, 2d sess. (1934), 2.

The 1934 Act provided that ``[i]n cases of actual controversy'' federal courts could ``declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be prayed. . . .''\431\ Upholding the Act, the Court said: ``The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to `cases of actual controversy,' manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense. The word `actual' is one of emphasis rather than of definition. Thus the operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only. In providing remedies and defining procedure in relation to cases and controversies in the constitutional sense the Congress is acting within its delegated power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Congress is authorized to establish.''\432\ Finding that the issue in the case presented a definite and concrete controversy, the Court held that a declaration should have been issued.\433\

NOTES:

\432\Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-240 (1937),

\433\Id., 242-244.

It has insistently been maintained by the Court that ``the requirements for a justiciable case or controversy are no less strict in a declaratory judgment proceeding than in any other type of suit.''\434\ As Justice Douglas has written: ``The difference between an abstract question and a `controversy' contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.''\435\ It remains, therefore, for the courts to determine in each case the degree of controversy necessary to establish a case for purposes of jurisdiction. Even then, however, the Court is under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction.\436\

NOTES:

\435\Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).

\436\Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942); Public Service Comm. v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952); Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962).

Utilization of declaratory judgments to settle disputes and identify rights in many private areas, like insurance and patents in particular but extending into all areas of civil litigation, except taxes,\437\ is common. The Court has, however, at various times demonstrated a substantial reluctance to have important questions of public law, especially regarding the validity of legislation, resolved by such a procedure.\438\ In part, this has been accomplished by a strict insistence upon concreteness, ripeness, and the like.\439\ Nonetheless, even at such times, several noteworthy constitutional decisions were rendered in declaratory judgment actions.\440\

NOTES:

\438\E.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Electric Bond & Share, Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 572-573 (1947).

\439\United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943); International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); Public Service Comm. v. Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237 (1952).

\440\E.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).

As part of the 1960s hospitality to greater access to courts, the Court exhibited a greater hospitality to declaratory judgments in constitutional litigation, especially cases involving civil liberties issues.\441\ The doctrinal underpinnings of this hospitality were sketched out by Justice Brennan in his opinion for the Court in Zwickler v. Koota,\442\ in which the relevance to declaratory judgments of the Dombrowski v. Pfister\443\ line of cases involving federal injunctive relief against the enforcement of state criminal statutes was in issue. First, it was held that the vesting of ``federal question'' jurisdiction in the federal courts by Congress following the Civil War, as well as the enactment of more specific civil rights jurisdictional statutes, ``imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims.''\444\

NOTES:

\442\389 U.S. 241 (1967).

\443\380 U.S. 479 (1965).

\444\Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).

Escape from that duty might be found only in ``narrow circumstances,'' such as an appropriate application of the abstention doctrine, which was not proper where a statute affecting civil liberties was so broad as to reach protected activities as well as unprotected activities. Second, the judicially-developed doctrine that a litigant must show ``special circumstances'' to justify the issuance of a federal injunction against the enforcement of state criminal laws is not applicable to requests for federal declaratory relief: ``a federal district court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction.''\445\ This language was qualified subsequently, so that declaratory and injunctive relief were equated in cases in which a criminal prosecution is pending in state court at the time the federal action is filed\446\ or is begun in state court after the filing of the federal action but before any proceedings of substance have taken place in federal court,\447\ and federal courts were instructed not to issue declaratory judgments in the absence of the factors permitting issuance of injunctions under the same circumstances. But in the absence of a pending state action or the subsequent and timely filing of one, a request for a declaratory judgment that a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional does not have to meet the stricter requirements justifying the issuance of an injunction.\448\

NOTES:

\446\Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). The case and its companion, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), substantially undercut much of the Dombrowski language and much of Zwickler was downgraded.

\447\Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).

\448\Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). In cases covered by Steffel, the federal court may issue preliminary or permanent injunctions to protect its judgments, without satisfying the Younger tests. Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 930-931 (1975); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712 (1977).

Ripeness. -- Just as standing historically has concerned who may bring an action in federal court, the ripeness doctrine concerns when it may be brought. Formerly, it was a wholly constitutional principle requiring a determination that the events bearing on the substantive issue have happened or are sufficiently certain to occur so as to make necessary adjudication and so as to assure that the issues are sufficiently defined to permit intelligent resolution; the focus was on the harm to the rights claimed rather than on the harm to the plaintiff that gave him standing to bring the action,\449\ although, to be sure, in most cases the harm is the same. But in liberalizing the doctrine of ripeness in recent years the Court subdivided it into constitutional and prudential parts\450\ and conflated standing and ripeness considerations.\451\

NOTES:

\450\Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138- 148 (1974) (certainty of injury a constitutional limitation, factual adequacy element a prudential one).

\451\Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81-82 (1978) (that plaintiffs suffer injury-in-fact and such injury would be redressed by granting requested relief satisfies Article III ripeness requirement; prudential element satisfied by determination that Court would not be better prepared to render a decision later than now). But compare Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991).

The early cases generally required potential plaintiffs to expose themselves to possibly irreparable injury in order to invoke federal judicial review. Thus, in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,\452\ government employees alleged that they wished to engage in various political activities and that they were deterred from their desires by the Hatch Act prohibitions on political activities. As to all but one plaintiff, who had himself actually engaged in forbidden activity, the Court held itself unable to adjudicate because the plaintiffs were not threatened with ``actual interference'' with their interests. The Justices viewed the threat to plaintiffs' rights as hypothetical and refused to speculate about the kinds of political activity they might engage in or the Government's response to it. ``No threat of interference by the Commission with rights of these appellants appears beyond that implied by the existence of the law and the regulations.''\453\ Similarly, resident aliens planning to work in the Territory of Alaska for the summer and then return to the United States were denied a request for an interpretation of the immigration laws that they would not be treated on their return as excludable aliens entering the United States for the first time, or alternatively, for a ruling that the laws so interpreted would be unconstitutional, inasmuch as they had not gone and attempted to return, although other alien workers had gone and been denied reentry and the immigration authorities were on record as intending to enforce the laws as they construed them.\454\ Of course, the Court was not entirely consistent in applying the doctrine.\455\

NOTES:

\453\Id., 90. In CSC v. National Assn. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), without discussing ripeness, the Court decided on the merits anticipatory attacks on the Hatch Act. Plaintiffs had, however, alleged a variety of more concrete infringements upon their desires and intentions than the UPW plaintiffs had.

\454\International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954). See also Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938); Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); Public Service Comm. v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972).

\455\In Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), without discussing ripeness, the Court decided on the merits a suit about a state law requiring dismissal of teachers advocating violent overthrow of the government, over a strong dissent arguing the case was indistinguishable from Mitchell. Id., 504 (Justice Frankfurter dissenting). In Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961), a state employee was permitted to attack a non-Communist oath, although he alleged he believed he could take the oath in good faith and could prevail if prosecuted, because the oath was so vague as to subject plaintiff to the ``risk of unfair prosecution and the potential deterrence of constitutionally protected conduct.'' Id., 283-284. See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

It remains good general law that pre-enforcement challenges to criminal and regulatory legislation will often be unripe for judicial consideration because of uncertainty of enforcement,\456\ because the plaintiffs can allege only a subjective feeling of inhibition or fear arising from the legislation or from enforcement of it,\457\ or because the courts need before them the details of a concrete factual situation arising from enforcement in order to engage in a reasoned balancing of individual rights and governmental interests.\458\ But one who challenges a statute or possible administrative action need demonstrate only a realistic danger of sustaining an injury to his rights as a result of the statute's operation and enforcement and need not await the consummation of the threatened injury in order to obtain preventive relief, such as exposing himself to actual arrest or prosecution. When one alleges an intention to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest but proscribed by statute and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he may bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief.\459\ Similarly, the reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.\460\ Of considerable uncertainty in the law of ripeness is the Duke Power case in which the Court held ripe for decision on the merits a challenge to a federal law limiting liability for nuclear accidents at nuclear power plants, on the basis that because plaintiffs had sustained injury-in-fact and had standing the Article III requisite of ripeness was satisfied and no additional facts arising out of the occurrence of the claimed harm would enable the court better to decide the issues.\461\ Should this analysis prevail, ripeness as a limitation on justiciability will decline in importance.

NOTES:

\457\E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

\458\E.g., California Bankers Assn. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 294-297 (1981); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320-323 (1991).

\459\Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707-708, 710 (1977); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297-305 (1979) (finding some claims ripe, others not). Compare Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-189 (1973), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 127-128 (1973). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).

\460\Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138-148 (1974) (holding some but not all the claims ripe). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (Justice Powell concurring) (parties had not put themselves in opposition).

\461\Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81-82 (1978). The injury giving standing to plaintiffs was the environmental harm arising from the plant's routine operation; the injury to their legal rights was alleged to be the harm caused by the limitation of liability in the event of a nuclear accident. The standing injury had occurred, the ripeness injury was conjectural and speculative and might never occur. See id., 102 (Justice Stevens concurring in the result). It is evident on the face of the opinion and expressly stated by the objecting Justices that the Court utilized its standing/ripeness analyses in order to reach the merits, so as to remove the constitutional cloud cast upon the federal law by the district court decision. Id., 95, 103 (Justices Rehnquist and Stevens concurring in the result).

Mootness. -- It may be that a case presenting all the attributes necessary for federal court litigation will at some point lose some attribute of justiciability, will, in other words, become ``moot.'' The usual rule is that an actual controversy must exist at all stages of trial and appellate consideration and not simply at the date the action is initiated.\462\ ``Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. . . . Article III denies federal courts the power `to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them, . . . and confines them to resolving `real and substantial controvers[ies] admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.' . . . This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. To sustain our jurisdiction in the present case, it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals. . . . The parties must continue to have a `personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit.''\463\ Since, with the advent of declaratory judgments, it is open to the federal courts to ``declare the rights and other legal relations'' of the parties with res judicata effect,\464\ the question in cases alleged to be moot now seems largely if not exclusively to be decided in terms whether an actual controversy continues to exist between the parties rather than some additional older concepts.\465\

NOTES:

\463\Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,477-478 (1990) (internal citations omitted). The Court's emphasis upon mootness as a constitutional rule mandated by Article III is long stated in the cases. E.g., Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301, 306 n. 3 (1964); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988), and id., 332 (Justice Scalia dissenting). But compare Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 756 n. 8 (1976) (referring to mootness as presenting policy rather than constitutional considerations). If this foundation exists, it is hard to explain the exceptions, which partake of practical reasoning. In any event, Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued that the mootness doctrine is not constitutionally based, or not sufficiently based only on Article III, so that the Court should not dismiss cases that have become moot after the Court has taken them for review. Honig, supra, 329 (concurring).

\464\But see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 470-472 (1974); id., 477 (Justice White concurring), 482 n. 3 (Justice Rehnquist concurring) (on res judicata effect in state court in subsequent prosecution). In any event, the statute authorizes the federal court to grant ``[f]urther necessary or proper relief'' which could include enjoining state prosecutions.

\465\Award of process and execution are no longer essential to the concept of judicial power. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).

Cases may become moot because of a change in the law,\466\ or in the status of the parties,\467\ or because of some act of one of the parties which dissolves the controversy.\468\ But the Court has developed several exceptions, which operate to prevent many of the cases in which mootness is alleged from being in law moot. Thus, in criminal cases, although the sentence of the convicted appellant has been served, the case ``is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.''\469\ The ``mere possibility'' of such a consequence, even a ``remote'' one, is enough to find that one who has served his sentence has retained the requisite personal stake giving his case ``an adversary cast and making it justiciable.''\470\ This exception has its counterpart in civil litigation in which a lower court judgment may still have certain present or future adverse effects on the challenging party.\471\

NOTES:

\467\Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922) (in challenge to laws regulating labor of youths 14 to 16, Court held case two-and-one-half years after argument and dismissed as moot since certainly none of the challengers was now in the age bracket); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). Compare County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), with Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).

\468\E.g. Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360 (1919); Oil Workers Local 8-6 v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363 (1960); A.L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324 (1961); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).

\469\Sibron v. New York, 395 U.S. 40, 50-58 (1968).

\470\Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-791 (1969). The cases have progressed from leaning toward mootness to leaning strongly against. E.g., St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633-634 n. 2 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49-58 (1968); but see Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). The exception permits review at the instance of the prosecution as well as defendant. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). When a convicted defendant dies while his case is on direct review, the Court's present practice is to dismiss the petition for certiorari. Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976), overruling Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481 (1971).

\471\Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 433, 452 (1911); Carroll v. President & Comrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). See Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) (holding that expiration of strike did not moot employer challenge to state regulations entitling strikers to state welfare assistance since the consequences of the regulations would continue).

A second exception, the ``voluntary cessation'' doctrine, focuses on whether challenged conduct which has lapsed or the utilization of a statute which has been superseded is likely to recur.\472\ Thus, cessation of the challenged activity by the voluntary choice of the person engaging in it, especially if he contends that he was properly engaging in it, will moot the case only if it can be said with assurance ``that `there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.'''\473\ Otherwise, ``[t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways'' and this fact would be enough to prevent mootness because of the ``public interest in having the legality of the practices settled.''\474\

NOTES:

\473\United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d. Cir., 1945)).

\474\United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). But see A.L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324 (1961).

Still a third exception concerns the ability to challenge short- term conduct which may recur in the future, which has been denominated as disputes ``capable of repetition, yet evading review.''\475\ Thus, in cases in which (1) the challenged action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again, mootness will not be found when the complained-of conduct ends.\476\ The imposition of short sentences in criminal cases,\477\ the issuance of injunctions to expire in a brief period,\478\ and the short-term factual context of certain events, such as elections\479\ or pregnancies,\480\ are all instances in which this exception is frequently invoked.

NOTES:

\476\Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). See Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125-126 (1974), and id., 130-132 (Justice Powell dissenting). The degree of expectation or likelihood that the issue will recur has frequently divided the Court. Compare Murphy v. Hunt, supra, with Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); compare Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-323 (1988), with id., 332 (Justice Scalia dissenting).

\477\Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49-58 (1968). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).

\478\Carroll v. President & Comrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (short-term court order restricting press coverage).

\479\E.g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5 (1973); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n. 8 (1974). Compare Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154 (1952).

\480\Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-125 (1973).

An interesting and potentially significant liberalization of the law of mootness, perhaps as part of a continuing circumstances exception, is occurring in the context of class action litigation. It is now clearly established that, when the controversy becomes moot as to the plaintiff in a certified class action, it still remains alive for the class he represents so long as an adversary relationship sufficient to constitute a live controversy between the class members and the other party exists.\481\ The Court was closely divided, however, with respect to the right of the named party, when the substantive controversy became moot as to him, to appeal as error the denial of a motion to certify the class which he sought to represent and which he still sought to represent. The Court held that in the class action setting there are two aspects of the Article III mootness question, the existence of a live controversy and the existence of a personal stake in the outcome for the named class representative.\482\ Finding a live controversy, the Court determined that the named plaintiff retained a sufficient interest, ``a personal stake,'' in his claimed right to represent the class in order to satisfy the ``imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial resolution;'' that is, his continuing interest adequately assures that ``sharply presented issues'' are placed before the court ``in a concrete factual setting'' with ``self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions.''\483\

NOTES:

\482\United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980).

\483\Id., 403. Justices Powell, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger dissented, Id., 409, arguing there could be no Article III personal stake in a procedural decision separate from the outcome of the case. In Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that a class action was not mooted when defendant tendered to the named plaintiffs the full amount of recovery they had individually asked for and could hope to retain. Plaintiffs' interest in shifting part of the share of costs of litigation to those who would share in its benefits if the class were certified was deemed to be a sufficient ``personal stake,'' although the value of this interest was at best speculative.

The immediate effect of the decision is that litigation in which class actions are properly certified or in which they should have been certified will rarely ever be mooted if the named plaintiff (or in effect his attorney) chooses to pursue the matter, even though the named plaintiff can no longer obtain any personal relief from the decision sought.\484\ Of much greater potential significance is the possible extension of the weakening of the ``personal stake'' requirement in other areas, such as the representation of third-party claims in non- class actions and the initiation of some litigation in the form of a ``private attorneys general'' pursuit of adjudication.\485\ It may be that the evolution in this area will be confined to the class action context, but cabining of a ``flexible'' doctrine of standing may be difficult.\486\

NOTES:

\485\Geraghty, supra, 445 U.S., 404 and n. 11.

\486\Id., 419-424 (Justice Powell dissenting).

Retroactivity Versus Prospectivity. -- One of the distinguishing features of an advisory opinion is that it lays down a rule to be applied to future cases, much as does legislation generally. It should therefore follow that an Article III court could not decide purely prospective cases, cases which do not govern the rights and disabilities of the parties to the cases.\487\ The Court asserted that this principle is true, while applying it only to give retroactive effect to the parties to the immediate case.\488\ Yet, occasionally, the Court did not apply its holding to the parties before it,\489\ and in a series of cases beginning in the mid-1960s it became embroiled in attempts to limit the retroactive effect of its--primarily but not exclusively\490\--constitutional-criminal law decisions. The results have been confusing and unpredictable.\491\

NOTES:

\488\Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).

\489\England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422 (1964); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972).

\490\Noncriminal constitutional cases included Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). Indeed, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Court postponed the effectiveness of its decision for a period during which Congress could repair the flaws in the statute. Noncriminal, nonconstitutional cases include Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).

\491\Because of shifting coalitions of Justices, Justice Harlan complained, the course of retroactivity decisions ``became almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search of its intended victim.'' Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (separate opinion).

Prior to 1965, ``both the common law and our own decisions recognized a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court . . . subject to [certain] limited exceptions.''\492\ Statutory and judge-made law have consequences, at least to the extent that people must rely on them in making decisions and shaping their conduct. Therefore, the Court was moved to recognize that there should be a reconciling of constitutional interests reflected in a new rule of law with reliance interests founded upon the old.\493\ In both criminal and civil cases, however, the Court's discretion to do so has been constrained by later decisions.

NOTES:

\493\Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 198-199 (1973).

When in the 1960s the Court began its expansion of the Bill of Rights and applied the rulings to the States, a necessity arose to determine the application of the rulings to criminal defendants who had exhausted all direct appeals but who could still resort to habeas corpus, to those who had been convicted but still were on direct appeal, and to those who had allegedly engaged in conduct but who had not gone to trial. At first, the Court drew the line at cases in which judgments of conviction were not yet final, so that all persons in those situations obtained retrospective use of decisions,\494\ but the Court then promulgated standards for a balancing process that resulted in different degrees of retroactivity in different cases.\495\ Generally, in cases in which the Court declared a rule which was ``a clear break with the past,'' it denied retroactivity to all defendants, with the sometime exception of the appellant himself.\496\ With respect to certain cases in which a new rule was intended to overcome an impairment of the truth-finding function of a criminal trial\497\ or to cases in which the Court found that a constitutional doctrine barred the conviction or punishment of someone,\498\ full retroactivity, even to habeas claimants, was the rule. Justice Harlan strongly argued that the Court should sweep away its confusing balancing rules and hold that all defendants whose cases are still pending on direct appeal at the time of a law-changing decision should be entitled to invoke the new rule, but that no habeas claimant should be entitled to benefit.\499\

NOTES:

\495\Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972).

\496\Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 224, 248 (1969); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 335-336 (1980) (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 55 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549-550, 551-552 (1982).

\497\Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 328-330 (1980) (plurality opinion); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977).

\498\United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 (1971); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973).

\499\Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (separate opinion); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (dissenting). Justice Powell also strongly supported the proposed rule. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 246-248 (1977) (concurring in judgment); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 337 (1980) (concurring in judgment).

The Court has now drawn a sharp distinction between criminal cases pending on direct review and cases pending on collateral review. For cases on direct review, ``a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a `clear break' with the past.''\500\ Justice Harlan's habeas approach was then adopted by a plurality in Teague v. Lane\501\ and then by the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh.\502\ Thus, for collateral review in federal courts of state court criminal convictions, the general rule is that ``new rules'' of constitutional interpretation, those that break new ground or impose a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, announced after a defendant's conviction has become final will not be applied. For such habeas cases, a ``new rule'' is defined very broadly to include interpretations that are a logical outgrowth or application of an earlier rule unless the result was ``dictated'' by that precedent.\503\ The only exceptions are for decisions placing certain conduct or defendants beyond the reach of the criminal law, and for decisions recognizing a fundamental procedural right ``without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.''\504\

NOTES:

\501\489 U.S. 288 (1989).

\502\492 U.S. 302 (1989).

\503\Penry, supra, 492 U.S., 314. Put another way, it is not enough that a decision is ``within the `logical compass' of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is `controlled' by a prior decision.'' A decision announces a ``new rule'' if its result ``was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds'' and if it was not ``an illogical or even a grudging application'' of the prior decision. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-415 (1990).

\504\Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307, 311-313 (1989) (plurality opinion); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415-416 (1990). Under the second exception it is ``not enough that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of a trial. . . . A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also `alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to the fairness of a proceeding.'' Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990).

What the rule is to be, and indeed if there is to be a rule, in civil cases has been disputed to a rough draw in recent cases. As was noted above, there is a line of civil cases, constitutional and nonconstitutional, in which the Court has declined to apply new rules, the result often of overruling older cases, retrospectively, sometimes even to the prevailing party in the case.\505\ As in criminal cases, the creation of new law, through overrulings or otherwise, may result in retroactivity in all instances, in pure prospectivity, or in partial prospectivity in which the prevailing party obtains the results of the new rule but no one else does. In two cases raising the question when States are required to refund taxes collected under a statute that is subsequently ruled to be unconstitutional, the Court revealed itself to be deeply divided.\506\ The question in Beam was whether the company could claim a tax refund under an earlier ruling holding unconstitutional the imposition of certain taxes upon its products. The holding of a fractionated Court was that it could seek a refund, because in the earlier ruling the Court had applied the holding to the contesting company and once a new rule has been applied retroactively to the litigants in a civil case considerations of equality and stare decisis compel application to all.\507\ While partial or selective prospectivity is thus ruled out, neither pure retroactivity or pure prospectivity is either required or forbidden.

NOTES:

\506\James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990). And, of course, the retirements since the decisions were handed down further complicate discerning the likely Court position.

\507\Beam, supra. The holding described in the text is expressly that of only a two-Justice plurality. Id., 501 U.S., 534-544 (Justices Souter and Stevens). Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Scalia (with Justice Marshall joining the latter Justices) concurred, id., 544, 547, 548 (respectively), but on other, and in the instance of the three latter Justices, and broader justifications. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id., 549.

Four Justices adhered to the principle that new law, new rules, as defined above, may be applied purely prospectively, without violating any tenet of Article III or any other constitutional value.\508\ Three Justices argued that all prospectivity, whether partial or total, violates Article III by expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond true cases and controversies.\509\ Future cases must, therefore, be awaited for resolution of this issue.

NOTES:

\509\Beam, supra, 501 U.S., 547, 548 (Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Marshall concurring). These three Justices, in Smith, supra, 496 U.S., 205, had joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens arguing that constitutional decisions must be given retroactive effect.

It may be that there will be a case assuredly within the Court's jurisdiction presented by parties with standing in which adverseness and ripeness will exist, a case in other words presenting all the qualifications we have considered making it a justiciable controversy, which the Court will nonetheless refuse to adjudicate. The ``label'' for such a case is that it presents a ``political question.'' Although the Court has referred to the political question doctrine as ``one of the rules basic of the federal system and this Court's appropriate place within that structure,''\510\ a commentator has remarked that ``[i]t is, measured by any of the normal responsibilities of a phrase of definition, one of the least satisfactory terms known to the law. The origin, scope, and purpose of the concept have eluded all attempts at precise statements.''\511\ That the concept of political questions may be ``more amenable to description by infinite itemization than by generalization''\512\ is generally true, although the Court's development of rationale in Baker v. Carr\513\ has changed this fact radically, but the doctrine may be approached in two ways, by itemization of the kinds of questions that have been labeled political and by isolation of the factors that have led to the labeling.

NOTES:

\511\Frank, Political Questions, in E. Cahn (ed.), Supreme Court and Supreme Law (Bloomington: 1954), 36.

\512\Ibid.

\513\Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-232 (1962).

Origins and Development. -- In Marbury v. Madison,\514\ Chief Justice Marshall stated: ``The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be made in this court.''\515\

NOTES:

\515\In Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 497, 516 (1840), the Court, refusing an effort by mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Navy to pay a pension, said: ``The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied, that such a power was never intended to be given to them.'' It therefore follows that mandamus will lie against an executive official only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, which admits of no discretion, and may not be invoked to control executive or political duties which admit of discretion. See Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 50 (1867); Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 475 (1867); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 524 (1838).

But the doctrine was asserted even earlier as the Court in Ware v. Hylton\516\ refused to pass on the question whether a treaty had been broken. And in Martin v. Mott,\517\ the Court held that the President acting under congressional authorization had exclusive and unreviewable power to determine when the militia should be called out. But it was in Luther v. Borden\518\ that the concept was first enunciated as a doctrine separate from considerations of interference with executive functions. This case presented the question of the claims of two competing factions to be the only lawful government of Rhode Island during a period of unrest in 1842.\519\ Chief Justice Taney began by saying that the answer was primarily a matter of state law that had been decided in favor of one faction by the state courts.\520\

NOTES:

\517\12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 19 (1827).

\518\7 How. (48 U.S.) 1 (1849).

\519\Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-222 (1962); id., 292- 297 (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).

\520\Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 1, 40 (1849).

Insofar as the Federal Constitution had anything to say on the subject, the Chief Justice continued, that was embodied in the clause empowering the United States to guarantee to every State a republican form of government,\521\ and this clause committed determination of the issue to the political branches of the Federal Government. ``Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must neccessarily decide what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other department of the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.''\522\ Here, the contest had not proceeded to a point where Congress had made a decision, ``[y]et the right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts.''\523\

NOTES:

\522\Ibid.

\523\Ibid.

Moreover, in effectuating the provision in the same clause that the United States should protect them against domestic violence, Congress had vested discretion in the President to use troops to protect a state government upon the application of the legislature or the governor. Before he could act upon the application of a legislature or a governor, the President ``must determine what body of men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor. . . .'' No court could review the President's exercise of discretion in this respect; no court could recognize as legitimate a group vying against the group recognized by the President as the lawful government.\524\ Although the President had not actually called out the militia in Rhode Island, he had pledged support to one of the competing governments, and this pledge of military assistance if it were needed had in fact led to the capitulation of the other faction, thus making an effectual and authoritative determination not reviewable by the Court.\525\

NOTES:

\525\Id., 44.

The Doctrine Before Baker v. Carr. -- Over the years, the political question doctrine has been applied to preclude adjudication of a variety of issues. Certain factors appear more or less consistently through most but not all of these cases, and it is perhaps best to indicate the cases and issues deemed political before attempting to isolate these factors.

(1) By far the most consistent application of the doctrine has been in cases in which litigants asserted claims under the republican form of government clause,\526\ whether the attack was on the government of the State itself\527\ or on some manner in which it had acted,\528\ but there have been cases in which the Court has reached the merits.\529\

NOTES:

\527\As it was on the established government of Rhode Island in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 1 (1849). See also Texas v. White, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 700 (1869); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900).

\528\Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v. City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912) (attacks on initiative and referendum); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913) (state constitutional amendment procedure); O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915) (delegation to court to form drainage districts); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) (submission of legislation to referendum); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (workmen's compensation); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74 (1930) (concurrence of all but one justice of state high court required to invalidate statute); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937) (delegation of legislative powers).

\529\All the cases, however, predate the application of the doctrine in Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See Attorney General of the State of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905) (legislative creation and alteration of school districts ``compatible'' with a republican form of government); Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897) (delegation of power to court to determine municipal boundaries does not infringe republican form of government); Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall (88 U.S.) 162, 175-176 (1875) (denial of suffrage to women no violation of republican form of government).

(2) Although there is language in the cases that would if applied make all questions touching on foreign affairs and foreign policy political,\530\ whether the courts have adjudicated a dispute in this area has often depended on the context in which it arises. Thus, the determination by the President whether to recognize the government of a foreign state\531\ or who is the de jure or de facto ruler of a foreign state\532\ is conclusive on the courts, but in the absence of a definitive executive action the courts will review the record to determine whether the United States has accorded a sufficient degree of recognition to allow the courts to take judicial notice of the existence of the state.\533\ Moreover, the courts have often determined for themselves what effect, if any, should be accorded the acts of foreign powers, recognized or unrecognized.\534\ Similarly, the Court when dealing with treaties and the treaty power has treated as political questions whether the foreign party had constitutional authority to assume a particular obligation\535\ and whether a treaty has lapsed because of the foreign state's loss of independence\536\ or because of changes in the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state,\537\ but the Court will not only interpret the domestic effects of treaties,\538\ it will at times interpret the effects bearing on international matters.\539\ The Court has deferred to the President and Congress with regard to the existence of a state of war and the dates of the beginning and ending and of states of belligerency between foreign powers, but the deference has sometimes been forced.\540\

NOTES:

\531\United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 610 (1818); Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 38 (1852).

\532\Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884).

\533\United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897); In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890). Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

\534\United States v. Reynes, 9 How. (50 U.S.) 127 (1850); Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 511 (1838); Keene v. McDonough, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 308 (1834). See also Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 415 (1839); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). But see United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). On the ``act of State'' doctrine, compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), with First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). And see First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); W. S. Kirkpatrick Co. v. Environmental Tectronics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990)

\535\Doe v. Braden, 16 How. (57 U.S.) 635 (1853).

\536\Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).

\537\Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 38 (1852). On the effect of a violation by a foreign state on the continuing effectiveness of the treaty, see Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 199 (1796); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).

\538\Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 199 (1796). Cf. Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (conflict of treaty with federal law). On the modern formulation, see Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 229-230 (1986).

\539\Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).

\540\Commercial Trust Co v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923); Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959); The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 52 (1819). The cases involving the status of Indian tribes as foreign states usually have presented political questions but not always. The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 1 (1831); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. (31 U.S.) 515 (1832).

(3) Ordinarily, the Court will not look behind the fact of certification that the standards requisite for the enactment of legislation\541\ or ratification of a constitutional amendment\542\ have in fact been met, although it will interpret the Constitution to determine what the basic standards are,\543\ and it will decide certain questions if the political branches are in disagreement.\544\

NOTES:

\542\Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (Congress' discretion to determine what passage of time will cause an amendment to lapse and effect of previous rejection by legislature).

\543\Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649 (1894); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) (statutes); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 378 (1798) (constitutional amendments).

\544\Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).

(4) Prior to Baker v. Carr,\545\ cases challenging the distribution of political power through apportionment and districting,\546\ weighed voting,\547\ and restrictions on political action\548\ were held to present nonjusticiable political questions.

NOTES:

\546\Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947).

\547\South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (county unit system for election of statewide officers with vote heavily weighed in favor of rural, lightly-populated counties).

\548\MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (signatures on nominating petitions must be spread among counties of unequal population).

From this limited review of the principal areas in which the political question doctrine seemed most established, it is possible to extract some factors that seemingly convinced the courts that the issues presented went beyond the judicial responsibility. These factors, necessarily stated baldly in so summary a fashion, would appear to be the lack of requisite information and the difficulty of obtaining it,\549\ the necessity for uniformity of decision and deferrence to the wider responsibilities of the political departments,\550\ and the lack of adequate standards to resolve a dispute.\551\ But present in all the political cases was (and is) the most important factor, a ``prudential'' attitude about the exercise of judicial review, which emphasizes that courts should be wary of deciding on the merits any issue in which claims of principle as to the issue and of expediency as to the power and prestige of courts are in sharp conflict. The political question doctrine was (and is) thus a way of avoiding a principled decision damaging to the Court or an expedient decision damaging to the principle.\552\

NOTES:

\550\Thus, see, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 415, 420 (1839). Similar considerations underlay the opinion in Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (48 U.S.) 1 (1849), in which Chief Justice Taney wondered how a court decision in favor of one faction would be received with Congress seating the representatives of the other faction and the President supporting that faction with military force.

\551\Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 226 (1962) (opinion of the Court); id., 268, 287, 295, (Justice Frankfurter dissenting.)

\552\For a statement of the ``prudential'' view, see generally A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch--The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New York: 1962), but see esp. 23-28, 69-71, 183-198. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting.) The opposing view, which has been called the ``classicist'' view, is that courts are duty bound to decide all cases properly before them. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264, 404 (1821). See also H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law--Selected Essays (Cambridge: 1961), 11-15.

Baker v. Carr. -- In Baker v. Carr,\553\ the Court undertook a major rationalization and formulation of the political question doctrine, which has considerably narrowed its application. Following Baker, the whole of the apportionment-districting-election restriction controversy previously immune to federal-court adjudication was considered and decided on the merits,\554\ and the Court's more recent rejection of the doctrine discloses the narrowing in other areas as well.\555\

NOTES:

\554\Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (apportionment and districting, congressional, legislative, and local); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (county unit system weighing statewide elections); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (geographic dispersion of persons signing nominating petitions).

\555\Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Nonetheless, the doctrine continues to be sighted.

According to Justice Brennan, who delivered the opinion of the Court, ``it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the `political question.'''\556\ Thus, the ``nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.''\557\ ``Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.''\558\ Following a discussion of several areas in which the doctrine had been used, Justice Brennan continued: ``It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.

NOTES:

\558\Id., 211.

``Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.''\559\

NOTE:

Powell v. McCormack. -- Because Baker had apparently restricted the political question doctrine to intrafederal issues, there was no discussion of the doctrine when the Court held that it had power to review and overturn a state legislature's refusal to seat a member-elect because of his expressed views.\560\ But in Powell v. McCormack,\561\ the Court was confronted with a challenge to the exclusion of a member- elect by the United States House of Representatives. Its determination that the political question doctrine did not bar its review of the challenge indicates the narrowness of application of the doctrine in its present state. Taking Justice Brennan's formulation in Baker of the factors that go to make up a political question,\562\ Chief Justice Warren determined that the only critical one in this case was whether there was a ``textually demonstrable constitutional commitment'' to the House to determine in its sole discretion the qualifications of members.\563\ In order to determine whether there was a textual commitment, the Court reviewed the Constitution, the Convention proceedings, and English and United States legislative practice to ascertain what power had been conferred on the House to judge the qualifications of its members; finding that the Constitution vested the House with power only to look at the qualifications of age, residency, and citizenship, the Court thus decided that in passing on Powell's conduct and character the House had exceeded the powers committed to it and thus judicial review was not barred by this factor of the political question doctrine.\564\ Although this approach accords with the ``classicist'' theory of judicial review,\565\ it circumscribes the political question doctrine severely, inasmuch as all constitutional questions turn on whether a governmental body has exceeded its specified powers, a determination the Court traditionally makes, whereas traditionally the doctrine precluded the Court from inquiring whether the governmental body had exceeded its powers. In short, the political question consideration may now be one on the merits rather than a decision not to decide.

NOTES:

\561\395 U.S. 486 (1969).

\562\Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

\563\Id., 395 U.S., 519.

\564\Id., 519-547. The Court concluded, however, by noting that even if this conclusion had not been reached from unambiguous evidence, the result would have followed from other considerations. Id., 547-548.

\565\Supra, n. 552. See H. Wechsler, op. cit., n. 552, 11-12. Professor Wechsler believed that congressional decisions about seating members were immune to review. Ibid. Chief Justice Warren noted that ``federal courts might still be barred by the political question doctrine from reviewing the House's factual determination that a member did not meet one of the standing qualifications. This is an issue not presented in this case and we express no view as to its resolution.'' Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 n. 42 (1969). And see id., 507 n. 27 (reservation on limitations that might exist on Congress' power to expel or otherwise punish a sitting member).

Chief Justice Warren disposed of the other factors present in political question cases in slightly more than a page. Since resolution of the question turned on an interpretation of the Constitution, a judicial function which must sometimes be exercised ``at variance with the construction given the document by another branch,'' there was no lack of respect shown another branch, nor, because the Court is the ``ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,'' will there be ``multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question,'' nor, since the Court is merely interpreting the Constitution, is there an ``initial policy determination'' not suitable for courts. Finally, ``judicially . . . manageable standards'' are present in the text of the Constitution.\566\ The effect of Powell is to discard all the Baker factors inhering in a political question, with the exception of the textual commitment factor, and that was interpreted in such a manner as seldom if ever to preclude a judicial decision on the merits.

NOTE:

The Doctrine Reappears. -- Reversing a lower federal court ruling subjecting the training and discipline of National Guard troops to court review and supervision, the Court held that under Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 16, the organizing, arming, and disciplining of such troops are committed to Congress and by congressional enactment to the Executive Branch. ``It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches, directly responsible--as the Judicial Branch is not--to the elective process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.''\567\ The suggestion of the infirmity of the political question doctrine was rejected, since ``because this doctrine has been held inapplicable to certain carefully delineated situations, it is no reason for federal courts to assume its demise.''\568\ In staying a grant of remedial relief in another case, the Court strongly suggested that the actions of political parties in national nominating conventions may also present issues not meet for judicial resolution.\569\

NOTES:

\568\Id., 413 U.S., 11. Other considerations of justiciability, however, id., 10, preclude using the case as square precedent on political questions. Notice that in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249 (1974), the Court denied that the Gilligan v. Morgan holding barred adjudication of damage actions brought against state officials by the estates of students killed in the course of the conduct that gave rise to both cases.

\569\O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (granting stay). The issue was mooted by the passage of time and was not thereafter considered on the merits by the Court. Id., 816 (remanding to dismiss as moot). It was also not before the Court in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), but it was alluded to there. See id., 483 n. 4, and id., 491 (Justice Rehnquist concurring). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger using political question analysis to dismiss a challenge to presidential action). But see id. 997, 998 (Justice Powell rejecting analysis for this type of case).

Despite the occasional resort to the doctrine, the Court continues to reject its application in language that confines its scope. Thus, when parties challenged the actions of the Secretary of Commerce in declining to certify, as required by statute, that Japanese whaling practices undermined the effectiveness of international conventions, the Court rejected the Government's argument that the political question doctrine precluded decision on the merits. The Court's prime responsibility, it said, is to interpret statutes, treaties, and executive agreements; the interplay of the statutes and the agreements in this case implicated the foreign relations of the Nation. ``But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.''\570\

NOTE:

After requesting argument on the issue, the Court held that a challenge to a statute on the ground that it did not originate in the House of Representatives as required by the origination clause was justiciable.\571\ Turning back reliance on the various factors set out in Baker, in much the same tone as in Powell v. McCCormack, the Court continued to evidence the view that only questions textually committed to another branch are political questions. Invalidation of a statute because it did not originate in the right House would not demonstrate a ``lack of respect'' for the House that passed the bill. ``[D]isrespect,'' in the sense of rejecting Congress' reading of the Constitution, ``cannot be sufficient to create a political question. If it were every judicial resolution of a constitutional challenge to a congressional enactment would be impermissible.''\572\ That the House of Representatives has the power and incentives to protect its prerogatives by not passing a bill violating the origination clause did not make this case nonjusticiable. ``[T]he fact that one institution of Government has mechanisms available to guard against incursions into its power by other governmental institutions does not require that the Judiciary remove itself from the controversy by labeling the issue a political question.''\573\ The Court also rejected the contention that, because the case did not involve a matter of individual rights, it ought not be adjudicated. Political questions are not restricted to one kind of claim, but the Court frequently has decided separation-of-power cases brought by people in their individual capacities, and the allocation of powers within a branch, as is the case in interbranch dispositions, is designed to safeguard liberty.\574\ Finally, the Court was sanguine that it could develop ``judicially manageable standards'' for disposing of origination clause cases, and, thus, it did not view the issue as political in that context.\575\

NOTES:

\572\Id., 390 (emphasis in original).

\573\Id., 392-393.

\574\Id., 393-395.

\575\Id., 395-396.

In short, the political question doctrine may not be moribund, but it does seem applicable to a very narrow class of cases.

Article III, Section 2, Clauses 1, 2, & 3. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies between two or more states;--between a state and citizens of another state; [1] --between citizens of different states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

Judicial review is one of the distinctive features of United States constitutional law. It is no small wonder, then, to find that the power of the federal courts to test federal and state legislative enactments and other actions by the standards of what the Constitution grants and withholds is nowhere expressly conveyed. But it is hardly noteworthy that its legitimacy has been challenged from the first, and, while now accepted generally, it still has detractors and its supporters disagree about its doctrinal basis and its application.\576\ Although it was first asserted in Marbury v. Madison\577\ to strike down an act of Congress as inconsistent with the Constitution, judicial review did not spring full-blown from the brain of Chief Justice Marshall. The concept had been long known, having been utilized in a much more limited form by Privy Council review of colonial legislation and its validity under the colonial charters,\578\ and there were several instances known to the Framers of state court invalidation of state legislation as inconsistent with state constitutions.\579\

NOTES:

\577\1 Cr. (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). A state act was held inconsistent with a treaty in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 199 (1796).

\578\J. Goebel, op. cit., n. 2, 60-95.

\579\Id., 96-142.

Practically all of the framers who expressed an opinion on the issue in the Convention appear to have assumed and welcomed the existence of court review of the constitutionality of legislation,\580\ and prior to Marbury the power seems very generally to have been assumed to exist by the Justices themselves.\581\ In enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress explicitly made provision for the exercise of the power,\582\ and in other debates questions of constitutionality and of judicial review were prominent.\583\ Nonetheless, although judicial review is consistent with several provisions of the Constitution and the argument for its existence may be derived from these provisions, they do not compel the conclusion that the Framers intended judicial review nor that it must exist. It was Chief Justice Marshall's achievement that, in doubtful circumstances and an awkward position, he carried the day for the device, which, though questioned, has expanded and become solidified at the core of constitutional jurisprudence.

NOTES:

\581\Thus, the Justices on circuit refused to adminster a pension act on grounds of its unconstitutionally, see Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 409 (1792), and supra, pp. 621-623. Chief Justice Jay and other Justices wrote that the imposition of circuit duty on Justices was unconstitutional, although they never mailed the letter, supra, p.599 n.21, in Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 171 (1796), a feigned suit, the constitutionality of a federal law was argued before the Justices and upheld on the merits, in Ware v. Hylton. 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 199 (1797), a state law was overturned, and dicta in several opinions asserted the principle. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 386, 399 (1798) (Justice Iredell), and several Justices on circuit, quoted in J. Goebel, op. cit., n. 2, 589-592.

\582\In enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, Congress chose not to vest ``federal question'' jurisdiction in the federal courts but to leave to the state courts the enforcement of claims under the Constitution and federal laws. In Sec. 25, 1 Stat. 85, Congress provided for review by the Supreme Court of final judgments in state courts (1) ``. . . where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity;'' (2) ``. . . where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity;'' or (3) ``. . . where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed'' thereunder. The ruling below was to be ``re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court. . . .''

\583\See in particular the debate on the President's removal powers, discussed supra. pp.522-531, with statements excerpted in R. Berger, op. cit., n. 576, 144-150. Debates on the Alien and Sedition Acts and on the power of Congress to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801 similarly saw recognition of judicial review of acts of Congress. C. Warren, op. cit., n. 12, 107-124.

Marbury v. Madison. -- Chief Justice Marshall's argument for judicial review of congressional acts in Marbury v. Madison\584\ had been largely anticipated by Hamilton.\585\ For example, he had written: ``The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution, is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.''\586\

NOTES:

\585\The Federalist, Nos. 78 and 81 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 521- 530, 541-552.

\586\Id., No. 78, at 525.

At the time of the change of Administration from Adams to Jefferson, several commissions of appointment to office had been signed but not delivered and were withheld on Jefferson's express instruction. Marbury sought to compel the delivery of his commission by seeking a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction against Secretary of State Madison. Jurisdiction was based on Sec. 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,\587\ which Marbury, and ultimately the Supreme Court, interpreted to authorize the Court to issue writs of mandamus in suits in its original jurisdiction.\588\ Though deciding all the other issues in Marbury's favor, the Chief Justice wound up concluding that the Sec. 13 authorization was an attempt by Congress to expand the Court's original jurisdiction beyond the constitutional prescription and was therefore void.\589\

NOTES:

\588\The section first denominated the original jurisdiction of the Court and then described the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Following and indeed attached to the sentence on appellate jurisdiction, being separated by a semi-colon, is the language saying ``and shall have power to issue . . . writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.'' The Chief Justice could easily have interpreted the authority to have been granted only in cases under appellate jurisdiction or as authority conferred in cases under both original and appellate jurisdiction when the cases are otherwise appropriate for one jurisdiction or the other. Textually, the section does not compel a reading that Congress was conferring on the Court an original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus per se.

\589\Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. (5 U.S.) 137, 173-180 (1803). For a classic treatment of Marbury, see Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L. J. 1.

``The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States;'' Marshall began his discussion of this final phase of the case, ``but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest.''\590\ First, certain fundamental principles warranting judicial review were noticed. The people had come together to establish a government. They provided for its organization and assigned to its various departments their powers and established certain limits not to be transgressed by those departments. The limits were expressed in a written constitution, which would serve no purpose ``if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained.'' Because the Constitution is ``a superior paramount law,'' it is unchangeable by ordinary legislative means and ``a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law.''\591\ ``If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?'' The answer, thought the Chief Justice, was obvious. ``It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . . If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.

NOTES:

\591\Id., 176-177.

``So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.

``If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.''\592\ To declare otherwise, Chief Justice Marshall said, would be to permit a legislative body to pass at pleasure the limits imposed on its powers by the Constitution.\593\

NOTES:

\593\Id., 178.

Turning, then, from the philosophical justification for judicial review as arising from the very concept of a written constitution, the Chief Justice turned to specific clauses of the Constitution. The judicial power, he observed, was extended to ``all cases arising under the constitution.''\594\ It was ``too extravagant to be maintained that the Framers had intended that a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises.''\595\ Suppose, he said, that Congress laid a duty on an article exported from a State or passed a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law or provided that treason should be proved by the testimony of one witness. Would the courts enforce such a law in the face of an express constitutional provision? They would not, he continued, because their oath required by the Constitution obligated them to support the Constitution and to enforce such laws would violate the oath.\596\ Finally, the Chief Justice noticed the supremacy clause, which gave the Constitution precedence over laws and treaties and provided that only laws ``which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution'' are to be the supreme laws of the land.\597\

NOTES:

\595\Id., 1 Cr. (5 U.S.), 179.

\596\Id., 179-180. The oath provision is contained in Art. VI, cl. 3. Compare A. Bickel, op. cit., n. 576, 7-8, with R. Berger, op. cit., n. 576, 237-244.

\597\Id., 1 Cr. (5 U.S.), 180. Compare A. Bickel, op. cit., n. 576, 8-12, with R. Berger, op. cit., n. 576, 223-284.

The decision in Marbury v. Madison has never been disturbed, although it has been criticized and has had opponents throughout our history. It not only carried the day in the federal courts, but from its announcement judicial review by state courts of local legislation under local constitutions made rapid progress and was securely established in all States by 1850.\598\

NOTE:

Judicial Review and National Supremacy. -- Even many persons who have criticized the concept of judicial review of congressional acts by the federal courts have thought that review of state acts under federal constitutional standards is soundly based in the supremacy clause, which makes the Constitution and constitutional laws and treaties the supreme law of the land,\599\ to effectuate which Congress enacted the famous Sec. 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.\600\ Five years before Marbury v. Madison, the Court held invalid a state law as conflicting with the terms of a treaty,\601\ and seven years after Chief Justice Marshall's opinion a state law was voided as conflicting with the Constitution.\602\

NOTES:

\600\1 Stat. 73, 85, quoted supra, n. 582.

\601\Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 190 (1796).

\602\Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. (10 U.S.) 87 (1810). The case came to the Court by appeal from a circuit court and not from a state court under Sec. 25. Famous early cases coming to the Court under Sec. 25 in which state laws were voided included Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 122 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, (17 U.S.) 316 (1819).

Virginia provided a states' rights challenge to a broad reading of the supremacy clause and to the validity of Sec. 25 in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee\603\ and in Cohens v. Virginia.\604\ In both cases, it was argued that while the courts of Virginia were constitutionally obliged to prefer ``the supreme law of the land,'' as set out in the supremacy clause, over conflicting state constitutional provisions and laws, it was only by their own interpretation of the supreme law that they as courts of a sovereign State were bound. Furthermore, it was contended that cases did not ``arise'' under the Constitution unless they were brought in the first instance by someone claiming such a right, from which it followed that ``the judicial power of the United States'' did not ``extend'' to such cases unless they were brought in the first instance in the courts of the United States. But answered Chief Justice Marshall: ``A case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends upon the construction of either.''\605\ Passing on to the power of the Supreme Court to review such decisions of the state courts, he said: ``Let the nature and objects of our Union be considered: let the great fundamental principles on which the fabric stands, be examined: and we think, the result must be, that there is nothing so extravagantly absurd, in giving to the Court of the nation the power of revising the decisions of local tribunals, on questions which affect the nation, as to require that words which import this power should be restricted by a forced construction.''\606\

NOTES:

\604\6 Wheat, (19 U.S.) 264 (1821).

\605\Id., 379.

\606\Id., 422-423. Justice Story traversed much of the same ground in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304 (1816). In Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 506 (1859), the Wisconsin Supreme Court had declared an act of Congress invalid and disregarded a writ of error from the Supreme Court, raising again the Virginia arguments. Chief Justice Taney emphatically rebuked the assertions on grounds both of dual sovereignty and national supremacy. His emphasis on the indispensability of the federal judicial power to maintain national supremacy, to protect the States from national encroachments, and to make the Constitution and laws of the United States uniform all combine to enhance the federal judicial power to a degree perhaps beyond that envisaged even by Story and Marshall. As late as Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248 (1880), the concepts were again thrashed out with the refusal of a Virginia court to enforce a mandate of the Supreme Court. And see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

Constitutional Interpretation.--In a system such as the one in the United States in which there is a written constitution, which is law and is binding on government, the practice of judicial review inherently raises questions of the relationship between constitutional interpretation or construction and the Constitution--the law--which is construed. The legitimacy of construction by an unelected entity in a republican or democratic system becomes an issue whenever the construction is controversial, as it was most recently in the 1960s to the present. Full consideration would carry us far afield, in view of the immense corpus of writing with respect to the proper mode of interpretation during this period.

Scholarly writing has identified six forms of constitutional argument or construction that may be used by courts or others in deciding a constitutional issue.\607\ These are (1) historical, (2) textual, (3) structural, (4) doctrinal, (5) ethical, and (6) prudential. The historical argument is largely, though not exclusively, associated with the theory of original intent or original understanding, under which constitutional and legal interpretation is limited to attempting to discern the original meaning of the words being construed as that meaning is revealed in the intentions of those who created the law or the constitutional provision in question. The textual argument, closely associated in many ways to the doctrine of original intent, concerns whether the judiciary or another is bound by the text of the Constitution and the intentions revealed by that language or whether it may go beyond the four corners of the constitutional document to ascertain the meaning, a dispute encumbered by the awkward constructions, interpretivism and noninterpretivism.\608\ Using a structural argument, one seeks to infer structural rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates.\609\ The remaining three modes sound in reasoning not necessarily tied to original intent, text, or structure, though they may have some relationship.Doctrinal arguments proceed from the application of precedents. Prudential arguments seek to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule. Ethical arguments derive rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution.

NOTES:

\608\Among the vast writing, see, e.g., R. Bork, The Tempting of America (1990); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980); L. Tribe & M. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution (1991); H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution (1990); Symposium, Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 259 (1981); Symposium, Judicial Review and the Constitution--The Text and Beyond, 8 U. Dayton L. Rev 443 (1983); Symposium, Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 Ohio St. L. J. 1 (1981); Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 Va. L. Rev. 631 (1991). See also Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L. J. 1085 (1989).

\609\This mode is most strongly association with C. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969).

Although the scholarly writing ranges widely, a much more narrow scope is seen in the actual political-judicial debate. Rare is the judge who will proclaim a devotion to ethical guidelines, such, for example, as natural-law precepts. The usual debate ranges from those adherents of strict construction and original intent to those with loose construction and adaptation of text to modern-day conditions.\610\ However, it is with regard to more general rules of prudence and self-restraint that one usually finds the enunciation and application of limitations on the exercise of constitutional judicial review.

NOTE:

Prudential Considerations. -- Implicit in the argument of Marbury v. Madison\611\ is the thought that with regard to cases meeting jurisdictional standards, the Court is obligated to take and decide them. Chief Justice Marshall expressly spelled the thought out in Cohens v. Virginia:\612\ ``It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.'' As the comment recognizes, because judicial review grows out of the fiction that courts only declare what the law is in specific cases\613\ and are without will or discretion,\614\ its exercise is surrounded by the inherent limitations of the judicial process, most basically, of course, by the necessity of a case or controversy and the strands of the doctrine comprising the concept of justiciability.\615\ But, although there are hints of Chief Justice Marshall's activism in recent cases,\616\ the Court has always adhered, at times more strictly than at other times, to several discretionary rules or concepts of restraint in the exercise of judicial review, the practice of which is very much contrary to the quoted dicta from Cohens. These rules, it should be noted, are in addition to the vast discretionary power which the Supreme Court has to grant or deny review of judgements in lower courts, a discretion fully authorized with certiorari jurisdiction but in effect in practice as well with regard to what remains of appeals.\617\

NOTES:

\612\6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264, 404, (1821).

\613\See, e.g., Justice Sutherland in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923), and Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).

\614\``Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the powers of the law, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.'' Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738, 866 (1824) (Chief Justice Marshall). See also Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936).

\615\The political question doctrine is another limitation arising in part out of inherent restrictions and in part from prudential considerations. For a discussion of limitations utilizing both stands, see Ashwander v. TVA 297 U.S. 288, 346-356 (1936) (Justice Brandeis concurring).

\616\Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).

\617\28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1254-1257. See F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, op. cit., n. 12, ch. 7. ``The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions. In almost all cases within the Court's appellate jurisdiction, the petitioner has already received one appellate review of his case. . . . If we took every case in which an interesting legal question is raised, or our prima facie impression is that the decision below is erroneous, we could not fulfill the Constitutional and statutory responsibilities placed upon the Court. To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved.'' Chief Justice Vinson, Address on the Work of the Federal Court, in 69 Sup. Ct. v, vi. It ``is only accurate to a degree to say that our jurisdiction in cases on appeal is obligatory as distinguished from discretionary on certiorari.'' Chief Justice Warren, quoted in Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 20, 51 (1954).

At various times, the Court has followed more strictly than other times the prudential theorems for avoidance of decisionmaking when it deemed restraint to be more desirable than activism.\618\

NOTE:

The Doctrine of ``Strict Necessity.'' -- The Court has repeatedly declared that it will decide constitutional issues only if strict necessity compels it to do so. Thus, constitutional questions will not be decided in broader terms than are required by the precise state of facts to which the ruling is to be applied, nor if the record presents some other ground upon which to decide the case, nor at the instance of one who has availed himself of the benefit of a statute or who fails to show he is injured by its operation, nor if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be fairly avoided.\619\

NOTE:

Speaking of the policy of avoiding the decision of constitutional issues except when necessary, Justice Rutledge wrote: ``The policy's ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the jurisdictional limitation, lie in all that goes to make up the unique place and character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority; the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system.''\620\

NOTE:

The Doctrine of Clear Mistake. -- A precautionary rule early formulated and at the base of the traditional concept of judicial restraint was expressed by Professor James Bradley Thayer to the effect that a statute could be voided as unconstitutional only ``when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,--so clear that it is not open to rational question.''\621\ Whether phrased this way or phrased so that a statute is not to be voided unless it is unconstitutional beyond all reasonable doubt, the rule is of ancient origin\622\ and of modern adherence.\623\ In operation, however, the rule is subject to two influences, which seriously impair its efficacy as a limitation. First, the conclusion that there has been a clear mistake or that there is no reasonable doubt is that drawn by five Justices if a full Court sits. If five Justices of learning and detachment to the Constitution are convinced that a statute is invalid and if four others of equal learning and attachment are convinced it is valid, the convictions of the five prevail over the convictions or doubts of the four. Second, the Court has at times made exceptions to the rule in certain categories of cases. Statutory interferences with ``liberty of contract'' were once presumed to be unconstitutional until proved to be valid;\624\ more recently, presumptions of invalidity have expressly or impliedly been applied against statutes alleged to interfere with freedom of expression and of religious freedom, which have been said to occupy a preferred position in the constitutional scheme of things.\625\

NOTES:

\622\See Justices Chase and Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 386, 395, 399 (1798).

\623\E.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).

\624\``But freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances.'' Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).

\625\Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, id., 89-97, is a lengthy critique and review of the ``preferred position'' cases up to that time. The Court has not used the expression in recent years but the worth it attributes to the values of free expression probably approaches the same result. Today, the Court's insistence on a ``compelling state interest'' to justify a governmental decision to classify persons by ``suspect'' categories, such as race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), or to restrict the exercise of a ``fundamental'' interest, such as the right to vote, Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), or the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), clearly imports presumption of unconstitutionality.

Exclusion of Extra-Constitutional Tests. -- Another maxim of constitutional interpretation is that courts are concerned only with the constitutionality of legislation and not with its motives, policy, or wisdom,\626\ or with its concurrence with natural justice, fundamental principles of government, or the spirit of the Constitution.\627\ In various forms this maxim has been repeated to such an extent that it has become trite and has increasingly come to be incorporated in cases in which a finding of unconstitutionality has been made as a reassurance of the Court's limited review. And it should be noted that at times the Court has absorbed natural rights doctrines into the text of the Constitution, so that it was able to reject natural law per se and still partake of its fruits and the same thing is true of the laissez faire principles incorporated in judicial decisions from about 1890 to 1937.\628\

NOTES:

\627\Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Justice Black dissenting). But note above the reference to the ethical mode of constitutional argument.

\628\E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

Presumption of Constitutionality. -- ``It is but a decent respect to the wisdom, integrity, and patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed,'' wrote Justice Bushrod Washington, ``to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the Constitution is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.''\629\ A corollary of this maxim is that if the constitutional question turns upon circumstances, courts will presume the existence of a state of facts which would justify the legislation that is challenged.\630\ It seems apparent, however, that with regard to laws which trench upon First Amendment freedoms and perhaps other rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights such deference is far less than it would be toward statutory regulation of economic matters.\631\

NOTES:

\630\Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1877); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935).

\631\E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 (1967). But see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The development of the ``compelling state interest'' test in certain areas of equal protection litigation also bespeaks less deference to the legislative judgment.

Disallowance by Statutory Interpretation. -- If it is possible to construe a statute so that its validity can be sustained against a constitutional attack, a rule of prudence is that it should be so construed,\632\ even though in some instances this maxim has caused the Court to read a statute in a manner which defeats or impairs the legislative purpose.\633\ Of course, the Court stresses that ``[w]e cannot press statutory construction `to the point of disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional question.''\634\ The maxim is not followed if the provision would survive constitutional attack or if the text is clear.\635\ Closely related to this principle is the maxim that when part of a statute is valid and part is void, the courts will separate the valid from the invalid and save as much as possible.\636\ Statutes today ordinarily expressly provide for separability, but it remains for the courts in the last resort to determine whether the provisions are separable.\637\

NOTES:

\633\E.g., Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924) (narrow construction of Clayton Act contempt provisions to avoid constitutional questions): United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (lobbying act): United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965): Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (both involving conscientious objection statute).

\634\United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)).

\635\Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); but compare id., 204-207 (Justice Blackmun dissenting), and 223-225 (Justice O'Connor dissenting). See also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929-930 (1991).

\636\Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635 (1895); but see Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 685 (1887), now repudiated. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971).

\637\Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-316 (1936). See also, id., 321-324 (Chief Justice Hughes dissenting).

Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law. -- Adherence to precedent ordinarily limits and shapes the approach of courts to decision of a presented question. ``Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.''\638\ Stare decisis is a principle of policy, not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision ``however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.''\639\ The limitation of stare decisis seems to have been progressively weakened since the Court proceeded to correct ``a century of error'' in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.\640\ Since then, more than 200 decisions have seen one or more earlier decisions overturned,\641\ and the merits of stare decisis seems more often celebrated in dissents than in majority opinions.\642\ Of lesser formal effect than outright overruling but with roughly the same result is a Court practice of ``distinguishing'' precedents which often leads to an overturning of the principle enunciated in the case while leaving the actual case more or less alive.\643\

NOTES:

\639\Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 110 (1940) (Justice Frankfurter for Court). See also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 22 (1970) (Chief Justice Burger dissenting). But see id., 19 (Justice Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117-119 (1970) (Justice Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part).

\640\157 U.S. 429, 574-579 (1895).

\641\See Appendix. The list encompasses both constitutional and statutory interpretation decisions. The Court adheres, at least formally, to the principle that stare decisis is a stricter rule for statutory interpretation, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-175 (1989), at least in part since Congress may much more easily revise those decisions, but compare id., 175 n. 1, with id., 190- 205 (Justice Brennan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).

\642\E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 339-340 (1962) (Justice Harlan dissenting): Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 383 (1963) (Justice Harlan dissenting). But see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 195 (1958) (Justice Black dissenting). And compare Justice Harlan's views in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.643, 674-675 (1961) (dissenting), with Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (opinion of the Court).

\643\Notice that in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992), while the Court purported to uphold and retain the ``central meaning'' of Roe v. Wade, it overruled several aspects of that case's requirements. And see, e.g., the Court's treatment of Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904), in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337, n. 7 (1972). And see id., 361 (Justice Blackmun concurring.)

Conclusion. -- The common denominator of all these maxims of prudence is the concept of judicial restraint, of judge's restraint. ``We do not sit,'' said Justice Frankfurter, ``like kadi under a tree, dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency.''\644\ ``[A] jurist is not to innovate at pleasure,'' wrote Jutice Cardozo. ``He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life.''\645\ All Justices will, of course, claim adherence to proper restraint,\646\ but in some cases at least, such as Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the Flag Salute Case,\647\ the practice can be readily observed. The degree, however, of restraint, the degree to which legislative enactments should be subjected to judicial scrutiny, is a matter of uncertain and shifting opinion.

NOTES:

\645\B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: 1921), 141.

\646\Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (Justice Douglas), with id., 507 (Justice Black).

\647\West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (dissenting).

Cases arising under the Constitution are cases that require an interpretation of the Constitution for their correct decision.\648\ They arise when a litigant claims an actual or threatened invasion of his constitutional rights by the enforcement of some act of public authority, usually an act of Congress or of a state legislature, and asks for judicial relief. The clause furnishes the principal textual basis for the implied power of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation and other official acts.

NOTE:

Development of Federal Question Jurisdiction. -- Almost from the beginning, the Convention demonstrated an intent to create ``federal question'' jurisdiction in the federal courts with regard to federal laws;\649\ such cases involving the Constitution and treaties were added fairly late in the Convention as floor amendments.\650\ But when Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, it did not confer general federal question jurisdiction on the inferior federal courts but left litigants to remedies in state courts with appeals to the United States Supreme Court if judgment went against federal constitutional claims.\651\ Although there were a few jurisdictional provisions enacted in the early years,\652\ it was not until the period following the Civil War that Congress, in order to protect newly created federal civil rights and in the flush of nationalist sentiment, first created federal jurisdiction in civil rights cases\653\ and then in 1875 conferred general federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.\654\ Since that time, the trend generally has been toward conferral of ever-increasing grants of jurisdiction to enforce the guarantees recognized and enacted by Congress.\655\

NOTES:

\650\Id., 423-424, 430, 431.

\651\1 Stat. 73. The district courts were given cognizance of ``suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States'' and ``of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. . . .'' Id., 77. Plenary federal question jurisdiction was conferred by the Act of February 13, 1801, Sec. 11, 2 Stat. 92, but this law was repealed by the Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132. On Sec. 25 of the 1789 Act, providing for appeals to the Supreme Court from state court constitutional decisions, see supra, n.582.

\652\Act of April 10, 1790, Sec. 5, 1 Stat. 111, as amended, Act of February 21, 1793, Sec. 6, 1 Stat. 322 (suits relating to patents). Limited removal provisions were also enacted.

\653\Act of April 9, 1866, Sec. 3, 14 Stat, 27; Act of May 31, 1870, Sec. 8, 16 Stat. 142; Act of February 28, 1871, Sec. 15, 16 Stat. 438; Act of April 20, 1871, Sec. Sec. 2, 6, 17 Stat. 14, 15.

\654\Act of March 3, 1875, Sec. 1, 18 Stat. 470, now 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331(a). The classic treatment of the subject and its history is F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, op. cit., n. 12.

\655\For a brief summary, see Hart & Wechsler, op. cit., n.250, 960-966.

When a Case Arises Under. -- The 1875 statute and its present form both speak of civil suits ``arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,''\656\ the language of the Constitution. Thus, many of the early cases relied heavily upon Chief Justice Marshall's construction of the constitutional language to interpret the statutory language.\657\ The result was probably to accept more jurisdiction than Congress had intended to convey.\658\ Later cases take a somewhat more restrictive course.

NOTES:

\657\Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824). See also Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264, 379 (1821).

\658\C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts (St. Paul: 4th ed. 1983), Sec. 17.

Determination whether there is federal question jurisdiction is made on the basis of the plaintiff's pleadings and not upon the response or the facts as they may develop.\659\ Plaintiffs seeking access to federal courts on this ground must set out a federal claim which is ``well-pleaded'' and the claim must be real and substantial and may not be without color of merit.\660\ Plaintiffs may not anticipate that defendants will raise a federal question in answer to the action.\661\ But what exactly must be pleaded to establish a federal question is a matter of considerable uncertainty in many cases. It is no longer the rule that when federal law is an ingredient of the claim, there is a federal question.\662\

NOTES:

\660\Newburyport Water Co. v. City of Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 576 (1904); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 305-308 (1923). If the complaint states a case arising under the Constitution or federal law, federal jurisdiction exists even though on the merits the party may have no federal right. In such a case, the proper course for the court is to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted rather than for want of jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). Of course, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is proper if the federal claim is frivolous or obviously insubstantial. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933).

\661\Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974).

\662\Such was the rule derived from Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824). See Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).

Many suits will present federal questions because a federal law creates the action.\663\ Perhaps Justice Cardozo presented the most understandable line of definition, while cautioning that ``[t]o define broadly and in the abstract `a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States' has hazards [approaching futility].''\664\ ``How and when a case arises `under the Constitution or laws of the United States' has been much considered in the books. Some tests are well established. To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action. . . . The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another. . . . A genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible or conjectural one, must exist with reference thereto. . . .\665\

NOTES:

\664\Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936).

\665\Id., 112-113. Compare Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964): Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).

It was long evident, though the courts were not very specific about it, that the federal question jurisdictional statute is and always was narrower than the constitutional ``arising under'' jurisdictional standard.\666\ Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn was interpreting the Article III language to its utmost extent, but the courts sometimes construed the statute equivalently, with doubtful results.\667\

NOTES:

\667\E.g., Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), and see id., 24 (Chief Justice Waite dissenting).

Removal From State Court to Federal Court. -- A limited right to ``remove'' certain cases from state courts to federal courts was granted to defendants in the Judiciary Act of 1789,\668\ and from then to 1872 Congress enacted several specific removal statutes, most of them prompted by instances of state resistance to the enforcement of federal laws through harassment of federal officers.\669\ The 1875 Act conferring general federal question jurisdiction on the federal courts provided for removal of such cases by either party, subject only to the jurisdictional amount limitation.\670\ The present statute provides for the removal by a defendant of any civil action which could have been brought originally in a federal district court, with no diversity of citizenship required in ``federal question'' cases.\671\ A special civil rights removal statute permits removal of any civil or criminal action by a defendant who is denied or cannot enforce in the state court a right under any law providing for equal civil rights of persons or who is being proceeded against for any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights.\672\

NOTES:

\669\The first was the Act of February 4, 1815, 8, 3 Stat. 198. The series of statutes is briefly reviewed in Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405-406 (1969), and in H. Hart & H. Wechsler, op. cit., n.250, 1192-1194. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1442, 1442a.

\670\Act of March 3, 1875, Sec. 2, 18 Stat. 471. The present pattern of removal jurisdiction was established by the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, as amended, 25 Stat. 433.

\671\28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441.

\672\28 U.S.C. Sec. 1443.

The constitutionality of congressional provisions for removal was challenged and readily sustained. Justice Story analogized removal to a form of exercise of appellate jurisdiction,\673\ and a later Court saw it as an indirect mode of exercising original jurisdiction and upheld its constitutionality.\674\ In Tennessee v. Davis,\675\ which involved a state attempt to prosecute a federal internal revenue agent who had killed a man while seeking to seize an illicit distilling apparatus, the Court invoked the right of the National Government to defend itself against state harassment and restraint. The power to provide for removal was discerned in the necessary and proper clause authorization to Congress to pass laws to carry into execution the powers vested in any other department or officer, here the judiciary.\676\ The judicial power of the United States, said the Court, embraces alike civil and criminal cases arising under the Constitution and laws and the power asserted in civil cases may be asserted in criminal cases. A case arising under the Constitution and laws ``is not merely one where a party comes into court to demand something conferred upon him by the Constitution or by a law or treaty. A case consists of the right of one party as well as the other, and may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law or a treaty of the United States whenever its correct decision depends upon the construction of either. Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right or privilege, or claim or protection, or defence of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted. . . .

NOTES:

\674\Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Whitton's Administrator, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 270 (1872). Removal here was based on diversity of citizenship. See also The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 411, 429-430 (1867); The Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 247 (1868).

\675\100 U.S. 257 (1880).

\676\Id., 263-264.

``The constitutional right of Congress to authorize the removal before trial of civil cases arising under the laws of the United States has long since passed beyond doubt. It was exercised almost contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution, and the power has been in constant use ever since. The Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, was passed by the first Congress, many members of which had assisted in framing the Constitution; and though some doubts were soon after suggested whether cases could be removed from State courts before trial, those doubts soon disappeared.''\677\ The Court has broadly construed the modern version of the removal statute at issue in this case so that it covers all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law.\678\ Other removal statutes, notably the civil rights removal statute, have not been so broadly interpreted.\679\

NOTES:

\678\Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969). See also Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926). Removal by a federal officer must be predicated on the allegation of a colorable federal defense. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989). However, a federal agency is not permitted to remove under the statute's plain meaning. International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991).

\679\Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975).

Corporations Chartered by Congress. -- In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,\680\ Chief Justice Marshall seized upon the authorization for the Bank to sue and be sued as a grant by Congress to the federal courts of jurisdiction in all cases to which the bank was a party.\681\ Consequently, upon enactment of the 1875 law, the door was open to other federally chartered corporations to seek relief in federal courts. This opportunity was made actual when the Court in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases\682\ held that tort actions against railroads with federal charters could be removed to federal courts solely on the basis of federal incorporation. In a series of acts, Congress deprived national banks of the right to sue in federal court solely on the basis of federal incorporation in 1882,\683\ deprived railroads holding federal charters of this right in 1915,\684\ and finally in 1925 removed from federal jurisdiction all suits brought by federally chartered corporations on the sole basis of such incorporation, except where the United States holds at least half of the stock.\685\

NOTES:

\681\The First Bank could not sue because it was not so authorized. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cr. (9 U.S.) 61 (1809). The language, which Marshall interpreted as conveying jurisdiction, was long construed simply to give a party the right to sue and be sued without itself creating jurisdiction,. Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295 (1916), but in American National Red Cross v. S. G., 112 S.Ct. 2465 (1992), a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that when a federal statutory charter expressly mentions the federal courts in its ``sue and be sued'' provision the charter creates original federal-question jurisdiction as well, although a general authorization to sue and be sued in courts of general jurisdiction, including federal courts, without expressly mentioning them, does not confer jurisdiction.

\682\115 U.S. 1 (1885).

\683\Sec. 4, 22 Stat. 162.

\684\Sec. 5, 38 Stat. 803.

\685\See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1349.

Federal Questions Resulting from Special Jurisdictional Grants. -- In the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Congress authorized federal courts to entertain suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements without respect to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties.\686\ Although it is likely that Congress meant no more than that labor unions could be suable in law or equity, in distinction from the usual rule, the Court construed the grant of jurisdiction to be more than procedural and to empower federal courts to apply substantive federal law, divined and fashioned from the policy of national labor laws, in such suits.\687\ State courts are not disabled from hearing actions brought under the section,\688\ but they must apply federal law.\689\ Developments under this section illustrate the substantive importance of many jurisdictional grants and indicate how the workload of the federal courts may be increased by unexpected interpretations of such grants.\690\

NOTES:

\687\Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Earlier the Court had given the section a restricted reading in Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), at least in part because of constitutional doubts that Sec. 301 cases in the absence of diversity of citizenship presented a federal question sufficient for federal jurisdiction. Id., 449-452, 459-461 (opinion of Justice Frankfurter). In Lincoln Mills, supra, the Court resolved this difficulty by ruling that federal law was at issue in Sec. 301 suits and thus cases arising under Sec. 301 presented federal questions. 353 U.S., 457. The particular holding of Westinghouse, that no jurisdiction exists under Sec. 301 for suits to enforce personal rights of employees claiming unpaid wages, was overturned in Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962).

\688\Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).

\689\Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). State law is not, however, to be totally disregarded. ``State law, if compatible with the purpose of Sec. 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.'' Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).

\690\For example, when federal regulatory statutes create new duties without explicitly creating private federal remedies for their violation, the readiness or unreadiness of the federal courts to infer private causes of action