The objectives of the joint congressional inquiry were (1) to reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks, (2) to honor the memories of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks by conducting a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that their families and many Americans have raised, and (3) to lay a basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of the government of the United States of America.

In order to achieve the foregoing objectives the Unitrd States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Com- mittee on Intelligence adopted this INITIAL SCOPE OF JOINT INQUIRY:

Pursuant to section 5(a)(1) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule XI(1)(b) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the two Committees have authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community's activities before and after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The Committees have undertaken this Joint Inquiry pursuant to their responsi- bility to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States government and all other authority vested in the Committees. The purpose of this Joint Inquiry is--

(a) to conduct an investigation into, and study of, all matters that may have
any tendency to reveal the full facts about--

(1) the evolution of the international terrorist threat to the United States,
the response of the United States Government, including that of the In-
telligence Community, to international terrorism, from the creation of the
Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center in 1986 to the
present, and what the Intelligence Community had, has, or should have
learned from all sources of information, including any terrorist attacks, or
attempted ones, about the international terrorist threat to the United States;

(2) what the Intelligence Community knew prior to September 11 about the
scope and nature of any possible attacks against the United States or United
States interests by international terrorists, including by any of the hijackers
or their associates, and what was done with that information;

(3) what the Intelligence Community has learned since the events of Septem-
ber 11 about the persons associated with those events, and whether any of
that information suggests actions that could or should have been taken to
learn of, or prevent, those events;

(4) whether any information developed before or after September 11 indicates
systemic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community from
learning of or preventing the attacks in advance, or that, if remedied, could
help the Intelligence Community identify and prevent such attacks in the
future;

(5) how and to what degree the elements of the Intelligence Community have in-
teracted with each other, as well as other parts of federal, state and local gov-
ernments, with respect to identifying, tracking, assessing, and coping with
international terrorist threats; as well as biological, chemical, radiological, or
nuclear threats, whatever their source (such as the Anthrax attack of 2001);

(6) the ways in which the Intelligence Community's responses to past intelli-
gence problems and challenges, whether or not related to international terror-
ism, have affected its counterterrorism efforts; and

(7) any other information that would enable the Joint Inquiry, and the Commit-
tees in the performance of their continuing responsibilities, to make such rec-
ommendations, including recommendations for new or amended legislation and
any administrative or structural changes, or other actions, as they determine to
be necessary or desirable to improve the ability of the Intelligence Community
to learn of, and prevent, future international terrorist attacks; and